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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This paper is an examination of the career of John W.
Davis as Solicitor General of the United States.

Davis

was the fifteenth individual to hold this office"*" and is
considered by most commentators to be one of the out
standing people to fill the position.

One of the chief

goals in writing this paper is to emphasize the legal
abilities of John W. Davis and the manner in which he used
them to fulfill the duties of his office.

Hopefully,

readers of this paper will no longer think of Davis, if
they think of him at all, as "the darkhorse presidential
candidate who lost to Coolidge in 1924."
The basic assumption of this paper is that Davis was
an important figure in the Wilson administration—a
critical period in American history.

Davis* tenure as

Solicitor General covered an important era in American
history:

first, it was the culmination of the progressive

movement, especially in the first years of the Wilson era;

For a listing of the solicitor generals from the time
the office was created in 1870 until Davis' appointment to
the office, see Appendix G.

and second, it was the beginning of America's rise to
world prominence with its participation in the First World
War.

Both as the government's leading courtroom attorney

and as a politician and administrator, Davis played a key
role in the events of 1913-1# era. This paper examines
the part played by Davis in these events.
There has been only one biography written on John W.
Davis.2

This was the campaign biography for the 1924

election, and it has all the weaknesses associated with
such works. It is short (only 140 pages of biography and
150 pages of speeches by Davis); overly sentimental; un
documented; and, in general, poorly written.
There are several short biographical sketches in
popular periodicals and legal journals, but these are by
their very nature shallow in their treatment of the subject.

Theodore A. Huntley, The Life of John W. Davis (New
York: Duffield and Co., 1924). At the time this paper
was being written Professor William H. Harbaugh of the
University of Virginia was writing a political biography
of Davis.
^"Great Lawyer," Newsweek, XLV (April 4, 1955), 30;
"May It Please the Court," Time, LVII (December 21, 1953)»
1$-19; "Our New Ambassador to England is an Intellectual
Prodigy," Current Opinion, LXV (November, 191$), 294-95;
"Our New President," American Bar Association Journal,
VIII (September, .1.922), 551; and. Edward Grand!son Smith,
"John William Davis, Solicitor-General of the United
States," The Green Bag, XXV (November, 1913), 457-59.

Several reference works also have short articles on Davis
but nothing of any length has been published.^
There have been many works, of course, which deal with
the Wilson administration in general, but an examination of
these will find little on the Office of the Solicitor
General.

The Department of Justice has been the subject

of several books,

but the Office of the Solicitor General

has never been the subject of a full-scale work.

There

have been, however, several monographs and dissertations
dealing with the office, all of which have been useful in

^"See, for example: "Davis, John W.," Current Biography
(New York: H. W. Wilson Co., 1954); "Davis, John William,"
Encyclopedia Britannica, VII, 106; and, "Davis, John W.,"
National Cyclopedia of American Biography, XLV (New York:
James T» White and Co.;, 2 b .
''See, for example: Homer Cummings and Carl McFarland,
Federal Justice: Chapters in the History of Justice and
the Federal Executive (New 'York: teacmillan, 193^7)i Luther
A. Huston, The Department of Justice (New York: Praeger,
1967); and, Albert Langeluttig, The Department of Justice
of the United States (Baltimore! Johns Hopkins Press,
rwrr.

£
the preparation of this paper.

There have also been

several works written which concentrate on the legal
questions that occupied Davis1

attention while he was

Solicitor General. The child labor question,''' civil
d
liberties during World War I, and various other legal
o
questions^ have been covered in book-length works.

£

Charles Fahy, "The Office of Solicitor General,"
American Bar Association Journal, XXVIII (January, 1942),
20-2*}; Simon E. Sobeloff, "Attorney for the Government:
The Work of the Solicitor General's Office," American Bar
Association Journal, XLI (March, 1953)> 229-32; Robert L.
Stern, "The Solicitor General's Office and Administrative
Agency Litigation," American Bar Association Journal,
XLVI (February, I960), 154-58, 2l7-l8; Thomas D. Thacher,
"Genesis and Present Duties of the Office of Solicitor
General," American Bar Association Journal, XVII (August,
1931)» 519-21; William E. Brigman, k'The Office of the
Solicitor General in the United States" (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1966); and
James R. Klonoski, "The Influence of Government Counsel on
Supreme Court Decisions Involving the Commerce Power"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University,
1970).
7
'Raymond
G. Fuller, Child Labor and the Constitution
(New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1923;; and Stephen i3. Wood,
Constitutional Politics in the Progressive Era: Child
Labor and the Law (Chicago: University of Chicago Press),
1968.

d
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United
States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1941)
James R. Mock, Censorship 1917 (Princeton, N. J.: Prince
ton University Press, 1941); and Harry N. Scheiber, The
Wilson Administration and Civil Liberties, 1917-1921
(Ithaca, to. Y.: Cornell University Press, I960).
o
For two examples, see Gabriel Kolko, Railroads and
Regulation, 1877-1916 (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton Univer
sity Pressi 19fc>5); and Melvin I. Urofsky, Big Steel and the
Wilson Administration: A Study in Business-Government fteXa
tions (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, l9t>9).

There is a wealth of information in the legal peri
odicals of the era 1913-1$ covering virtually every aspect
of the legal questions that made up Davis' work.

Those

used in the preparation of this paper are listed, with
annotations, in the bibliography.

While this is not an

exhaustive listing, one could be compiled from the Index
to Legal Periodicals.
The greatest sources of primary material are the
various manuscript collections. The ones used in the
preparation of this paper are listed in the bibliography.
Basically, this paper will concentrate, as the title
indicates, on Davis's career from 1913 to 1918.

There is,

however, a short biographical chapter that discusses his
life up to the time he became Solicitor General in 1913 as
well as a chapter that sketches his career after he left
the office in 191$.
Davis* career as Solicitor General will be examined
from three points of view:

first, the nature of the office

of the Solicitor General of the United States; second,
Davis' major cases before the Supreme Court; and third,
problems arising from America's entrance into World War x.
Each of these subjects will constitute a chapter and will
collectively make up the bulk of this paper.
At this point, appreciation ought to be expressed
for the indispensable assistance rendered by those in
charge of various manuscript collections used in the

preparation of this paper.

These people include Mr. James

D. Walker and Mr. Donald Mosholder of the National Archives,
Washington, D. C.; the staff of the Division of Archives
and Manuscripts, West Virginia University Library; the
Oral History Research Office, Columbia University, New
York, N. Y.; Ms. Judith A. Schiff and her staff at the
Division of Manuscripts and Archives, Sterling Memorial
Library, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.; the staff of
the Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress, Washing
ton, D. C.; and the staff of the Division of Manuscripts,
University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville, Va.
Acknowledgment is due the Sterling Memorial Library,
Yale University, for permission to quote from the John W.
Davis Papers and the Colonel Edward M. House Collection;
for permission by the West Virginia University Library to
quote from their collections; and for permission by the
Oral History Project, Columbia University to quote from
their transcripts.
The Inter-Library Loan Departments of Marshall Univer
sity, Huntington, W. Va.; and West Virginia University,
Morgantown, W. Va., have provided valuable assistance, as
has the staff of the Law Library, West Virginia University
Law School, Morgantown, W. Va.
The staff of the Law Library, Library of Congress, was
extremely helpful, especially in procuring the Supreme

Court Records and Briefs for the period 1913-lS.

The

Microfilm Division of the Library of Congress drew my
attention to some items that might have otherwise been
ignored in addition to providing copies of several
dissertations.
Several individuals have provided assistance, among
them William Davis of the West Virginia Library Commission,
Dr. William H. Harbaugh of the University of Virginia,
Dr. Paul D. Stewart of Marshall University, Dr. Simon D.
Perry of Marshall University, and particularly Dr. Richard
H. Rosswurm of Marshall University.
Financial assistance for the preparation of this
paper was provided

^ by the West Virginia University

Foundation, Inc. The assistance provided by this organi
zation is gratefully acknowledged.
A special note of gratitude is due members of my dis
sertation committee for their assistance, especially the
chairman of the committee, Dr. Royal C. Gilkey, whose
efforts far exceed those normally required of a disserta
tion adviser.
Finally, and most important, a great debt is owed my
wife, Kay, for aid and comfort that she provided during the
preparation of this paper.

CHAPTER II
JOHN W. DAVIS TO 1913
Although this paper deals primarily with Davis'
career as Solicitor General of the United States, it will
be helpful if the reader knows something of his background
prior to assuming this office. This chapter will examine
briefly Davis' life and career prior to his appointment
to the Office of Solicitor General in July, 1913•

I. Family Background
John William Davis was born April 13, 1#73> in Clarksi
burg, West Virginia.
He was the only son and the sixth
child of John James Davis and Anna Kennedy Davis.
2
two of his sisters lived to adulthood.

Only

^Yluch of this chapter is based on "The Reminiscences
of John W. Davis," a part of the Oral History Project of
Columbia University, New York, N. Y. These reminiscences
were the result of a series of interviews that took place
from July 1952 to December 1954* The interviews were origi'
nally recorded on magnetic tape and were later transcribed
into written form. These transcribed interviews are avail
able to scholars on microcards published by the New York
Times Corporation. It should be remembered that this
interview was oral and that quotes from it are sometimes
not so precise or polished as they would be had the inter
view been in written form. The interview will be cited
henceforth as Davis Interview.
^Theodore A. Huntley, The Life of John W. Davis,
(New Yorks Duffield & Co., I924), p« IS.

9

The first of the Davis family to live in the Clarks
burg area was John W. Davis' grandfather, who in 1619 had
brought his father, mother, brother, and sister from the
Shenandoah Valley of Virginia.^

Davis' grandfather estab

lished a saddler's shop in Clarksburg.
John James Davis was bora in 1635•

He received his

early formal education at a local Clarksburg academy.
Although his mother wanted him to go to college, his father
refused to send him.

The reasons for this refusal may have

been in part financial.

The family records do not make

this clear.

John J.'s father did agree, however, to send his son
to a private law school conducted by Judge Brockenborough
in Lexington, Virginia.

He attended this school two years

and in 1656, at the age of 21, was admitted to the bar in
Harrison County, Virginia.
Davis became a leader among those opposed to leaving
the Union when Virginia passed the ordinance of secession
in February 1661. Davis was something of an anomaly in
this instance, for he was a staunch Democrat, and most
individuals of that persuasion living in Virginia were

^At this time, Clarksburg was still part of the state
of Virginia. It was not until June 20, 1663, that West
Virginia became a separate state.

secessionists
Such a position was not taken lightly by some of the
Davis neighbors.

There exists a crudely written letter

in the John J. Davis papers which warns Davis to take care
for his personal safety since he had "desserted our just &
holy cause by upholding John Carlise [another leading Union
supporter from Clarksburg] in his nigger doctrines.
Davis' position on secession was based on his support
of the Union, and did not derive from any strong attachment
to the idea of rights for the blacks.

Although he was a

strong opponent of secession and vras instrumental in the
establishment of the new state of West Virginia, " . . .
when reconstruction came . . ., he was so outraged by it
that he swung violently the other way, and was a combative,
anti-reconstruction Democrat as long as he lived.
When Davis was elected to the House of Representatives
in 1870 for the first of the two terms he was to serve,
he was a vocal opponent of various reconstruction measures.

^In the words of his son, "I don't think he ever voted
anything but the Democratic ticket in his life," Davis
Interview, p. 19.
^Anonymous letter to John J. Davis, 16 August l£62,
John J. Davis Papers, Box 1, West Virginia University.
Davis Interview, p. 16.

He contended that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
were invalid because of the circumstances surrounding
their adoption. He also spoke and vottd against various
civil rights laws.7
Davis was re-elected to Congress in 1#72 in a disputed
election. His right to the seat was upheld by his col
leagues in the House of Representatives.

Among those

speaking in his support was Benjamin F. Butler, the
representative from Massachusetts and the infamous "Beast
g
of New Orleans."
Davis did not stand for re-election to a third term,
in fact he never again ran for public office.

He did,

however, maintain an active interest in local politics,
although he tried to keep his son out of the political
Q
arena.
The elder Davis would try to talk his son out of

^On June 19» 1&74, Davis spoke against pending civil
rights legislation on the floor of the United States House
of Representatives. There is a copy of this speech in the
John J. Davis Papers, Box 1, West Virginia University.
a
Butler received this title because of his alleged
harshness while serving as commander of the occupying
Federal Army in New Orleans during the Civil War.
^Apparently Davis backed the wrong faction in an
intraparty struggle and lost his chance for renomination
at the subsequent party convention. He served as county
chairman, however, for twelve years after he left Congress.
Irving Stone, They Also Ran (Garden City: N. Y.: Doubleday, 1966), p. 3o.

running for political office, but once the younger Davis
was committed to the race, his father became one of his
strongest supporters.1^
John W. Davis' mother was born in Baltimore, Maryland.
She received a degree in literature from Baltimore College
for Women, one of the first females to receive an A.B.
degree. Mrs. Davis was one of the chief molding forces
in her son's life. Not only did he resemble her physically,
but he also inherited much of her emotional temperament.
Her influence was most evident in Davis's early childhood
education.

There was at least one occasion when the elder Davis
did support his son's entry into politics. When a group
of prominent Harrison County Democrats expressed their
support for John J. Davis as a delegate to the 1904 Demo
cratic National Convention, he replied:
While I appreciate the confidence reposed
in me by my Democratic friends from Harrison
County, and their desire to vote for me as a
delegate to the St. Louis Convention—a
compliment of which I am justly proud, cir~
cumstances are such that I must ask them
not to press my name before the convention.
It would be very gratifying to me if the
delegates from Harrison County would select
John W. Davis, as a delegate to that body.
John J. Davis to Harrison County Democratic Delegation, 18
April 1904> Box 1, John J. Davis Papers, West Virginia
University.

II. Early Education
Davis* early education was largely the result of
his mother's teaching. In fact, Davis never attended
any school outside his home until he was 10 years old.
According to Davis:

"Mother was very fond of teaching.

. . . When I came along, here was a fresh piece of teach
able materia-l, ready at her hand. I think she rather
relished the idea of going towards it."11
Davis learned to read at such a tender age that he
had "no recollection at all of being taught to read. It
seems to me that I have been reading ever since I had any
consciousness."12 At the age of eight, Davis started the
study of Latin tutored by his mother; by the time he
entered school outside the home, he was far ahead of his
peers in Latin as well as other academic subjects.
Later in life, many jurists would comment on Davis*
talent for concise statement, either in the written or
spoken word. He attributed this directly to his mother's
training.

As he recalled:
If she called on me to write anything,
she was severely critical. I have memory
of an occasion when my father said to
her, "Now, Anna, you're ruining that boy."

11
Davis Interview, p. 25.
12Ibid.

14

His style was somewhat florid. He liked
figures of speech and adjectives. She
would cut them out. "You're ruining that
boy. He gives you something, and you
peel it down until there's nothing but
the bare bones."
She said, "I want him to be able to say what he
means."

His later speeches and writings would testify

that he learned his lesson well.
The remainder of Davis' education in Clarksburg was
received in a variety of-private situations.

He spent

one term in a private school kept by a Dr. Craig, who
apparently did not meet the approval of the Davis parents.
While attending the Craig school, Davis was placed with
classmates who were much older than he was.
At the end of the term, the elder Davis and others
in the community joined together and hired a teacher for
their children.

This "school," which had about 15 stu

dents, lasted for one term.

Finally, young Davis and

three or four of his peers were sent to a local academy
for girls.

At the end of that term, the decision was made

to send Davis away to school.
age at the time.

He was thirteen years of

While the Davis parents did not always

agree on pedagogical techniques, they did agree that

13Ibid.,

pp. 26-27

their son was not to attend public schools as "[t]hey did
II

not think the teachers were so hot."
Davis was sent to Pantops Academy in Charlottesville,
Virginia, where it was anticipated that he would be pre
pared for entrance into college.

While at Pantops, Davis

had an adequate but not outstanding record.

He remained

at Pantops Academy until he was 16 years old.
After his stay at Pantops Academy, Davis entered
Washington and Lee University in Lexington, Virginia.

He

attended Washington and Lee for three years, receiving a
Bachelor of Arts in literature, summa cum laude, in
1392.15
There is at least one specific instance in which
Davis'

liberal education proved to be of practical use

in his law practice.

Early during his law career in

Clarksburg, Davis was approached by a group of Frenchspeaking Belgian glassmakers who wanted him to draw up a
contract. His knowledge of French so impressed them—he

^Ibid., p. 26.
"^"John W. Davis," Current Biography (New York:
H. W. Wilson & Co., 1954T

was probably the only resident of Clarksburg who spoke
French—that they put him on a permanent retainer.
Ill.

Law Training

After his graduation from Washington and Lee University
with a bachelor's degree, Davis served as a tutor for a
private family. For his services, he received the stun of
twenty-five dollars a month and board.

One of his students

was Julia McDonald, whom Davis married some six years
later.17
Davis served as a tutor for one year.

At the end of

that time he started working in his father's law office.
While working in the office, he "read law," which is to
say, he served as an apprentice lawyer.

The first thing

^In a letter to his sister "Lillie," later Mrs. John
A.Preston, Davis gave his French grades as follows:
Examination

Session

Combination

Grade

93

91

94

1st

Davis to Lillie Davis, 20 January, 1$91> Box 1, Mrs. John
Preston Collection, West Virginia University.
17
'Stone, 0£. cit., p. 324.

17

his father did was have Davis read Blackstone's Commen1$
taries.
Although Davis was fond of his father, he was
somewhat critical of his qualities as a law teacher. The
elder Davis believed that the best way to learn was by
doing, a technique which has definite limitations in
training for the legal profession.
At the end of this year of reading law, Davis borrowed
$300 from his father, added it to his own savings, and
19
entered the law school at Washington and Lee University.
The law school consisted of two instructors and about
fifty students.

The normal course of instruction re

quired two years of study.

There was, however, a short

course which required only one year of work. Davis took
the latter course, spending a total of nine months in the
law school. He finished his program in June, 1S95-

id

William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of
England was a four-volume work that served as the major
link between English and American jurisprudence. From the
time of its publication in 1765-69 until virtually the
beginning of the twentieth century, American lawyers used
these volumes as the basis of their legal training. By
the time Davis read the work, however, it was badly out of
date as far as a practicing lawyer was concerned. Of course,
it was still of significance as a historical account of
English common law.
%n the meantime, Davis had been offered the position
of assistant principal at the Clarksburg high school.
Huntley, 0£. cit., p. 54.

The two instructors during Davis' stay at Washington
and Lee were John Randolph Tucker and Charles A. Graves.
The former concentrated on constitutional law and equity,
the latter in real estate and contracts.

Davis found both

men more than adequate and would later praise both men as
instructors and for teaching the law as it was rather than
20

how it ought to be.

Classes at the law school consisted of lectures and
illustrative cases, along with intensive reading of the
standard texts of the day.

Of course electives had no

place in a nine month course of legal training and the
case method of teaching was some years in the future.
Perhaps the most noteworthy event of Davis* stay at
law school was one of a non-academic nature. Davis had
deposited his cash assets in the Bank of Lexington, re
puted to be the soundest bank in the region.

Without

warning, the bank failed and Davis lost $150 in savings.
This money was to have paid for his expenses until he gradu
ated. Fortunately, the elder Davis was able to come to his
son's assistance. Davis borrowed $150, which if added to
the initial loan of $300 made a total debt of $450, a con21
siderable sum for a new law graduate in the mid-1390's.
20
Davis Interview, p. 34• Davis did not like the trend
found in many law schools to teach a theoretical concept of
law which emphasized its prescriptive nature.
21
Huntley, o£. cit., pp. 54-55.

19

Davis finished his program at Washington and Lee in
1395 and was admitted to the bar of Harrison County the
same year.

Almost immediately, he and his father became

partners, a partnership which would continue until Davis
became Solicitor General in 1913IV.

Law Practice

Davis lost his first three cases and was, in his own
22
words "determined to retire from the bar."
His first
case concerned the possession of a flock of turkeys, the
second involved a cow that had been killed by a train
(Davis won this case but it was overturned in a higher
court because he forgot to ask the jury to assess damages),
1

and the third case involved the sale of a house.

After

this unpromising beginning, Davis told his father: "I'm
going to quit this business. I don't like it.

I want to

be in some business that isn't a fight all the time."

The

elder Davis then gave his son "the damnest lecture I ever
want to hear," indicating that he never wanted to hear those
23
y

sentiments expressed again.

During his first year of practice, Davis made
$493.00.He had not been able to repay the debt he owed

22

Davis Interview, p. 37.

23Ibid.,

pp. 37-41.

2 4 Ibid.,

p. 43.

20

his father, and his prospects were not promising.

At this

juncture, an offer came from the law school at Washington
and Lee University to teach for one year.

The individual

who had been hired died suddenly, and Davis was selected
25

as a "place-filler." ^

Although he was asked to stay on

at the end of his one year appointment, Davis expressed a
desire to return to his law practice with his father.
In the years that followed, Davis built up a large
law practice that included cases of all types.
work before a jury especially challenging.
this interest by saying:

Davis found

He explained

"I think what makes it interesting

to me is the gaudium certaminis—the love of battle, the
joy of battle."^
Davis' large and varied practice included a job as
legal "trouble shooter" for the Baltimore and Ohio Rail
road. This position did not, however, preclude his taking
cases against the B & 0. He also had coal operators as
his clients, as well as miners. He was especially interested
in defending miners accused of violating injunctions in

Ibid. Of this experience Davis said: "I knew little
more than the class before me. There is the best legal
education I ever had—under pressure." (Ibid.).
2 6 Ibid.,

p. 44.
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labor disputes.

Many of the public utilities in Harrison

County had Davis as their attorney.
2$
finger in a good many pies."

As he put it, "I had a

In 1S97t Davis was involved in what would come to be
one of his most famous cases as a private attorney.

During

one of the frequent labor disputes that characterized the
coal mining industry, the firm of Davis and Davis defended
a group of miners who were charged with violating an in
junction against picketing.

The case attracted more atten

tion than usual because of the presence of two controversial
figures in the labor movement—Eugene V. Debs and "Mother"
Jones.
The legendary account of the incident, as related by
Colonel J. C. Johnson of Clarksburg is as follows:
[During] a mine strike in 189# and 1$99 "Mother
Jones',' grizzled warrior for the labor cause, and
Mr. Debs had come here [Clarksburg] to lead the
union miners. The mine owners obtained an in
junction against the strikers, and when Mr. Debs
and the venerable woman refused to abide by it
they were surrounded ... by angry townspeople
and nonunion miners. They were in the midst of
a dangerous swarm. The' Angry mass moved forward

This interest in labor dispute injunctions was made
obvious when Davis assisted in the drafting of the Clayton
Anti-Trust Act of 1914. He was personally responsible for
writing the anti-injunction section of the bill.
otj
Davis Interview, p. 49.

apparently to wreak summary treatment. It
was at this juncture that Mr. Davis, recently
out of Washington and Lee University and
flushed with his first undertaking, mounted a
shabby wagon and delivered an impassioned plea.
He denounced the injunction as high-handed and
against all the institutions of this country
and pleaded that reason take the place of mob
spirit. He was successful in getting the en
dangered strike leaders into safety, and sub
sequently went into court and defended tljftm.
He won. It was his first legal victory. y
Although it is a beautiful story, and one almost wishes it
had occurred, the facts simply do not support Colonel
Johnson's tale.
The actual events appear to have been as follows:
1. On August 16, 1897» James Sloane and
Charles Mackall, coal operators, applied
separately to the United States circuit court
for the District of West Virginia for an
injunction restraining Eugene V. Debs and
others from interfering with the property
of the complainants or their employees. On
the same day, Judge J. J. Jackson granted a
temporary injunction in conformity with
their applications.
2. On August 17, 1897 > Judge Jackson issued
an order requiring the miners to cease march
ing over the road of Harrison County.
3. On August 21, 1897 > Judge Nathan Goff,
who later became United States Senator for
West Virginia, issued an order for the arrest
of twenty-seven men for contempt of court,
and sentenced them to serve three days in the
Harrison County jail at Clarksburg and to pay
the cost in addition.

2^Clinton

York:

W. Gilbert, "You Takes Your Choice" (New
G. P. Putnam's Sons, ±yrAk)f pp. 70-71.
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4. On the same day, a demurrer to the in
junction order of Judge Jackson was filed
in behalf of twelve of the men so arrested.
Winfield Scott and the firm of Davis and
Davis appear as counsel for the men. Inter
lineations in the handwriting of John W.
Davis prove that he took an active part in
the preparation of the case and indicate
that he personally wrote the demurrer. Debs*
name does not appear in the demurrer . . .
5. Three months later, on November 23,
1S97, the cases having meanwhile been joined,
all were dismissed and the injunctions made
permanent.30
There is no evidence that "Mother" Jones was involved
in the case. She was, however, active in the West Virginia
31
coal fields during this period.
V.

Entry Into Politics

Soon after he returned to Clarksburg from law school,
Davis was nominated by the Harrison County Democratic con
vention as a candidate for the House of Delegates, the
"i2

lower house of the West Virginia state legislature.-^

^Huntley, <o£. cit., pp. $0-Sl. Davis1 participation
in this case is confirmed by William Harbaugh in "The
Papers of John W. Davis," Yale University Gazette, XXXVII
(July, 1962), 14.
•^Huntley, op. cit., p. 79. Davis made no mention of
the case in the Davis Interview.
•^Davis was opposed to the primary election as a
means of choosing candidates for public office. He noted
that "In those days [1396] we used to nominate candidates
for office by conventions—which I wish to God we had never
abandoned." Davis Interview, p. 58.

Davis, who was nominated against his will, was elected
in the ensuing general election.

He attributed his elec

tion to a split in the Republican party and the good will
that his father had built up over the years.

Taking

office in January, 1#99, he was selected chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee and Democratic Majority Leader.^
At the end of his term he refused to run for re-election.-^

^"Our New President," American Bar Association
Journal, VIII (September, 19&2), 55l.
^From all accounts, Davis handled himself well in his
initial political post. An example of the esteem he gained
from his peers in the legislature is illustrated by the
following letter:
Dear Mr. [John J,] Davis:
In view of my high personal esteem for
you, I cannot refrain from writing you that
it gives me delight and unfeigned pleasure to
say that your son John W. has won the admira
tion and esteem of all the members of the
Legislature, the attaches and the general pub
lic, in his able, manly course as a member of
the Legislature and the leader of the Demo
cratic side of the House. He has shown that
he possesses the courage of his convictions,
and does not hesitate to express them in a
straightforward, able and fearless manner,
giving undoubted evidence that he is a
logical, forcible and conclusive speaker, and
has impressed his fellow-members with his
purity and integrity as a man. He is indeed
a worthy son and a brilliant future awaits
him.
Holly G. Armstrong, House of Delegates, Charleston, W. Va.
to John J. Davis, 24 February, 1399, Box 1, John J. Davis
Papers, West Virginia University.

In the years following his service in the state
legislature, Davis was active in Democratic party affairs.
In 1900, he was one of the candidates on the Democratic
ticket for presidential elector.

The Republican ticket

of McKinley and Roosevelt carried West Virginia, and Davis
did not have the opportunity to cast his vote for Bryan
and Stevenson. In 1904, Davis was a delegate to the
national Democratic convention in St. Louis.

This con

vention selected Alton B. Parker of New York as the presi
dential nominee and Senator Henry G. Davis of West Virginia
as their nominee for the office of vice president.
Davis' stature in his profession was recognized by
his peers in 1906 when he was elected president of the
West Virginia Bar Association.

His presidential address
35
was entitled "The Growth of the Commerce Clause.
In July, 1910, the Democratic congressional convention
met in Wheeling to select a candidate for the First Con
gressional District of West Virginia.

The district, of

which Harrison County was a part, had not sent a Demo
cratic congressman to Washington since the 1S94 election.
The Democratic party was, however, in the ascendancy in

•^The address was delivered at Elkins, West Virginia,
December 27, 1906. There is a printed copy of the speech
in Box 6, Mrs. John Preston Collection, West Virginia
University.

West Virginia in 1910; and many party leaders were opti
mistic about their chances of electing a Congressman in
the First District.

When party leaders talked of a

strong candidate for the post, the name of Davis often
entered into the conversation. Davis stated emphatically
that he did not want the nomination. He carefully outlined
his position in a letter to a newspaper editor:
Years ago I thought I had put behind me for
all time any political ambition and I was
firmly resolved never to permit myself to
become a candidate again, but to devote
instead all of my time and energy to the
practice of law. I have followed this
resolution pretty strictly and whatever
part I have taken in politics has been done
without any eye to my personal advancement
but solely because of my attachment to
Democratic principles; which is all I really
want for the future. To leave my practice
just at this time would be a great sacrifice,
one, however, which I might make if I had
only myself to consider, which under the
circumstances I am hardly in the position
to do.
I agree hardily with what you say about
the relative value of money and do not want
to spend my life in the pursuit of the
almighty dollar. I should like, however,
before taking up other lines to feel that
the future of not only myself but of those
dependent on me was not imperiled by any
course I might adopt. These are the con
siderations which have led me to decline

^ The election of 1910 resulted in the Democrats
capturing four of the five Congressional seats in West
Virginia. Prior to this election Republicans had filled
all five seats.

to permit my name to be used in connection
with this nomination ... .37
The elder Davis was strongly opposed to any attempt
to nominate his son.^ Davis attended the Wheeling con
vention, in part to prevent any draft in his absence.
The party leaders insisted, however, that Davis accept the
nomination. Davis wired his father for advice, and his
father answered:

"Do not yield to solicitations. Stand

firm on declination."

To emphasize his position, the elder

Davis sent a second wire saying: "Say no and be firm."
Davis, however, never received the telegrams.

One of his

supporters intercepted the messages and showed them to
39

Davis only after he had been nominated by acclamation.^7
Although Davis and the Democrats were optimistic
about his chances of victory, Davis was pragmatic enough

to realize that he would have to campaign vigorously if he
expected to win.

He organized the counties of the district

through the county committees, something that previous

•^Davis to Walter Stewart [Stuart], 6 July, 1910,
Folder 1, Walter Stuart Papers, West Virginia University.
In later years, Davis noted that he ". . . was just getting
into a fairly renumerative practice and wanted to continue."
Davis Interview, p. 59.
id
•' Davis Interview, p. 60.
•^Huntley, o£. cit., pp. 65-69.

Democratic candidates had not done in the First District.
He spoke in all sections of the district, concentrating
on the tariff question.^

Davis won the election by a mar

gin of about 3>000 votes out of 55»000 cast.^
VI. Service In Congress
Davis could not have selected a more opportune time
to enter the House of Representatives as a freshman Demo
cratic legislator.

The Democratic trend that had seen the

Republicans lose four House seats in West Virginia was
reflected throughout the United States.

Whereas the

Republicans had enjoyed a 219-172 majority in the House of
Representatives in the Sixty-first Congress (1909-1911),
the Sixty-second Congress found the Democrats in the
majority by a margin of 22&-161.
Davis, who had been Chairman of the Judiciary Committee
when he served in the West Virginia state legislature, was

^ The tariff in question was the Payne-Aldrich Tariff
of 1909f a strongly protective measure which was opposed
by progressive elements in both the Republican and Demo
cratic parties. It was an important issue in both the
1910 and 1912 elections. See Kenneth W. Hechler,
Insurgency: Personalities and Politics of the Taft Era
(foew York: Russell and Russell, lybl+); and Wilfred E.
Binkley, American Political Parties: Their Natural His
tory (4th ed.; toew 'York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962J for a
discussion of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff as a campaign issue.

^Davis Interview, p. 61.
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given a place on this prestigious and powerful committee
in the House of Representatives.

Committee assignments

were made by the Ways and Means Committee, which was
chaired by Oscar Underwood of Alabama.

The assignment of

a freshman legislator to such an important committee (which
Davis ranked only behind the Ways and Means Committee and
the Appropriations Committee) was in part due to pressure
placed on Underwood by members of the Judiciary Committee
whom Davis had known before the election,^2 and in part due
to the attention gained by his carrying a traditionally
Republican district
During the Sixty-second Congress, Davis did important
work on the Clayton Anti-Trust Act. He drafted that sec
tion of the bill which attempted to eliminate the abuse of
injunctions in labor disputes.^ In keeping with his
emphasis on the issue during his campaign for Congress,

^2Huntley, o£. cit., p. 64.
^Davis Interview, p. 71.
^William H. Harbaugh, The Life and Times of Theodore
Roosevelt (rev. ed.; New York: Collier Books, 19&3)> P*
39^. TF"should be noted that injunctions were not out
lawed by the Clayton Act. This was done, however, for
all practical purposes by the Norris-LaGuardia Act of
1932 (an act which Davis opposed). Davis Interview, p.
80.

0

Davis spoke out on the Payne-Aldrich Tariff.^

He was

also active in the attempt to reform federal judicial
procedures.^
Davis received considerable publicity for the part he
played in two judicial roles for the House of Representa
tives.

The first case involved an incident in which a

member of the House, Representative Thetus W. Sims of
Tennessee, was publicly assaulted by a prominent Washington
banker, Charles C. Glover. Davis functioned as a prosecutor
for the House of Representatives in the case, the result
being that Glover "was arrested and brought before the bar
of the House of Representatives for contempt

^'For his position in opposition to the rates on wool
as imposed by the Payne-Aldrich Tariff, see "The Wool
Schedule," a speech given by Davis in the House of
Representatives on June 16, 1911, of which there is a
copy in Box 6, Mrs. John Preston Collection, West Virginia
University.
^See United States Congress, House, Committee on the
Judiciary, Judicial Procedure of United States Courts.
A report by John W. Davis of West Virginia, tWashington:
Government Printing Office, 1912).
^Huntley, ojo. cit., p. 86. See also United States
Congress, House, Select Committee on Assault upon Rep
resentative Sims, In the Case of Charles C. Glover for
Assault upon Rep. T. W. Sims. Report by John W. Davis of
West Virginia. (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1913).
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The second case, and the more important of the two,
involved the impeachment and trial of Judge Robert W.
Archbald of the Commerce Court.

Davis served as one of

the House managers both during impeachment and the trial
id
before the Senate.
Archbald, who was a United States circuit court judge
sitting as a member of the Commerce Court, was impeached
on thirteen counts of illegally using his office for
personal gain.

The specific charges contended that he had

speculated in land owned by corporations who were litigants
before his court.

Archbald did not deny the facts of the

indictment; but he did, however, contend that they did not
constitute "high crimes and misdemeanors" within the mean
ing of Article II, Section 4 of the United States
Constitution.
Davis attacked Archbald's defense by saying that
a Federal judge holds office during life
and "good behavior," and that an obvious
departure from "good behavior" in office

^ For a detailed account of this affair, see John D.
Feerick, "Impeaching Federal Judges: A Study of Consti
tutional Provisions," Fordham Law Review, XXXIX (October,
1970), 1-5#. See also "Argument of toon. John W. Davis,
One of the Managers of the House of Representatives before
the Senate . . . [on] the Impeachment of Judge Robert W.
Archbald, January 9, 1913." A copy of this argument is
in Box 6, Mrs. John Preston Collection, West Virginia
University.
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is in fact a "high crime and misdemeanor."
Even if Archbald's conduct were not
criminal in the accepted sense, it was
highly improper and calculated to destroy
public confidence in the courts ... in
that no judge who speculated in the prop
erties of persons or corporations which
,g
came before him for judgment could be
considered an impartial judicial officer. "
The Senate found Archbald guilty on five of the thir
teen counts in the indictment. Davis recalled "the way
Senator LaFollette of Wisconsin hissed out, "Guilty!'"
when the roll was called in the Senate.

Archbald's fate

was sealed when Senator Elihu Root, "who had great respect
5o
from both parties" voted "guilty."^

^Huntley, 0£. cit. pp. 87-88* See Carl Brent Swisher,
American Constitutional Development (2d ed.; Cambridge,
Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1954;» pp. 537-40 for the history
of the Commerce Court. The essential purpose of the
Commerce Court, which was established as part of the MannElkins Act of June 18, 1910, was to centralize juris
diction in cases arising from Interstate Commerce Commission
orders and from cases involving the enforcement of the
Interstate Commerce Act. Opposition to the establishment
of the court was strong, especially among the progressives
who saw it as a private court for the railroad industry.
An attempt was made in 1911 by Congress to abolish the
court by means of a rider on an appropriations bill. Presi
dent Taft, a strong supporter of the court, vetoed the
measure and Congress was unable to overturn the veto.
In 1912, the Democrats gained control of the Senate
(they had gained control of the lower house in 1910) and
elected a president, costing the court most of its support.
Its existence was terminated on December 31, 1913• Arch
bald's impeachment and conviction weakened the court at a
time when it was already under attack. That the Commerce
Court was under such heavy fire causes one to wonder if the
impeachment of Archbald was not politically motivated.

^Davis Interview, p. 8 3 ,

Davis ran for re-election in 1912. Although he was
not a delegate, he attended the national convention where
his favorite candidate for the presidential nomination was
c. i
Champ Clark.
Davis, unlike the national ticket of Wilson
and Marshall, did not benefit from the RepublicanProgressive ("Bull Moose") split, for his opponent in the
First Congressional District ran on both the Republican
and Progressive tickets. Davis won re-election by 14#
votes.^
The capture of the executive department by the Demo
cratic party in the election of 1912 resulted in new
problems for Congressman Davis.

51Ibid.,

Although he had too

p. 76.

^In July of 1913» Davis told Speaker of the House
Champ Clark that the President had offered him the position
of Solicitor General. The following exchange took place
between Davis and Clark:
"Davis, you gonna take that job upstreet?"
"I think I will, Mr. Speaker."
"Great mistake. Great mistake, you ought to
stay in the House."
Well, he didn't know [related Davis], but when
you've dropped from a 3»000 plurality to 14#t
staying in the House didn't look so hot.

Ibid., p. 64.
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little seniority to be able to distribute very many jobs,
the pressure of Democratic job-seekers became "so bad I
had to quit going to my office because of the visiting
hungry Democrats who wanted to get influence .... It
was terrible.Davis, who did not care for the political
aspects of his Congressional office, felt that one way out
of his dilemma was to secure an appointment to the federal
bench.
A vacancy occured in the Fourth Judicial Circuit,
which included West Virginia, when Judge Nathan Goff, also
a Clarksburg native, resigned to accept a seat in the
Senate. Davis, who "was hell-bent in those days to go to
the bench,made a strong effort to obtain an appointment
to that position.
Davis' efforts to get the appointment were summarized
in a letter to his sister:
Judge [Nathan] Goff took a round with the
Atty.-Genl. and the President in person
on Monday; Speaker [Champ] Clark and a
delegation of congressmen have been to
both places and I have filed sufficient
testimonials to choke the proverbial cow.
There remains little to do but "wait and
see." One thing however becomes clearer
to me all the time, and that is that I

53Ibid.,

p. 75.

54Ibid.,

p. 35.

want the job. I was at the White House
myself this morning (with Uncle Henry G.
[Davis] and Sen. [Charles J.] Faulkner)
to invite the President to attend the
semi-centennial at Wheeling—which of
course he will not do; but he told Goff
he would like to have a look at me, and
so I gave him the chance.55
Davis' candidacy for the position received virtually
unanimous bi-partisan support from his colleagues in
Congress.

He did not, however, have the support of the

one individual who counted most, the President.

Wilson

appointed Charles Wood of South Carolina to the post, an
individual characterized by Davis as "a very worthy man."

^Davis to Mrs. John Preston, 27 March, 1913> Box
Mrs. John Preston Collection, West Virginia University.
Henry G. Davis was a former senator from West Virginia as
well as the Vice Presidential nominee on the Democratic
ticket in 1904. Charles J. Faulkner was also a former
Democratic senator from West Virginia.
^Davis Interview, p. 8 6 .
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His failure to receive the position "was a sore disappoint
ment to Davis, one of the major disappointments of his
life."57
Although his failure to become a circuit judge was a
bitter disappointment for Davis, the incident was not with
out its positive effect.

During his "campaign" for the

position, Davis' name had been brought to the attention of
the President and the Attorney General in a favorable way.
When President Wilson decided to replace Solicitor General
William Bullitt (who had been appointed by President
Taft), Attorney General McEeynolds suggested to the Presi
dent that Davis be offered the post.

Wilson approved of

^Stone, o£. cit., p. 327. The affair did not end
with the appointment of Wood to the post in question.
Some of Davis' friends in Congress introduced a bill which
would have created a new judgeship in the Fourth Circuit,
the understanding being that Davis would be appointed to
fill the newly created post. The bill was placed on the
unanimous consent calendar, where a single objection was
sufficient to defeat the measure. Davis related the events
leading up to its defeat as follows:
When the bill was called the Republican
leader, Jim Mann, rose and objected. He said
he understood the purpose of the bill. He
had no personal objection whatever to the
prospective appointee under it but didn't
believe in creating positions to be filled
by prospective individuals. He objected.
He did me the greatest service of my life.
No man has ever done more. I'd have gone
on that bench just as sure as God made
little apples if that bill had passed.

Davis Interview, p. 36.
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McReynolds* suggestion; and on July 23, 1913» the President
appointed Davis as the fifteenth solicitor general of the
United States.
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CHAPTER III
THE OFFICE OF SOLICITOR GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES
This chapter will examine the nature of the Office
of the Solicitor General of the United States, with
particular emphasis on its historical development and its
relationship to other branches within the Justice Depart
ment.
The internal organization of the Office of Solicitor
General, as it existed in the years 1913-1#> will be
discussed with special attention given to the division of
labor among the several Assistant Attorneys General working
within the Solicitor General's office.
The duties of the Solicitor General will be dealt
with in the third part of this chapter.

Although he is

usually thought of as the government's representative before
the Supreme Court of the United States—and this is, of
course, one of his major duties—it will be shown that the
Solicitor General's duties were much wider in scope.

Both

statutory provisions and informal delegation of powers by
the Attorney General have resulted in considerable accumu
lation of powers and duties for the Solicitor General.
The Solicitor General's most important function while
Davis held the office was then, as it is today, the
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representation of the government in cases before the
Supreme Court of the United States.

The fourth part of

this chapter will discuss in detail Davis' activities be
fore this body.
Finally, this chapter will concern itself with Davis*
non-court activities and with his involvement in discussions
concerning possible appointments to various other positions
within the Wilson Administration.
I. The Historical Development
of the Office of Solicitor General
There have been several books and articles and at
least one dissertation that have examined the historical
development of the Office of Solicitor General of the
1
United States.
Although it is outside the scope of this

See the following works for a more detailed examination
of the historical development of the Office of Solicitor
Generalt Homer Cummings and Carl McFarland, Federal Justice;
Chapters in the History of Justice and the Federal Executive
(toew York: Macmillan, 1937); Luther A. Huston, The PeparlT^""
merit of Justice (New York: Praeger, 1967); Albert Langeluttig, The Department of Justice of the United States
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, I9b7); Charles Fahy, "The
Office of Solicitor General," American Bar Association
Journal, XXVIII (January, 1942), 20-22; Sewall Key, "The
tegal Work of the Federal Government," Virginia Law Review,
XXV (December, 193#)t 165-201; Simon E. Sooeloff, "Attorney
for the Government: The Work of the Solicitor General's
Office," American Bar Association Journal. XLI (March, 1953),
229-32; and Thomas D. Thacher, "Genesis and Present Duties of
the Office of Solicitor General," American Bar Association
Journal. XVII (August, 193l)> 519-21. A doctoral dissertation
by William E. Brigman, "The Office of the Solicitor General
in the United States" (University of North Carolina, 1966),
is concerned with the decision-making process within the
Office of the Solicitor General but contains information on
the historical development of the office.

paper to make a detailed study of this aspect of the Office
of Solicitor General, it is necessary to discuss in broad
terms the development of the office from the time of its
creation through the period in which Davis filled the
position.

To avoid confusion, it will also be necessary to

note how the Office of Solicitor General during Davis*
tenure differs from the office as it exists today.
The Office of Solicitor General owes its existence to
an 1870 statute which established the Department of Justice.
In IS67, the Attorney General, in response to a Congres
sional inquiry, observed that his office, as it was then
organized, could handle the administrative work asked of
it. Yet, he felt that additional aid was needed to prepare
arguments for Supreme Court cases, as well as someone to
represent the United States before the Court.

To fulfill

these duties, and to assist the Attorney General in the
preparation of opinions, it was suggested that a Solicitor
3

General be appointed.

There was a well-established

precedent for this office for "in England there was an

p

An Act to Establish the Department of Justice, June
22, 1^70. See Appendix B for the sections of the Act
relating to the Office of Solicitor General.
^Charles Fahy, "The Office of Solicitor General,"
American Bar Association Journal, XXVIII (January, 1942),
7TT.
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office of the Crown called the Solicitor General, first
created by Letters Patent in 1461, and upon whom devolved
the duties of the Attorney General in case of a vacancy."^
The Act of 1870 required that the Solicitor General
be "an officer learned in the law," who was to assist the
Attorney General and who would serve as his second-incommand. The statute further required that in case the
Office of Attorney General was vacant, or in event of the
Attorney General's absence, the Solicitor General would
c
have the power to "exercise all the duties of that office."-'
The court duties of the Solicitor General were
established in Sec. 5 of the Act of June 22, 1$70. This
section stated that the Solicitor General could be required
to represent the United States in any court at any level,
state or federal.

An individual who served as Solicitor

General has noted:
The assignment of duty, and the delegation
of responsibility to the Solicitor General
[under the provisions of the Act of June 22,
I870], was left to the Attorney-General, as
the head of the Department. But in the
congressional debates it is quite clear that
the reason for the creation of this new
office was to do away with the necessity

4Ibid.
5Sec.

2, Act of June 22, 1370
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for employing special counsel to represent
the interests of the United States in cases
arising not merely at the seat of Govern
ment but throughout the entire country.6
The Act further provided that the Solicitor General
be appointed by the President, with the advice and consent
of the Senate, at an annual salary of $7,500.
The Solicitor General's greatest source of power,
the concentration of all the federal governments liti
gation within his office, was developed over a period of
time.

Under the provisions of the Act of June 22, 1870,

the solicitors of the State Department, Naval Department,
Department of Internal Revenue, and Treasury Department
were transferred to the Justice Department.

Although these

solicitors, and those subsequently created, were under the
nominal authority of the Attorney General, they retained a
considerable amount of independence.

£

Thomas D. Thacher, "Genesis and Present Duties of
the Office of Solicitor General," American Bar Association
Journal, XVII (August, 1931), 520. In the same article,
Thacher asserts that "... those duties which have been
delegated to the Solicitor General are of a purely pro
fessional character, involving no administrative or politi
cal responsibility vrtiatsoever." (Ibid., pp. 520-21).
While this may have been true when Thacher wrote his
article, and while it may be true today, it will be shown
later in this paper that many of Davis' duties were purely
administrative or political in nature.
^Secs. 9-10, Act of June 22, 1870. By 1913> the salary
had increased to $10,000 a year. It remained at that level
during Davis' tenure in office.
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By 1913 this independence of the solicitors
and resulting division of control had become
so marked that Attorney General McReynolds
recommended to Congress that the misleading
titles of Assistant Attorneys of the Post
Office and Interior Departments be abolished
and that those officers be called solicitors.
This was immediately done. Therefore we
find in existence solicitors for each of the
State, Treasury, Interior, Commerce, Labor,
Agriculture, Navy, and Post Office Depart
ments, and a Solicitor of Internal Revenue,
all actually if not theoretically^independent of the Department of Justice.8
Later, however, the departmental solicitors were re
turned to their respective departments and their control
9

over litigation was eliminated by statute.

In 1933» an

executive order transferred all control over litigation to
the Justice Department.^
A major result of the gradual concentration of the
control over litigation in the Office of the Solicitor
General has been his virtual absolute control over the
appeal of Federal cases.

Brigman noted this in his study,

observing:

g
Sewall Key, "The Legal Work of the Federal Govern
ment," Virginia Law Review, XXV (December, 193#)» 1#9.
% U. S. C. 297.
"^William E. Brigman, "The Office of the Solicitor
General in the United States (unpublished Ph.D. disser
tation, University of North Carolina, 1966), pp. 23-24.
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The specialization by the Solicitor
General in Supreme Court practice, coupled
with the incorporation of the departmental
legal officers into the Department of
Justice, has resulted in almost total con
trol of appellate matters by the Solicitor
General. There are occasions when the
Attorney General, or even the President,
takes an active part in the decision to
appeal, but this is very rare.11
Thus, the Solicitor General in effect decides to a
large extent the type of questions which will come before
the Supreme Court, and, as noted by a former Solicitor
General, "he must therefore address himself to the inquiry,
'what kinds of legal problems does the Court wish to
entertain?'
As one would expect, most Solicitors General develop
a special working relationship with the Supreme Court.

As

one commentator observed, there have been some outstanding
Solicitors General—he includes Davis in this group-—and
that even when the Solicitor General is not an especially
competent individual,
the office staff has usually been good.
The citizen may be represented by a virtual
novice in Supreme Court practice, the
government by a pro who may do nothing
else. As a result, the government has an
immense edge in litigation.

1:LIbid.,

IP

pp. 24-25.

Simon E. Sobeloff, "Attorney for the Government:
Work of the Solicitor General's Office," American Bar
Association Journal, XLI (March, 1953)* 23TI

The
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This is true in the presentation of
oral arguments, but it is even more true
in the presentation of written briefs
.... In the briefs, which are the
written detailed arguments of both sides
submitted in advance of the oral argu
ment, the difference can be enormous. In
hundreds of cases each year the private
litigant is represented by a lawyer whose
brief reveals that he has no notion at
all of the requisites of Supreme Court
litigation or of what is and what is
not persuasive to the Court to which
the brief is addressed. These are the
cases that never get to argument be
cause by its preliminary order the Court
disposes of them; and in such cases the
government wins very frequently because
of the weight of its experience. 1 3
Because of his power to control to a large degree the
flow of cases through the appellate courts, H[t]he Solicitor
General . . . is in a much better position than are pri
vate counsel to pick and choose the time, place, and
circumstances under which he will push a policy issue to
decision by the Supreme Court."1^

The policymaking impli

cations of this power are obvious.
II.

The Organization of the
Department of Justice

In 1913, the Justice Department was headed, as it is
today, by the Attorney General of the United States.

He

"^John P. Frank, Marble Palace: The Supreme Court in
American Life (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1958), pp. 94-9^.
^Glendon A. Schubert, Judicial Policy-Making (Glenview,
111.: Scott, Foresman, I965J, p.
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is appointed by the President, with the advice and consent
of the Senate, and serves at the pleasure of the President.1'*
The second-in-command within the Justice Department
was the Solicitor General.

His statutory duties, which were

discussed earlier in this chapter, have changed somewhat
since 1913» the most significant change being the removal
of his administrative tasks.

No longer is he charged with

running the Justice Department in the absence of the Attorney
General, and no longer is he the second-in-command.1^

15
-"'The Attorney General is the head of the Department
of Justice and the chief law officer of the Goveraient. He
represents the United States in matters involving legal
questions; he gives his advice and opinion when they are
required by the President or by the heads of other executive
departments on questions of law arising in the administration
of their respective departments; he appears in the Supreme
Court of the United States in cases of especial gravity and
importance; he exercises a general superintendence and
direction over United States Attorneys and marshals in all
judicial districts in the States and Territories, and he
provides special counsel for the United States whenever
required by any department of the Government." United
States Department of Justice, Register of the Department of
Justice and the Courts of the United States (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1914)f p. 25. This and subse
quent editions of the Register are invaluable for an under
standing of the internal operation and general organization
of the Justice Department.

^There now exists a Deputy Attorney General to assist
the Attorney General in administrative matters and to fill
the office in the absence of the Attorney General. This
change has resulted in a lower profile for the Office of
the Solicitor General. For a detailed description of this
office, see United States General Services Administration,
United States Government Organization Manual, 1969-70
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 19o9), pp.
190-92.
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An Assistant to the Attorney General was appointed in
1913 who had "special charge of all suits and other matters
arising under the Federal antitrust and interstate commerce
17

laws . . . . " '

He functioned as the third-in-command

within the Justice Department.
In 1914» a Special Assistant to the Attorney General
was appointed to handle rate regulation cases arising from
the interstate commerce laws.

This officer reduced the

work load of the Assistant to the Attorney General, who
henceforth devoted his time to anti-trust cases and
administrative details within the Justice Department.

The

Special Assistant to the Attorney General worked out of
id

the Office of the Solicitor General.

i

Most of the legal work done within the Justice Depart19

ment was done by the Assistant Attorneys General.

These

^United States Department of Justice, loc. cit.
id
A second Special Assistant to the Attorney General
was appointed in 1917 whose sole area of interest was warrelated legal problems. The origins of this office and its
functions will be discussed in detail in Chapter V.
"^This does not include various legal officers of other
departments who were originally located within the Justice
Department. During the early years of the Wilson Adminis
tration, these officials were transferred to their respec
tive departments. In 1913, there was an Assistant Attorney
General for the Interior Department and Solicitors for the
Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce, and Labor. There
was also a separate Solicitor for Internal Revenue. Regard
less of the location of these legal officers, the Solicitor
General was, with a few minor exceptions, in charge of all
the government's cases before the Supreme Court.
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officers had their work divided among them according to a
20

functional division by subject.

They served directly

under the supervision of the Solicitor General.

He assigned

them the cases that they were to represent before the
Supreme Court, almost always remaining within the boun
daries of their subject areas mentioned above.
All the Assistant Attorneys General were stationed
in Washington with the exception of one "in charge of the
interests of Government in all matters of reapprisment
and classification of imported goods in litigation before
the several boards of United States General Appraisers
21
and the Court of Customs Appeals . . . ."
He was sta
tioned in New York City.
There were, of course, many other officials of
varying degrees of importance located within the Justice
22
Department.
Among these officials was the Chief of the

OA

See Appendix D for division of duties.

^United States Department of Justice, o£. cit., p. 26.
22

See Appendix D for a tabular listing of the key
officials within the Justice Department from 1913-1#•
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2*5
Division of Investigation. J

His division was the fore

runner of the present-day Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Although this division was an important agency for the
enforcement of federal laws, it was a small operation and
relatively ineffective. Its priority within the Justice
Department's hierarchy is illustrated by the low salary
paid its Chief—only $3,500 a year, which was slightly
more than the general office help.

The division increased

both its duties and size when World War I began, especially
after the country's entry into the conflict in April,
1917.24

2%is

duties were as follows;
The Chief of the Division of Investi
gation has general supervision of the
examination of the offices and records of
the Federal court officials throughout the
United States, and directs the work of all
the examiners, special agents, and accoun
tants of the department, whose compensation
or expenses are paid from the appropriation
•Detection and prosecution of crimes,' and
who are employed for the purpose of collect
ing evidence or of making investigations or
examinations of any kind for this department
or the officers thereof.

United States Department of Justice, 0£. cit., p. 28.
^^Until such time as the records of the Bureau of Inves
tigation are opened to researchers, the activities of the
Department of Justice in the area of enforcement remain to
a large degree based on secondary sources or conjecture.
Although the records are fifty-five years old for the
period covered by this study, they are screened at the
National Archives for material relating to the Bureau of
Investigation before their release to researchers.

III.

ATTORNEY GENERAL

JAMES CLARK MCREYNOLDS
President Wilson's first choice for Attorney General
was A. Mitchell Palmer, but political pressures forced him

to look elsewhere.2^

His second choice for the post was

James Clark McReynolds, a Tennessee lawyer practicing in
New York.

Colonel House, one of Wilson's closest advisors

concurred with the President's choice, for
House considered McReynolds a progressive;
in fact, he believed him to be somewhat
radical. House's opinion . . . was based
largely on the fact that McReynolds, as
an Assistant Attorney-General in the Taft
Administration, had carried on the govern
ment's prosecution against the tobacco
monopoly.26

In the short time McReynolds held the office of
Attorney General (March 5, 1913 to August 29, 1914), he
had an impressive record in the antitrust field.

Among

^William G. McAdoo, Crowded Years: The Reminiscences of William McAdoo (Boston: Houghton Mif±Jlin, 1931)
p. 153. Others, however, contend that another individual
was Wilson's first choice for the job:
Brandeis, in fact, had been Wilson's first
choice for the office of Attorney General,
but ... he had been talked out of the
idea.
William F. Swindler. Court and Constitution in the
Twentieth Century: The Old Legality, 1589-19;J2 (Indian
apolis, Inc.: J3obbs-Merrill, I9W, p. 171.

^McAdoo, loc. cit.
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his accomplishments in this area were
the decree requiring the American Tele
phone and Telegraph Company to relinquish
its monopoly of wire communications; the
dissolution of the United States Thread
Association; an injunction restraining
the National Wholesale Jewelers' Associ
ation from a conspiracy to restrain
trade; and the decree requiring the New
Haven Railroad to relinquish a monopoly
of transportation in New England.2'
McReynolds was liberal in his opposition to the
trusts, but his tenure as a New York corporate lawyer from
the time he left his post as Assistant Attorney General in

1907 to his appointment to the Cabinet in 1913 was a period
"in which his natural conservatism was reinforced by
serving and being regarded by large corporations who
fought governmental and Progressivists controls."
More important than his political ideology, however,
was the dogmatism that characterized his personality.

He

was called a "grouch" by Chief Justice William Howard

297

Taft, and a "Scrooge" as well as an anti-Semite by others.

27

Houston, o£. cit., pp. 40-41.

pg
Donald C. Leavitt, "Attitudes and Ideology on the
White Supreme Court, 1910-1920*(unpublished Ph.D. disser
tation, Michigan State University, 1970), p. 443•
2%bid., p. 445.
See Stephen Early, Jr., "James Clark
McReynolds and the Judicial Process" (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Virginia, 1954) for an inter
esting insight into the character of McReynolds.
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Wilson's son-in-law and Secretary of the Treasury,
William G. McAdoo, noted that
after McReynolds became Attorney-General
the President discovered that he did not
get along smoothly in harness with others.
He appeared to lack the cooperative spirit,
and he became unpopular with the leading
members of the Senate and the House.30
McAdoo could have gone on to say that neither did
McReynolds get along with the other members of the cabinet.
It was, in fact, feuds such as one between McAdoo and
McReynolds that finally resulted in the latter's removal
from the cabinet by virtue of an appointment to the
Supreme Court.
Apparently Davis was not engaged in any of the
various personal disputes in which McReynolds seemed con
stantly to find himself. There is nothing either in the
official archives or the personal papers of Davis to
indicate anything but the best of relations between the

^McAdoo, 0£. c i t . , p . 1 6 4

31

two individuals.

There is evidence that Davis and

McReynolds had a friendship that transcended their official
duties. They often went horseback riding together, and on
more than one occasion, McReynolds utilized Mrs. Davis as
his hostess for an official formal dinner.^
Such happy relations were not the normal state of
affairs for McReynolds.

The feelings between McReynolds

and other members of the Wilson Administration, as well as
members of Congress, became strained. In time, as a

^ Davis was quite candid in his letters to his father
concerning his relationships with official and unofficial
acquaintances. In fact, the letters by Davis to his
father and mother constitute a virtual diary for his term
as Solicitor General. As one would expect, his letters to
his father were of more interest on legal and political
affairs, since he and his father had been law partners.
Davis did, however, often confide in his mother on political
and legal matters and obviously valued her judgment on such
questions. Davis* letters to his mother are especially
useful for the period after the death of his father in 1917.
The bulk of Davis' papers are in the John W. Davis Papers,
Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
There is a smaller collection scattered through the John J.
Davis Papers, the Julia Davis Papers, and the Mrs. John
Preston Collection, all located at the West Virginia University Library, Morgantown, W. Va. The official files of the
Solicitor General are located in Records Group 60, Depart
ment of Justice Piles, National Archives, Washington, D. C.
•*2Davis to Father, 22 February, 1916, John W. Davis
Papers, Box 3, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University,
New Haven, Conn. [Hereinafter cited as Davis Papers, Yale
University].
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consequence of this,, the President sensed that his Attorney
General was disrupting the orderly operation of his
administration.
An illustrative example of this bickering is brought
to light in the correspondance of Col. House.

J

On March 3,

1914, Thomas Watt Gregory, an official in the Department of
Justice who would succeed McReynolds as Attorney General,
wrote Col. House bringing to the latter's attention a dis
pute that had developed between Secretary of the Treasury
McAdoo and McReynolds.

Gregory stated: "I am afraid the

friction between McReynolds and McAdoo is becoming acute
and that serious trouble for the administration may come
of it. I am very fond of both men and have done what I
could to avert serious estrangement."^
The immediate cause of conflict between the two cabinet
officers was McAdoo*s changing a bill that had been drafted
by McReynolds, without the latter*s knowledge, and sub
mitting it to a Congressional committee.

McAdoo informed

^Col. House of Texas was one of Wilson's chief advisors
during much of the Wilson Administration. One of these
tasks was ironing out political differences that developed
within the President's official family. The House papers
are located in the Sterling Memorial Library, Yale Univer
sity, New Haven, Conn. They will be cited hereafter as the
House Collection.
^Gregory to House, 3 March
Yale University.

1914» House Collection,

McReynolds of the action only after the fact and then by
a'Yormal letter."-^
McAdoo had also written McReynolds suggesting that
Mr. Gordon Auchincloss, Col. House's son-in-law, be
appointed Assistant Attorney General in charge of customs
matters.

This position, one of the highest paid in the

Justice Department,-^ and one which entailed the super
vision of ten other attorneys, was to be offered to a
relatively young man of very little legal experience. This
appointment was seen by Gregory as likely to be questioned
because solely based on Auchincloss' relationship to
House.J'
House perceived the situation in the same manner as
Gregory. In a letter answering Gregory on March 3> 1914,
House stated:
You are quite right in believing that
under no circumstances whatever would I
consent to have Gordon [Auchincloss] given
such a position. As a matter of fact, I
did not want him in the Government Service
at all, as Mr. McReynolds knows, and solely
for the reason that he was my son-in-law.

35Ibid.

•^The salary for this position was $6*000 at the time.
^Gregory to House, loc. cit.

It was generous of McAdoo to think of
him in that connection, but no worse blow
given
me than
1
1
Icould
I 1 • I •possibly
I • * beA W'l
'i#
H K' to *place
I .
him in such an office. I would appreciate
it if you would let Mr. McReynolds know
how I feel.38
The seriousness of the situation was such that House
was under considerable pressure to mediate the dispute
between the two individuals.

He noted that on the day he

answered Gregory's letter, he had "three urgent appeals"
7
on the matter.39

House was, at least for the moment,

optimistic, saying:
X am sure that you and I together can
right the situation, for neither one of
them would be willing to embarrass the
President by any sort of friction.*0
In reality, the personality of McReynolds was such
that no mediation was possible (the entire affair was com
plicated by McAdoo's being Wilson's son-in-law).
When a vacancy on the Supreme Court occurred with the
death of Justice Lurton in the summer of 1914, Wilson used
the opportunity to cleanse his cabinet and appoint McReynolds
to the position, in effect "kicking him upstairs."

Although

3$
House to Gregory, 6 March, 1914, House Collection,
Yale University.
^Ibid.
40 Ibid.

Swisher asserts that "[t]here is little evidence to show
why he filled the position by moving his Attorney General
. . . to the Supreme Court,

circumstances would indicate

the overriding consideration to be harmony within the
administration.
An appointment made in apparent haste, and for
questionable reasons, by Wilson would return to plague him.
He later noted that the appointment had been a great misi2
take.
Any liberal leanings McReynolds may have demon
strated earlier were soon pushed aside as he "aligned him)O
self with the most conservative element on the Court."
Davis himself came to the conclusion that McReynolds had
moved into the conservative camp.^

^Carl Brent Swisher, American Constitutional Development (second ed; Cambridge", Mass.: Houghton Mifflin,
M), pp. 591-92.
^2Ibid., p. 592, citing Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow
Wilson, Life and Letters (New York: Scribner, 1927-39)»
VI, p. 113.
^Swisher, o£. cit., p. 592.

^Davis Interview.

5*
IV. Attorney General
Thomas Watt Gregory
Wilson's second attorney general was Thomas Watt
Gregory.

Gregory was appointed to the position when

McReynolds resigned to ascend to the Supreme Court.
Gregory took office on September 3> 1914.
Gregory, a graduate of the University of Texas Law
School, was born and reared in Mississippi.

Although he

had never been a candidate for public office, he had taken
an active part in Texas state politics.

He was an active

supporter of Wilson both before and during the 1912 Demo
cratic National Convention.^

In the early months of the

Wilson Administration, Gregory was offered a position in
the Justice Department. His chief area concern was the
case against the New York, New Haven, and Hartford Railway
Company.^

This suit, usually called the New Haven Case,

had a history dating back to the early part of the Taft
Administration.
In May, 190$, action had been brought against the
New York, New Haven, and Hartford Railway Company, alleging
a monopoly of transportation facilities in New England.

^"The Attorney General of the United States," Case
and Comment, XXII (January, 1916), 702-03.
46Ibid.,

p. 703.
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The suit was discontinued in 1909» but reinstated by
McReynolds in 1914After several months of negotations,
Gregory was able to bring about a plan of voluntary dissoig
lution.
His success in this difficult case, along with
his history of political support for the President, was a
key factor in bringing his name to Wilson's attention when
the office of attorney general became vacant.

The fact

that he was a former classmate of McReynolds may have also
LQ

had some bearing on his appointment.

Davis asserted that he had a good working relationship
<50
with Gregory,
but a statement made in private during his
tenure as Solicitor General indicated dissatisfaction with
51
his superior.
For the most part, however, the two men
respected each other's abilities and had a basically good
working relationship. In fact, as will be noted in more

^United States Department of Justice, Report of the
Attorney General, 1914 (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1914), p. 12.
^Ibid.
^Swindler, op. cit., p. 181.
SO
Davis Interview.
-^Davis to Father, 11 April 1915, Davis Papers, Box 8,
Yale University.
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detail later in this paper, Davis often served as a mediator
between Gregory and other members of the Justice Department
with whom the Attorney General was in disagreement.
Early in his tenure as attorney general, Gregory
became engaged in a dispute with Louis Brandeis.

A dis

pute developed when Brandeis was retained to handle a case
involving the Treasury Department, which was under the
jurisdiction of the Justice Department.

Several attorneys,

including Davis, were also selected to handle the case and
soon the rumor spread that Brandeis had served
an ultimatum on the Controller [of the
Treasury] that unless his position were
explained by a statement from Gregory
he would withdraw from the case rather
than continue in the light of counsel
forced upon the Department of Justice
by the Treasury Department.52
The matter apparently was settled to the satisfaction of
both Gregory and Brandeis for the latter wrote:
I am sending you a formal letter to the
Riggs Bank charge [the case in question],
but I must add my appreciation of your
personal letter, and the great satisfaction
in my associatipn v/ith you in this and
other matters.53

^ New York Times, April IS, 1915, Sec. II, p. 11,
col. 11 Brandeis had been Wilson's first choice for the
position of attorney general and would be his next appoint
ment to the United States Supreme Court.
^Brandeis to Gregory, 6 July 1916, Record Group 60,
File 190470, Box 2730, National Archives, Washington, D. C.
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Gregory, who remained in office until the appointment
of A. Mitchell Palmer on March 5> 1919> is seen by some as
an outstanding attorney general.

One commentator feels

that he served as a bridge between "the early hopes of the
5L
social reformers to the reactions of his successor . .
The part he played in this transition will be apparent when
the activities of the Justice Department during World War I
are examined in Chapter V.
V.

The Duties of the Solicitor General

The formal duties of the Solicitor General were dis
cussed earlier in this paper.

Essentially the duties of

the office, as it exists today, are:
1.

deciding which cases warrant a petition
for certiorari to the Supreme Court,

2.

writing or revising briefs in support or
in opposition to petitions for certiorari,

3.

presenting oral arguments in the Supreme
Court, or authorizing and supervising the
presentation of the arguments by someone
outside the staff,

4. appearing as amicus curiae before the
Supreme Court in cases where the United
States has an interest, but is not a party,
5. authorizing other parties to intervene
as amicus curiae when the United States
is a party,

^Swindler, o£. cit., p. l£2.
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6.

deciding on intervention in cases where
the United States has a technical right
to intervene, and

7. serving as a mediator in interdepartmental
disputes."
To this list, as it applied to Davis, must-be added
the duty of serving as an administrative officer (that is,
second-in-command) in the absence of the Attorney General.
This additional duty entailed a considerable amount of
work.

This duty was not long in coming, for on the day

before he took the oath of office, Davis wrote;

"Tomorrow

morning at ten-thirty I shall take the oath and by reason
of the absence of the attorney-general will be in charge
56

of the Department.""^

Even before Davis took office, he expressed his pleas
ure at the nature of his employment.

While moving into

his office, he wrote his father: "I feel sure that I am
going to find the work up [here] very much to my taste."^7
The physical facilities in which Davis was to work
left much to be desired.

The Justice Department was not

located in one central building but in three adjoining

^Brigman, o£. cit., p. 26.
^Davis to Mother, 29 August
Box B, Yale University.
^Davis to Father, 6 August
Yale University.

1913 > Davis Papers,

1913> Davis Papers, Box S,
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structures. It was not until the federal construction
programs of the 1930's that the present building housing
the Justice Department was erected.

Such problems as

space, lack of shelving for law books, and heating simply
added to the already difficult job of the Solicitor
General.^
Davis' subordinates, as were all government employees,
were required to work 5 it days a week.^ His personal
office staff consisted of a secretary, two attorneys who
functioned as brief-writers, and a law clerk.^

His legal

staff consisted of the Assistant Attorneys General and
their respective subordinates.

During most of his time in

office, Davis was assisted by seven Assistant Attorneys
General.

eg
J

Davis Interview.

^^Davis to Father, 6 September
Box S, Yale University.
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1913» Davis Papers,

For the entire time that Davis held the position of
solicitor general, his secretary was Charles Pedicord.
Although Pedicord was listed in the Register as an assistant
attorney, he functioned as Davis' private secretary and is
identified as such in an article in the Clarksburg, W. Va.,
Exponent-American, March 23, 1916. A clipping of this
article is located in the Mrs. John Preston Collection,
Box 12, West Virginia University, Morgantown, West Virginia.
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The caliber of the men who served as Assistant
Attorney General varied greatly.

It seemed as though the

best people were always leaving to accept other positions,
either in government or in private life.

For example,

Assistant Attorney General Dennison, a hold-over appointee
from Wickersham, and an individual upon whom Davis relied

a great deal, resigned in November, 1913, to accept a job
61
on the Philippine Commission.

In January, 1917, Davis wrote his mother:
I am . . . concerned tonight in the announce
ment from [William] Wallace, our ablest
Assistant Attorney General, that he has
made up his mind to quit the service and
has accepted an offer to go to a New
York firm at the end of thirty days. He
was my main reliance in the argument of
case on the Supreme Court docket, and I
feel as if I had lost a leg.62
The most prominent, and controversial, individual
among the Davis Assistant Attorneys General was Charles
Warren.

Warren would later gain fame for his history of

the United States Supreme CourtHe played an important

6l
Davis to Father, 7 November
Box
Yale University.

1913, Davis Papers,

Davis to Mother, 10 January
Box 9, Yale University.

1917, Davis Papers,

^The supreme Court in United States History (rev. ed.;
Boston! Little, brown, i^Zb). Another individual of lesser
prominence who served as an assistant attorney general under
Davis was S. Houston Thompson, who, upon leaving the Justice
Department, became a member of the Federal Trade Commission.
Thompson's personal papers are in the Library of Congress.
They are of little use for the period during which he was
assistant attorney general.
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role in the Justice Department during Davis' years of
service, especially in the war years. (See Chapter V for
a full discussion of Warren's activities in the Justice
Department during World War I.) Another Assistant Attorney
General, Ernest Knaebel, resigned in 1916 to become
Reporter of Decisions for the United States Supreme Court
when Charles Butler resigned from that position.
Most of Davis' personal staff stayed with him through
out his term of office.
a "brief writer."

In 1915 > he hired Robert Szold as

Davis gave Szold a doubtful compliment

by writing:
I think I have picked up a good man as
brief maker in Szold .... I rather
think Szold is a Polish Jew—certainly
of Polish extraction, and apparently as
keen as that origin would indicate.
Szold must have justified the "faith" placed in him by
Davis for he retained his position for as long as Davis was
Solicitor General.
There were, of course, instances in which Davis' sub
ordinates failed to please him.

He related one such inci

dent in a letter to his mother:
I have been very busy ever since I
got back from Clarksburg—what with my
own briefs and those submitted by the

^Davis to Father, 30 May
Yale University.

1915 > Davis Papers, Box 8,
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various assistants. I sat up last night
until one o'clock over one of the latter,
and quit it almost in despair. A typical
sentence—
"Appellant concludes in his petition
by way of an attempted allegation
that by reason of the discontinuance
of said contract he was damaged as
follows:"
What would you do with some thirty pages
of that sort of English? I have the sensi
bilities of an assistant attorney general
to consider on the one hand, and on the
other have a due regard for my mothertongue and the good opinion of the Court.
It requires all one's self-control to
keep from tearing up a document like that
and doing the work over oneself.65
As one would expect, the Solicitor General devotes most
of his time and effort to legal matter, especially Supreme
Court cases in which the United States is a party or has a
vested interest.

Yet, the provision in the Act of June 22,

1870, providing that the Solicitor General be in charge of
the Justice Department in the absence of the Attorney
General cut heavily into Davis' schedule.
Soon after he took office, Davis, in his position of
Acting Attorney General during the absence of McReynolds,
found himself before the President on a relatively

^Davis to Mother, 23 November 1913t Davis Papers,
Box 3, Yale University.
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unimportant legal matter.

This was not, however, a

typical activity for Davis.

A more typical day would be

like one he described in a letter to his father:
I began the day by a visit to my office:
refused to take an appeal requested by
the Department of Labor from a decision
naturalizing a Phillipino [sic]; ordered
an appeal from a judgment dismissing a
suit for penalty under the contract labor
law; OK'd a long list of additions to the
law library of the Department; read a
petition for rehearing prepared by Chest
nut in the case of Downey v. Insurance
Co.; went over a brief of Marshall's—
U. S. Attorney at New York—on the right
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As Davis described it, the affair went as follows:

On Thursday I had a call to the White House and
went wondering what it was. The President was most
cordial, but as usual got right to business—the
sauce being to request this Department to interest
itself and if possible intervene in the proceedings
for the ouster quo warranto of one of the District
Commissioners recently appointed. The Organization
Act of the District requires that each comm[issioner]
shall have been an actual resident of the District
for three years and have claimed no residence else
where during that time. You may have noticed the
row that was raised at the time Com. Newman's name
was before the Senate, but notwithstanding he was
confirmed. Now a private citizen has filed a
petition seeking to oust him. Some nice questions
are involved—can a third party, interested only as
a taxpayer, bring such a proceeding; is the action
of the President and Senate fina; what is actual
residence, etc. etc. [?] Wilson is greatly int'erested, and while I see no way for official inter
vention in the suit, I will probably add my name
as counsel for the respondent.

Davis to Father, 6 September 1913, Davis Paper, Box 8,
Yale University.

6S

to have a stenographer present in a
grand jury room, a question now in the
C.C.A. [Circuit Court of Appeals];
learned later there was danger of having
our big Divisor case set down for the
17th of January, and pulled out the
brief I have in preparation there
trembling at the thought of such an
unexpected calamity . . .°7
Gregory's poor health resulted in Davis? doing much of
the work normally performed by the Attorney General.

An

example of this was a request made by Gregory for Davis

to represent him at a department conference, noting that
"[my] eyes are so bad that it is almost impossible for
me to read."^
All these duties were, despite their time-consuming
nature, of secondary importance to Davis.

The real job

of the Solicitor General was the representation of the
United States before the Supreme Court.
VI.

Operation in Court

The worth of a solicitor general is measured by his
success in court.

Although the government is successful

in more than 60 per cent of the cases decided by the

^Davis to Father, 1 January
Box S, Yale University.

1916, Davis Papers,

^Gregory to Assistant to the Attorney General Todd,
29 March 1917 > Record Group 60, File 190470, Box 2735»
National Archives, Washington, D. C.
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Supreme Court,

69 its success rate varies from time to
70

time and from solicitor general to solicitor general.
Davis approached his first appearance before the
Court with understandable apprehension.

He wrote to his

mother:
. . . [T]he opening of the Supreme Court
[is] but thirty days away. No school boy
ever dreaded his commencement day oration
more. As the work of this position opens
up to me, and my own slender equipment
become more evident, I have a positively
smothering sense of my inadequancy—more
than I have ever been sensible of before,
and closely bordering on panic. I am
conscious of the fact that I am letting my
fears oppress me beyond reason, yet try as
I will I cannot shake them off.'1

69
Robert Scigliano, The Supreme Court and the Presi
dency (New York: Free Press, ±9^1.), p. 177.
70

' Scigliano notes:
Not all solicitors general have graced the
Office with distinction. The one initially
entrusted with defending the New Deal in
the Supreme Court was "an estimable but in
effective old gentleman" who "showed his
unfitness for the responsibility [by]
losing ten of seventeen cases in his first
five months."

Ibid., p. 166, citing Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age
of koosevelt: The Politics of Upheaval TBoston: Houghton

Mifflin, 1957), p. 261.
^Davis to Mother, 14 September 1914» Box S, Davis
Papers, Yale University. Davis had only slight contact
with the Supreme Court while a private attorney. Although
he had been a party to two cases that reached the Supreme
Court, he had appeared for oral argument in only one,
Pickens v. Ro^, 137 U. S. 177 (1902).

His confidence was restored, however, after he made
his first appearance before the Court.

He was critical of

his maiden effort, exclaiming one point:

"I am conscious

that I did not do myself full justice, largely on account
of my nervousness; I can do better, and so help me, I will
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before they are done with me."

This appearance in court removed any second thoughts
he may have had about the wisdom of his retirement from
Congress.

He was convinced that he would be "far happier

in it [the Office of Solicitor General] than I could ever
have been in Congress or in any other public office I can
think of."73
In addition to the administrative work entailed by the
position,7^ and his personal appearances in court, Davis

7^Davis to Mother, 19 October
Papers, Yale University.

1913> Box 8f Davis

73Ibid.

7^He

described a normal day's work as follows:
Five or six appeals to be authorized or re
fused; briefs in as many cases to be
approved, returned to the writers, or re
written by myself, an opinion requested
by the attorney general on a matter coming
from the post-office department, and the
usual run of routine matter in relation of
motions, notices, etc.

Davis to Father, 14 December
Yale University.

1913, Box S, Davis Papers,
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also supervised the activities of the assistant attorneys
general.

Their supervision included both a review of

their briefs and personal observance of their appearance

75

before the Supreme Court.

Usually, a case was assigned to an assistant attorney
general, who (assuming the Solicitor General was not going
to argue the case) would remain with it until it was dis
posed of by the Court.

In at least one instance, the

assistant attorney general assigned to the case "became so
convinced against the government's position that he asked
to be relieved."'

Davis took the case and, as he put it,

"succeeded in persuading myself that the law [was] with
us, although the circumstances of its application [were]

77

rather harsh."

^Davis to Father, 2 3 October 1913 > Box S f Davis Papers,
Yale University. Although Davis was by all accounts, in
cluding his own, a hard worker, he was not immune from the
common sin of procrastination, for example:
I woke up to find myself on the verge of being
called to argument in a case, the record of
which, containing over one thousand pages I
had not even read, and to which no brief was
ready. Fortunately my adversaries were com
passionate, and I got a reprieve until next
week . . . .

Davis to Mother, 25 January

1914» Box £, Davis Papers,

Yale University.

^Davis to Father, 2 October
Yale University.

1915, Box £, Davis Papers,

^Ibid. It is not surprising that the government lost
the case. The case involved the question of the right to
review by a writ of habeas corpus the decision of immigra
tion inspectors and the Secretary of Labor in actions
excluding aliens.
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The Attorney General seldom argues a case before the
Supreme Court.

In the Harvester Trust Case, however,

Attorney General Gregory injected himself into the case
at the eleventh hour, much to the dismay of Davis, who
noted:
. . . [ojvernight Gregory became imbued
with a desire to talk, notwithstanding his
previous determination not to participate
in the case, and his lack of thorough
preparation. Todd [the Assistant to the
Attorney General] thereupon dropped out—•
I think to the poor chap's great disappoint
ment, for he had labored to prepare himself;
and Gregory took an hour to state in general
outline the government's position, chiefly
by reading extracts from the brief. Between
ourselves, strictly, I did not think much
of his performance either in matter, manner
or underlying purpose, although I had
urged him repeatedly to prepare and par
ticipate in the case. But evidently at
the last moment the thought of seeing the
ship go into port without his name at the
mast head was too much for him.7°
Davis, incidentally, put great emphasis on preparation by
an attorney, contending that "there is little difference in
lawyers save in industry . . . .
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^ Davis to Father, 11 April 1915, Box £, Davis Papers,
Yale University. Davis could be harsh when he felt someone
was infringing upon his jurisdiction. When he perceived
that the solicitor for the Interstate Commerce Commission,
Joseph Folk, was crossing him in a matter of some appeals,
he wrote his father that Folk "is not and has never been a
real lawyer, and is not only a peewee and a skunk by
nature but has limelightitis in its [worst] form . . . ."
Davis to Father, 14 May 1914, Box S, Davis Papers, Yale
University.

"^Davis to Mother, 25 February 1914, Box 6, Davis
Papers, Yale University.

Oral argument before the Supreme Court is an impressive
affair.

For many years, all individuals associated with

the Court, including the attorneys, were required to dress
go
in formal attire.
Davis himself wore a morning coat and
striped trousers when appearing before the Court.
More important than the physical appearance of the
advocates was, however, the quality of the lawyer's argu
ment.

There are conflicting reports as to how important

oral arguments are in influencing the justices, but if
appellate judges in general are to be believed, oral argu82
ment is important.
Justice Robert H. Jackson (who had been a Solicitor
General as well as Attorney General) observed that although
the time allotted for oral arguments had been decreased by

80
Charles Henry Butler, A Century at the Bar of the
Supreme Court of the United States (New York; Putnam,
1942), pp. 85-86.
cH
York:
82

Luther A. Houston, The Department of Justice (New
Praeger, 1967), p. 60.

See Robert L. Stern and Eugene Grossman, Supreme
Court Practice (4th ed.; Washington: Bureau of National
Affairs, iyb9), pp. 483-84, for a discussion of this question
as well as for several citations of articles written by
appellate judges on the problem of oral arguments. Justice
Holmes was one of the few appellate judges that felt oral
argument to be of little importance. He is alleged to have
said that he was never influenced by oral arguments but
considered the cases wholly on the briefs. Butler, op.
cit., pp. 86-87.
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the Court, the importance of such arguments had not
go
diminished.
The rules of the Supreme Court permit the
submission of briefs without oral argument, but assert
that the Court "looks with disfavor" on such a practice
and retains the option of requiring oral argument byparties to a case.^
Essentially, appellate argument is a "solo perfor
ms
mance,"'in which the advocate
is angling, consciously and deliberately
angling, for the judicial mind. Whatever
tends to attract judicial favor to the
advocate's claim is useful. Whatever
repels it is useless or worse.8®
^Robert H. Jackson, "Advocacy Before the Supreme Court:
Suggestions for Effective Case Presentation." American Bar
Association Journal, XXXVII (November, 1951)» 801.
^Stern and Grossman, o£. cit., pp. 4&4-B5.
^Frederick Bernays Wiener, "Specialized Appellate
Counsel: His Importance, Necessity and Usefulness," Ameri
can Bar Association Journal, XLV (July, 1959)» 766.
John W. Davis, "The Argument of an Appeal," American
Bar Association Journal, XXVI (November, 1940), 895~ This
article, which was written long after Davis had left govern
ment service, has become a classic in its description of the
correct procedure to be followed in presenting a legal argu
ment to the court. He formulated his "ten commandments" as
follows:
1. Change places with the court
2. State the nature of the case and briefly its
prior history
3. State the facts
4. State the applicable rules of law on which you rely
5. Always "go for the jugular vein"
6. Rejoice when the court asks questions
7. Read sparingly and only from necessity
6. Avoid personalities
9. Know your record from cover to cover
10. Sit down.
Ibid., pp. 896-93.
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Davis was renowned for his oral arguments, both while
Solicitor General and in his practice before the Court in
g7
later years. ' He was especially noted for the brevity of
his oral presentations, as is illustrated by the following
incident:
. . . [T]he Solicitor General argued the
great Five Percent Discount Case against
Frederic to. Lehman [a former Solicitor
General]. The former before the argument
stated to the Court that as the case in
volved $27,000,000 he wished to ask for
30 minutes extra time for argument. "How
much money did you say?" asked the Chief
Justice. "$27,000,000 at least," said the
Solicitor General. "I am surprised at
your moderation in asking for only 30 min
utes," said the Chief Justice. It was
characteristic of the Solicitir General,
and his remarkable power of concise com
pression in argument; for most lawyers
would h§ve asked for at least two hours
extra.°°
Such skill did not go unnoticed by the Court.

Chief

Justice White was quoted that Davis "was the greatest
comfort the Court had had in the Solicitor General's
office in the 21 years he had been on the bench."

7
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'Davis is alleged to have appeared before the Supreme
Court more than any other attorney in history. Justice
Charles Evans Hughes noted that it was an "intellectual
treat" to hear Davis argue a case. Davis to Father, 1# Janu
ary 1915, Box 8, Davis Papers, Yale University.
dd
Charles Warren, "War Notes," an unpublished manuscript
in Box 5, Charles Warren Papers, Library of Congress.
^^Davis to Father, 10 April
Papery Yale University.

1914, Box 3, Davis

Justice Pitney called Davis "the clearest lawyer who
appeared before them [the Court]."^®
It should be noted, however, that "[a]lthough oral
arguments get most of the publicity, as in any law office,
91
they take the least amount of time."^
More time consum
ing, and perhaps more important, is the writing of briefs.
92
Davis, despite some doubts about his own ability.
was as
skillful in the writing of briefs as he was in oral argu
ment.

As in oral argument, he made a deliberate attempt

to keep his briefs short and concise.^

Davis did this in

part by keeping the number of citations as low as possible.
He was a strong advocate of this technique as a method of
9L
producing an uncluttered brief. ^

^Davis to Father, 23 January
Papers, Yale University.

1915» Box 8, Davis

^"Robert L. Stern, "The Solicitor General's Office and
Administrative Agency Litigation," American Bar Association
Journal, XLVI (February, I960), 155.
realize that one of my greatest deficiencies is a
lack of knowledge of the philosophy of the law and a corres
ponding want of literary finish in my briefs
Davis
to Father, 28 December 1913» Box 8, Davis Papers, Yale
University.
^Davis to Father, 6 February
Papers, Yale University.

1914» Box B, Davis

^See his comments in "The Case for the Trial Lawyer,"
Massachusetts Law Quarterly, III (December, 1917), 108.

In one instance, Davis severely edited the brief of
an attorney who had been retained by the government.

The

attorney wrote Davis a letter
lamenting the absence of some of his
pet (and most absurd) ideas and charging
their loss to Assistant Attorney General
Knaebel. I sent him a few brief lines to
the effect that I_ had written the brief
and did not share his idea of the value of
his suggestions. I would have gone into
detail, but remembered your favorite motto
that it is "a waste of lather to shave an
ass."95
The success of Davis in his relations with the Supreme
Court is easily documented. In the five terms during when
he was Solicitor General, Davis personally argued 67 cases
96
which were decided on their merits.
Davis won 49 of
these cases for an average of better than 73 per cent.
(See Appendix E for an elaboration of Davis' record before
the Court.)
Davis consistently won a higher percentage of cases
than did the government as a whole.

^Davis to Father, 2 April
Yale University.
96
7

For example, in 1915»

1914» Box S, Davis Papers,

The appearance of Davis before the Court in various
actions involving petitions or motions is not included in
this total. The Court grants "from 50 per cent to 75 per
cent of all Government petitions ... as contrasted to no
more than 10 per cent of other petitions." Stern, op. cit.,
p. 156.

7S

Davis won 90.90 per cent of the cases in which he
appeared.

The government was successful in the same year

in 7&.6£ per cent of the cases decided on their merits.^
The table on the following pages give a year-by-year break
down of Davis' successes.
There are several independent variables that account
for the success of any given solicitor general before the
Court. For one thing, there is a "situational bias" that
favors the Solicitor General, which is largely "a function
of his more frequent, more intensive, and more extensive
interaction with the justices, in comparison with other
counsel."7

That is not to say, however, that the indi

vidual holding the office does not make a difference;
virtually all authorities will agree that it does.^

^Davis to Gregory, 15 June 1916, Record Group 60,
File 19470 , Box 2730, Folder 2, National Archives, Washing
ton, D. C.
art
7 Schubert, loc. cit.
^Scigliano, 0£. cit., p. 196.
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TABLE I
DAVIS' SUCCESS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT

Term of
Court

Total Cases
Argued

Cases
Won

1913

17

12

5

71*

1914

11

7

4

64$

1915

11

10

1

91/'

1916

7

6

1

S6/0

1917

21

14

7

679S

Totals

67

49

IS

731o

Term of
Court

Total Cases
on Brief

Cases
Won

Cases
Lost

Cases
Lost

Percent
Won

Percent
Won

1913

7

5

2

7±f°

1914

5

2

3

40#

1915

110

100#

1916

5

3

2

6096

1917

3

3

0

100%

Totals

21

14

7

67#

TABLE I (continued)
Total
Cases
Lost

Total
Percentage
Won

17

7

711°

16

9

7

56%

1915

12

11

1

92</o

1916

12

9

3

75/°

1917

24

17

7

71°/»

Grand
Totals

gg

63

25

72<fo

Term of
Court

Total Cases,
Argued and
on Brief

1913

24

1914

Source:

Total
Cases
Won

U. S. Reports» Vols. 231-47.
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VII. The Non-Court Legal
Activities of the Solicitor General
As has been previously noted, the solicitor general
during Davis' tenure was much more than the national
government's chief trial lawyer.

He was by statute

second-in-command in the Justice Department and was re
quired by law to assist the Attorney General in the prep
aration of opinions.
The Attorney General, although the President's chief
legal officer, is seen by most presidents, including
President Wilson, as more of a political adviser and
policy-maker than a legal technician.Much of the Attor
ney General's time is devoted to political and adminis
trative questions, as opposed to legal problems.
Quite often the head of one of the executive depart
ments, or even the President himself, would request an
opinion from the Attorney General on a question of law.
Usually, the writing of these opinions was delegated to one
of his subordinates.

On occasion, he would ask several of

his subordinates to prepare an opinion on the same question
and then have Davis supervise the drafting of the final

This is not to say, however, that the individuals
holding the office of Attorney General during Davis' tenure
were not well-qualified legal technicians. Both McReynolds
and Gregory had been competent, if not spectacular, attorneys
before they became cabinet officers.

document.

With a few exceptions, these opinions were then
101

issued in the name of the Attorney General.

Often, the

Attorney General would have Davis review an opinion pre
pared by another member of the Justice Department.

This

was almost always done if there was a diversity of opinion
within the Department.

The normal procedure followed in the drafting of an
opinion was for the individual so designated by the Attorney
General to submit a "Memorandum for the Attorney General"
containing his views.

These memoranda were considered

internal working papers, outside the review of any other
agency or another branch of government.
In 1916, the Senate Committee on Public Land requested
that the Attorney General send to it "the opinion and find
ings of Solicitor General Davis made about March 3 of this
year in the matter of the Honolulu Oil Co."^^

David

stated his views on the matter as follows:

Davis wrote some opinions while functioning as the
Acting Attorney General. These opinions were issued in
his name. The opinions are published by the Government
Printing Office in a series entitled Opinions of the
Attorney General.
102
For examples of this, see Record Group 60, File
190470, Box 2734, National Archives, Washington, D. C.

•'cited in Davis to Gregory, 27 April 1916, Record
Group 60, File 177631, National Archives, Washington, D. C.

S3

Of course, I have no personal objection
to your sending to the committee, if you
should deem it proper, the memorandum which
I submitted to you on that date. There are
reasons, however, which it seems to me,
would justify you in declining to accede
to its request. The memorandum in question,
as you will recall, was of an entirely in
formal and confidential character. It was
intended solely for your personal guidance
and did not purport to be a full or formal
presentation of my views. After its
delivery to you a number of conferences were
held .... I can see no useful purpose
to be served by forwarding to the committee
any of the memoranda . . . since such
papers, if forwarded, might be misleading
as not entirely representative of the con
clusions finally reached in the matter.^4
105
The Attorney General refused the committee's request.
The regulation of passports during World War I is an
interesting case study on the opinion function of the
Attorney General and the part played by the Solicitor
General.

In the early months of the American involvement

in World War I, the State Department asked that the Presi
dent issue an executive order requiring all persons either
entering or leaving the United States to have a passport,
The Attorney General was asked by the President for an
opinion on the matter.

10^Ibid.

^Gregory to Senate Committee on Public Lands, 17 April
1916, Record Group 60, File 177631, National Archives,
Washington, D. C.

8

The Attorney General delegated the writing of the
opinion to Davis and Assistant Attorney General Charles
Warren."'"^

Each individual, after consultation with the

other, submitted a memorandum to the Attorney General with
his individual opinion on the question.
Davis and Warren saw eye-to-eye on one point.

They

agreed that by virtue of the Trading With the Enemy Act

of October 6, 1917, Sec. 3(b),Congress had given the
President the authority to require passports of enemy

10$

aliens.

Davis, however, contended that this grant by

Congress did not give the President the power to issue a
general proclamation requiring that all aliens and American
citizens have a passport.

In defense of his contention,

Davis outlined briefly his theory of the executive war
powers:
It seems clear to me that the President
can not under the guise of this war power
forbid any and all American citizens to

I A/'

Davis and Warren often found themselves at opposite
poles on questions involving the war powers of the president.
See Chapter V for a detailed discussion of the division and
Warren's subsequent dismissal because of it.
10740

lOfi

Stat. 411.

"Memorandum for the Attorney General," Davis to
Gregory, 22 October 1917» and "Memorandum for the Attorney
General," Warren to Gregory, 16 October 1917» Record Group
60, File 9169339, National Archives, Washington, D. C.

S5

leave the country without first securing
passports. If he can impose such a con
dition, by the same reasoning he would
have the power to forbid their departure
at all. Such a general restraint upon
the liberty of the citizen can, as I think,
only be accomplished, if at all, by legis
lative act, accompanied by the necessary
sanction of a penalty for its disobedience.
I freely admit that the executive power
expands in time of war to an indefinable
extent, but it does not absorb the
functions of the legislative or judicial
branches of the Government. If it did,
it would at once become a dictatorship,
pure and simple.
Speaking to the specific question, Davis noted:
Neither do I think it follows . . .
that because he has been authorized by
Congress to regulate the movements and
prohibit the departure of alien enemies
without a permit he can, as a means of
making this regulation effective, impose
on of the same quality upon all persons,
whether citizen or alien.HO
He acknowledged that Lincoln's Secretary of State, William
Seward, had made such a proclamation.

Apparently the

proclamation was never questioned, but Davis felt that "as
a matter of abstract law Seward's act seems to me to have
111
been unauthorized."
^"Memorandum for the Attorney General," Davis to
Gregory, 22 October 1917» Record Group 60, File 9169339*
National Archives, Washington, D. C.
110ibid.

Ill

Davis also observed that the proclamation was made
"on August 19t 1S61 (at which date . . . Seward was prob
ably not yet disabused of the idea that it was himself and
not Lincoln who had really been made President)." Ibid.
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Warren, on the other hand, disagreed with Davis, as
he noted in a memorandum to the Solicitor General:
As you are aware, I have long been
of the opinion (differing from you and
the Attorney General in this matter),
that the Secretary of State can be given
the power to require citizens leaving
the country to obtain passports.
I believe that the President possesses
this power as one of his war powers,
there being clear military necessity for
such a provision.
According to Warren's interpretation of Section 3(b)
of the Trading With the Enemy Act, "it would be entirely
proper to require, tinder a rule or regulation, every
person who leaves or enters the country (whether citizen
113

or not), to have a passport or credential."

Except for Warren, there was almost no support for
the idea that an executive order could be issued requiring
citizens to have a passport.

Finally, the Departments of

State, Treasury, War, Navy, and Labor drafted a proposed
regulation that would have governed the departure of aliens,
except enemy aliens.Even then, Gregory felt it neces
sary to write President Wilson:

11?
"Memorandum for the Solicitor General," Warren to
Davis, 17 October 1917 > Record Group 60, File 9169339>
National Archives, Washington, D. C.
113Ibid.

"'""^Enemy aliens were, of course, governed by the Trading
With the Enemy Act.

After careful consideration I have
reluctantly reached the conclusion that
the executive is without power to sanction
regulations of this character and that
there is no legal authority vested in the
Departments referred to [State, Treasury,
War, Navy, and Labor] which authorized
them to make or issue such regulations.
The evils at which these regulations are
aimed cannot be adequately remedied until
Congress takes appropriate action in
accordance with recommendations already
made to it by you.1^
The Solicitor General was also called upon to assist
in drafting legislation.

Many times, the Attorney General

would delegate such a task to Davis and virtually give him
a carte blanche. In the case of the Omnibus Bill of 1917,
which involved several pieces of legislation relating to
the war, the Attorney General assigned the drafting to
J.3.6

Davis and V/arren.

In a letter to Davis, Gregory asked

him to draft the bill; and if he and Warren agreed, Gregory
would forward the bill to the Senate and House Judiciary
Committees as an administration measure. If there was dis
agreement, Davis and Warren were to meet with Gregory to

^Gregory to Wilson, 29 December 1917» Record Group
60, File 9169339, National Archives, Washington, D. C.
The Attorney General's formal opinion on the passport
question accompanied this letter.
j•

Questions concerning the war were considered the
specialty of V/arren until John 0'Brian was appointed Special
Assistant to the Attorney General for war work.

B8
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iron out their differences. ' As Warren became more and

more extreme in his positions on war questions, Gregory
and Davis more often than not found themselves in agreement
and opposed to the Assistant Attorney General.
The President would on occasion ask the Attorney General
of the advisability of signing a bill into law which had
already passed both houses of Congress.

When Davis was

asked for such an opinion on the Kenyon "Red Light District"
Bill, he wrote that he considered the bill "a rotten piece
of draughtsmanship and of dubious validity," but not bad
11&
enough to warrant a veto.
In discussing this bill with his father, Davis noted
that there was a contest in progress among various groups
of "professional reformers" as to who would enjoy "the
doubtful but coveted honor of leading the movement to
rescue or reform the soon-to-be homeless citizens of the
red-light district.""*"1^

"^'Gregory to Davis, 31 March 1917, Record Group 60,
File 190470, Box 2734, National Archives, Washington, D. C.
^^Davis to Father, 2 March
Yale University.
119

1914, Box B, Davis Papers,

Ibid. Apparently, the whole question became moot
when the "ladies of the evening" simply moved into other
areas of town. Davis asked "of what pray shall reformers
be nourished if those who are to be reformed decline to
submit to the treatment?" Ibid.
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While opinion writing was perhaps the most important
of the non-court legal duties performed by Davis, there were
other details of a legal nature that often occupied his
time.

This was especially true when he was functioning as

Acting Attorney General.
In his capacity as Acting Attorney General, he was
120
required to make administrative decisions of a legal nature
as well as present recommendations to the President on

121
questions of pardons and paroles.

All the indications

are that Davis was a good legal administrator and that his
performance was as stellar in this realm as it was in the
courtroom.
VIII.

Possible Appointments

to Other Positions
While Davis was Solicitor General, there were con
stantly stories circulated that he was moving to another
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An example of this type of action was a decision
made by Davis in relation to a question concerning an in
crease in the water bill at the United States Penitentiary
at Leavenworth, Kansas. Davis advised that the increased
water bill be paid "[o]ut of consideration of comity toward
the State officials, and in view also of the small amount
involved ....*' Davis to F. H. Duenay, Superintendant
of Prisons, 23 June 1915, Record Group 60, File 42149,
National Archives, Washington, D. C.
"^^Davis to Father, 9 September
Papers, Yale University.

1916 [?], Box 8 , Davis
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post. He had scarcely entered the office when he was
mentioned as a possible candidate for a seat on the Supreme
Court.

When Justice Lurton's health started to fail in

1914f word reached Davis that the President was considering
him as his first appointment to the Supreme Court.
Davis dismissed this speculation by saying that he
did "not want that bee to buzz in my bonnet no matter how
softly."

He gave his reasons as follows:
In the first place, Lurton's health is
improving and a vacancy is far away; in
the second place, there is not better
than one chance in five hundred that Wilson
would turn to me; and in the third, I have
settled with that particular ambition, I
really hope for all time and do not want
to reopen the subject.-*-22

Not long after Davis wrote this letter, Justice Lurton
died.

At that time, Davis was on a motor tour of England
123

and Wales.

In a letter to John J. Davis, Charles

Petticord, John W.'s secretary, commented on the favorable
remarks he had heard concerning the chances of the Solicitor
General for an appointment to the Supreme Court.

Petticord

felt that McReynolds had the best chance for the post, in
122
Davis to Father,
Yale University. Davis
he suffered when he was
Fourth Circuit Court of
Nathan Goff resigned to
Senate.

4 March 1914> Box 8, Davis Papers,
is alluding to the disappointment
not selected for the position on the
Appeals that occurred when Judge
become a member of the United States

^^Davis took this opportunity to observe the British
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, "which he pro
nounced the most informal court of high jurisdiction in the
world . . . ." New York Times, July 26, 1914, Sec. 3» p. 2,
col. 7.
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which event Davis would be a favorite to be promoted to
the Attorney General's post."1"2^
As has been noted earlier, President Wilson, in part
to maintain harmony within his official family, appointed
McReynolds to the position; and Gregory was appointed to
succeed McReynolds.

Of these developments, Davis wrote,

"The former, as you know was in no way a surprise, the
125
latter I confess I did not expect!" y
Davis acknowledged that Gregory had performed favor
ably in the New Haven Case.

He further noted, however, that

Gregory
is slightly deaf, has (I take it) no
national prominence, and not only hails
from the same state as [Postmaster
General] Burleson but from the same
town, Austin, and certainly adds nothing
to the situation politically.126
That Gregory was a college classmate of McReynolds and "a
favorite of the omnipotent Col. House" was enough to offset
127
these deficiencies. '

^2^Charles E. Peddicord to John J. Davis, 15 July
1914, Box 8, Davis Papers, Yale University.

"^•^^Davis to Father, 22 August
Papers, Yale University.
126ibid.
127Ibid.

1914» Box S, Davis
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It was quite obvious that Davis was hurt by the appoint
ment of Gregory, going so far as to say that "my vanity
would have been better pleased if his appointment had been
12&
more obviously to be expected."
To a friend who sug
gested his resigning in protest, Davis pointed out that he
could hardly do so in a graceful manner, and that in any
event he saw no reason why he could not work well with
Gregory.
In the summer of 1915, Robert Lansing, the Solicitor
for the State Department, was appointed to succeed William
Jennings Bryan as Secretary of State.

Word soon circulated

that Lansing was attempting to have Davis fill his old
position. In a letter to his sister, Davis made an attempt
to disclaim such speculation, and lay to rest requests
that he return to West Virginia to run for public office.
Davis said that "[a]11 this talk about my transfer from my
present position is moonshine—outside of the cabinet there
is no position in Washington for which I would exchange it,
and even the cabinet is not so congenial a berth for a mere
lawyer like myself."^^

12^Ibid.
12^Davis

to Mrs. John A. Preston, 1 July 1915, Box 4,
Mrs. John Preston Collection, West Virginia University.

Although Davis feared that he was going to be forced
"to choose between my present post and the State Depart130

ment,"

there was another serious and active contender

for the State Department post.

A. Mitchell Palmer, a

politician of some note from Pennsylvania (who would eventu
ally succeed Gregory as Attorney General), and an early
supporter of Wilson's candidacy, expressed an interest in
the vacancy.

Palmer had powerful supporters within the

administration, including Col. House, Postmaster General
Burleson, Joseph Tumulty (the President's secretary), and
the Secretary of the National Democratic Committee.

The

Palmer supporters soon found, however, that "Lansing was
not a man who could be induced to make a major appointment
for reasons which were largely political."131
Gregory was strongly opposed to Davis' transfer and
made his feelings known in a letter to Col. House. House
noted that Gregory agreed to acquiesce to the loss of his

"^^Davis to Father, 23 July
Yale University.
1^1Stanley

1915» Box 6, Davis Papers,

Coben, A. Mitchell Palmer; Politician (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1V&3) p. 117* TEiTs work
gives a detailed account of this entire episode from Pal
mer's point of view.
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solicitor general only if it were considered absolutely
necessary.132
^
The President's position on the question was established
in a personal letter to Gregory, which said in part:
John W. Davis has been recommended to me
as the man best fitted to take the place
vacated by Lansing in the State Depart
ment. The following considerations have
suggested themselves to me in the matter.
1. Is it wise to disturb one who is
so clearly the right man in the right
place [?]
2. I doubt whether he has made any
particular study of questions arising in
international law.
3. The salary of the place is three
thousand less than he is now receiving.
4* He can be expected to succeed
wherever he is put.-^33
Davis took double pleasure in the President's letter:
first of all he was pleased that he was not going to be
forced to leave his post as solicitor general; second, it
pleased him to realize "that the Commander in Chief is
aware of one's existence.""'"-^
Davis' father was suspicious of the entire affair.
He suspected that someone was trying to maneuver his son

^"•^House to Burleson, 25 July 1915» Item No. 2261,
Vol. 15, Burleson Papers, Library of Congress.
"^^Cited in Davis to Father, 23 July 1915» Box 8,
Davis Papers, Yale University.
13/fIbid.
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out of the Solicitor General's office and strongly urged
him to retain his position.

He reasoned:

You are familiar with the business of the
office of Solicitor General and not with
the affairs of the State Department, and
it would require time and diligent study
to make yourself so before you could do
efficient work therein, and besides, a
mistake there would be seen and known to
you disparagment, while mistakes at the
bar are more easily overlooked and
sooner forgotten.135
In any event, the President agreed with Gregory that Davis
should continue as Solicitor General; and Lansing refused
to give his approval to Palmer's appointment to the
position.^36

Eventually, Frank L. Polk was appointed to

137
the position. '
The death of Justice Joseph Lamar once more placed
Davis' name into consideration for a place on the Court.
The strongest argument against his chances for appointment
in this instance was that some of his cases of great impor
tance, including the Harvester Trust Case, were pending

"^John J. Davis to John W. Davis, 23 July
Box 3, Davis Papers, Yale University.

1915,

-^Burleson felt that Palmer deserved consideration
because "Palmer rendered great service to the President in
the pre-convention contest." Burleson to House, Item 2333»
Vol. 15» Burleson Papers, Library of Congress.
After they both left public service, Davis and Polk
became law partners.

before the Court.

Legal ethics precluded "Justice" Davis

ruling on cases that "Solicitor General" Davis had argued
before the Court.
When Gregory told Davis that it was difficult to find
a man of the calibre of Harlan, Brewer, or Miller to fill
the vacancy, Davis replied, "Yes, if you think of them not
as they came to the bench but as they left it."^*^

This

position was filled by the appointment of Louis Brandeis.
When Justice Hughes resigned to accept the Republican
presidential nomination, there was considerable speculation
that Gregory would be appointed to the Supreme Court and
Davis promoted to Attorney General.

Gregory disqualified

himself personally to the President, citing his deafness,
his disqualification in pending cases, and his distrust
139
of his own abilities.
John H. Clarke of Ohio was then
appointed to the vacancy.
At this point, Davis must have felt like the perennial
bridesmaid.

He expressed disappointment that he did not

get the cabinet position, but noted:

"I know of no way

in which a new attorney general can be appointed when the

"^Davis to Father, 6 January 1916, Box 3, Davis Papers,
Yale University.
•^•^Davis to Father, 5 June
Yale University.

1916, Box #, Davis Papers,
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incumbent elects to stay put."^®

If Davis is to be

believed, he no longer had any interest in being appointed
to the Supreme Court.

He observed:

Familiarity [with the Supreme Court] has
done, I am afraid, its deadly work, and
if I do not despise it, at least I do
not yearn for it. On my word, if it had
been offered to me, it would have cost
me a struggle to accept.1^
In the months prior to the presidential election in

1916, there was considerable speculation that Davis would
serve as Wilson's campaign manager.

The New York Times

reported that Davis was the President's personal choice
for the position.1^"2

Nothing came of this speculation,

although Davis was quite active politically during the
ensuing campaign.
In the usual post-election speculation concerning
the composition of the cabinet, Davis had his name mentioned
often as the new Attorney General.However, a wire from
President Wilson to Gregory that stated, "I take it for
granted that these persistent rumors about your leaving

"^Davis to Mother, 5 July
Yale University.

1916, Box 8, Davis Papers,

^New York Times, June 13, 1916, p. 3> col. 1.

^•^New York Times, November 24, 1916, p. 5, col. 1 and
December 8, 1916, p. 1, col. 4*
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the Cabinet are all newspaper talk. It would break my
heart to lose you," ended any immediate chances Davis might
have had for promotion.1^
The end of 1916 found Davis restless in his current
position.

He often spoke of "turning something up dif

ferent" if he did not move from his existing job.

The

entry of the United States into World War I was to remove
any doubt that Davis might have had about "sticking to his
post."

Like all good soldiers, he would serve where the

president felt he was most needed.

^Wilson to Gregory, Box 1, Gregory Papers, Library
of Congress. This item in the Gregory Papers is a typed
copy of the original wire. Until the original wire is dis
covered, this document should be used with caution.

CHAPTER IV
DAVIS AND THE SUPREME COURT
During the period that Davis was Solicitor General,
the Supreme Court disposed of 668 cases in which the United
States was either a party or in which the United States had
a substantial interest.

The annual distribution of these

cases was as follows:
Term of Court

1913
1914
1915
1916

Number of Cases

H#
HO
105
146

1917

Total

663

The Solicitor General was responsible, by statute,
for the government's participation in these cases. It was,
of course, physically impossible for him to prepare the
briefs and argue each of these cases personally.

Most of

the cases were, therefore, prepared and argued by the
several Assistant Attorneys General working under Davis'
supervision.
Of the 668 government cases disposed of by the Supreme
Court in the period 1913-17, Davis argued 67 and appeared
on the brief in 21 others.

This does not include his par

ticipation in miscellaneous petitions to the Court, including

certiorari petitions.

Many, if not most, of the important

government cases that were disposed of while Davis was
Solicitor General were argued by him.

A discussion of the

more important cases will be the subject of this chapter.
While a partially arbitrary listing as this is always open
to question, this list will probably contain most of the
historically or politically important cases in which Davis
was a direct participant.1
The cases that will be discussed in detail are Guinn
v. United States. 236 U. S. 347 (1915); The Pipe Line
Cases, 234 U. S. 54& (1914)? United States v. Midwest Oil
Co., 236 U. S. 459 (1915); International Harvester Co. v.
United States, 246 U. S. 5#7 (1919); Brushaber v. Union
Pacific Railway Co., 240 U. S. 1 (1916); Wilson v. New,
243 U. S. 322 (1917); The Selective Draft Law Cases, 245
U. S. 366 (1917); and Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251
(1916).

For a detailed listing of the federal government's
cases resolved by the Supreme Court, see the annual Report
of the Attorney General. Appendix E of this paper contains a listing of the cases in which Davis either argued
or appeared on the brief before the Supreme Court while
Solicitor General. This list will vary somewhat, depending
on how one defines a case, or if co-joined cases are listed
separately.
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I. The Pipe Line Cases
Davis' first appearance before the Supreme Court as
Solicitor General involved a challenge to the section of
the Hepburn Act of 1906 regulating the interstate transportation of oil by pipe lines.2 The statute was challenged
by six member companies of the Standard Oil group, namely,
the Ohio Oil Company, Standard Oil Company, Standard Oil
Company of Louisiana, Prairie Oil and Gas Company, Uncle
Sam Oil Company, and Tide Water Pipe Company, Ltd.
One of the provisions of the Hepburn Act stated that
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) had jurisdiction
"over corporations or persons engaged in the transportation
of oil or other commodity (excepting water and gas) 'by
means of pipe lines . . . who shall be considered and held
to be common carriers within the meaning and purpose of
the Act.'"^ In accordance with this provision, the ICC
ordered those companies engaged in the interstate

Davis wrote his father: "[i] am just back from the
Court and have my first argument out—though far from well
out, of my system. Had one and one-half hours and pounded
along as best I could . . . ." Davis to Father, [15] Octo
ber 1913, Davis Papers, Box 8, Yale University.
•^The Pipe Line Cases, 234 U. S. 54&, note 1.
^"A. P. Matthew, "Validity of Act of Congress Declaring
Pipe Lines Common Carriers," California Law Review, II
(September, 1914), 494, citing 34 Stat. 584, ch. 3591*

transportation of oil through their pipe lines to file a
5

rate schedule with the Commission.

In an appeal to the Commerce Court of the United
£
States, the oil companies were successful in having the
ICC order reversed, the Commerce Court holding that the
statute was "obnoxious to the Fifth Amendment."

7

The

government appealed the decision of the Commerce Court to
the Supreme Court.
Davis was not optimistic about the government's case.

In a letter to his father, he noted:
I am called to demonstrate that Congress
has the right to declare all oil pipe
lines to be common carriers, whether con
ducted for purely private purposes or not,
and that the provision to that effect in
the Hepburn Act of 1906 does not contravene
the Fifth Amendment. To tell you the
g
truth it is a tight squeak—in my judgment.
Davis' pessimism in this case was perhaps reflected in the
rather conservative approach to the commerce clause that

^In the Matter of Pipe Lines, 24 I.C.C. 1 (1912).
See Chapter II for a discussion of the nature of the
Commerce Court of the United States.

^Matthew, loc. cit. The case reversing the ICC rule
was Prairie Oil and Gas Co. v. United States, 204 Fed. 79#
(1917r
^Davis to Father, 12 August 1913 > Box 8, Davis Papers,
Yale University.

he took in his brief.

At least one commentator is, in
9
fact, quite critical of Davis* handling of this case.
The basic position of the oil companies was this:
To make the owners of private pipe
lines common carriers as to those lines
is to subject private property to a
public use and is a "taking" of property
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.
Since the act, as thus construed, takes
private property without providing for
due compensation, it violates the Fifth
Amendment
Their total argument was much more complicated than this,
but the attack on the constitutionality of the controlling
statute because it "took" property without due compensation
was the main issue and the issue against which Davis
directed his attack.
After asserting that the intent of Congress in passing
the Hepburn Act of 1906 was to bring under ICC jurisdiction
those pipe lines of the type involved in the instant cases,

^James R. Klonoski, "The Influence of Government Counsel
on Supreme Court Decisions Involving the Commerce Power"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan,
195$). Klonoski contends that Davis' "unimaginative ap
proach to argument in commerce clause cases added little
to a broader conceptualization of the power of Congress
over commerce." (Ibid., p. 113*) Not only is Klonoski
critical of Davis' handling of this case in particular but
also of his approach to commerce clause cases in general.
1(^The

Pipe Line Cases, supra, 554.

Davis made a three-point argument in which he attempted to
show that "the act construed as applying to all interstate
oil-carrying pipe lines and making it a condition upon
their operation that they shall act as common carriers
does not violate the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution."
The three points of the argument were:
1.

The object of the Pipe Line Amendment,
namely, to regulate interstate commerce
in oil by protecting well owners and
independent refiners from duress by
pipe-line owners, rendering possible
real competition and preventing monopoly
of interstate commerce in oil is one for
which the authority of Congress may
properly be exercised.

2. The means employed, the prohibition of
pipe lines except upon condition that
they act as common carriers, has a real
and substantial relation to the object
sought, the prevention of monopoly, and
is not arbitrary or beyond the necessities
of the cases.
3.

Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the
adoption by Congress of this means, so
found to be in fact reasonable and
appropriate to the accomplishment of its
purpose.12

The essence of Davis' argument is found under Point 3
in his contention that the act in question did not violate

11
Government Brief, p. II, The Pipe Line Cases,
United States Supreme Court Records and Briefs, Vol. 234>
12Ibid.,

pp. II-III.

1*5
J

the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.

He used

as precedent to support his contention the Court's position
I I

on the regulation of banks by states. ^ Davis asserted
that "the interstate business of pipe lines affected the
public generally, thereby exposing the pipe lines to national
government regulation for the same reasons that the Court
15
had held the banks amenable to state control."'
In an 6-1 opinion (Justice McKenna dissenting), the
Court agreed with Davis' basic argument. In the Court's
opinion, written by Justice Holmes (Chief Justice White
wrote a concurring opinion), it was held:
1.

That the provision of the Hepburn
Act making pipe lines common carriers
if engaged in the interstate trans
portation of oil was applicable to the
lines owned by the Standard Oil Company,
although all oil transported was owned
by Standard Oil.

2.

That "interstate transportation of oil
purchased from the producers by the
owners of the pipe is interstate

"^See Klonoski, o£. cit., pp. 113-14 for a cogent
analysis of the Davis brief.
^The specific cases cited in the Davis brief are
Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104 (1911) and
Engle v. (VMall'ey, 2iy U. S. 123 (1911).
"^Klonoski, 0£. cit., pp. 113-14.
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commerce and under the control of
Congress."

3.

That the requirement that a person
engaged in the interstate transpor
tation of oil by pipe lines to become
a carrier did not involve the taking
of private property, hence that pro
vision of the Hepburn Act to that
effect did not violate the due process
plause of the Fifth Amendment.

4.

That a corporation could transport
oil by pipe line across a state line
to its own oil refinery without be
coming a common carrier if the oil
was drawn from wells owned by the
corporation, "the transportation being
merely incidential to the use of oil
at the end."

The decision met with considerable criticism.

A note

in the Columbia Law Review speaking of the decision asserted
that "[o]nly where the public welfare is vitally involved
. . . should a serious restriction [on interstate commerce]
be sustained," the implication being that in the instant

1

case the public welfare was not vitally involved.

The

note further observed that the question of monopoly in
fluenced the Court's thinking in the case, and answered the
Court's contentions on monopolies by asserting:
A monopoly is not malum in se [a wrong
in itselfJ. The conception of all
property rights is founded upon a kind

•1 £

"Pipe Lines as Common Carriers," Columbia Law Review,
XIV (December, 1914), 663.
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of monopoly. Under common law principles,
the legislative authority may zealously
protect free competition from the abuse of
monopoly. However desirable in a given
case this end may be, the Constitution puts
rigid limitations upon the means employed
to bring about the result. The defendant
should not be made to give the use of its
property to others solely because of a
monopoly in the property.17
The general feeling was, however, that the decision
upheld the intent of Congress in passing the statute in
question and that Congress did in fact possess sufficient
power under the commerce clause to bring the pipe lines
under the jurisdiction of one of its creations, the ICC.
The ruling also marked a change in the attitude of the
Court, one which showed the court more disposed to "save
the constitutionality of remedial legislation, notwith
standing its vulnerability to attack upon technical
grounds."1^
This case, the first to hold that pipe lines, a key
element in the oil industry, were under the jurisdiction
of the ICC,"*"^ was typical of the efforts of the Wilson
Administration (at least during the pre-World War I years)

17

Ibid., p. 664, footnotes omitted.

lfiMatthew, ojd. cit., p. 49&.
"^Theodore A. Huntley, The Life of John W. Davis (New
York: Duffield and Company, 1^24), p. 104.

to bring all aspects of industry under the supervisory
umbrella of the federal regulatory agencies.
This case was not only an important victory for the
Wilson Administration but also an important personal vic
tory for Davis.

By gaining a victory in this case, he

established himself as a "winner" at the very beginning of
his tour of duty.

The victory was made even more enjoyable

by the overwhelming margin of victory ($-1), in a case
which was considered a toss-up by most observers.
II.

Guinn v. United States

The Guinn case, often called the Grandfather Clause
case, was only the second case Davis argued before the
Supreme Court.

It was also one of the few important

individual rights cases (the Alabama peonage case of United
States v. Reynolds, 235 U. S. 133 (1914)» is the strongest
challenger to this claim) that Davis argued while Solicitor
General.

The case involved a constitutional provision

used by the State of Oklahoma to disfranchise blacks living
in that state. In 1910, the state adopted a constitutional
amendment which read:
No person shall be registered as an
elector of this state or be allowed to
vote in any election held herein, unless
he be able to read and write any section
of the Constitution of the state of
Oklahoma; but no person who was, on
January 1st, 1866, or any time prior
thereto, entitled to vote under any form
of government, or who at the time resided

in some foreign nation, and no lineal
descendant of such person, shall be
denied the right to register and vote
because of his inability to so read and
write sections of such Constitution.20
Oklahoma was by no means unique in having such a
provision in its constitution.

The State of Louisiana

was the first to enact such an amendment, doing so in
21
1S9&.
The states of North Carolina, Alabama, Georgia,
and Virginia also added similar provisions to their
22
constitutions.
There had been attempts to have these grandfather
clauses ruled unconstitutional prior to the instant case
but without success. In the case of Giles v. Harris, 1&9
U. S. 475 (1902), which ruled on the Alabama law, the
Court held that "it had no jurisdiction in equity to compel
a board of registers to enroll certain negroes, both
because if the plaintiff's contentions were sound the entire
registration plan was invalid and because the court could

20

Constitution of Oklahoma, Art. Ill, Sec. 4a, cited
in Alfred Hayes, "The Grandfather Clause," Cornell Law
Quarterly, I (November, 1915), 33*
21

Constitution of Louisiana, Art. CXCVIII, Sec. 5»
cited in Ibid., p. 32.
22

Constitution of North Carolina, Art. VI, Sec. 4;
Constitution of Alabama of 1901, Sec. ISO; Constitution
of Georgia, Art. II, Sec. 1; Constitution of Virginia of
1902, Art. II, Sec. 19. Ibid., pp. 32-33.

not undertake the task of enforcing political rights
...

23

A second attempt to have the Court rule on the
2L
Alabama law was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.
The Oklahoma amendment had been attacked in the state

courts, but the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in two cases
(Atwater v. Hassett, 27 Okla. 292 [1910], and Cofield v.
Farre11, 314 Pac. 407 [1913]) upheld its constitutionality.'
It was thus apparent that if judicial relief was to be
afforded those disfranchised by the grandfather clause,
the federal courts were the answer.
Certain black citizens who had been enfranchised prior
to the adoption of the grandfather clause were refused the
right to vote soon after the enactment of the clause.
This refusal was made by state election officials in a
congressional election under the guise of enforcing the
new literacy law.
Two of the election officials of the State of Oklahoma
who enforced the grandfather clause were indicted and con
victed in federal court for "the crime of having conspired
unlawfully, willfully and fraudulently to deprive certain

23Ibid.,
24Giles

p. 33.

v. Teasley, 193 U. S. 146 (1904).

25uThe Constitutionality of the Grandfather Clauses,"
Columbia Law Review, XIV (April, 1914)» 337*

negro citizens, on account of their race and color, of a
right to vote at a general election . . .

The case

reached the Supreme Court on certificate from the Circuit
Court of Appeals to answer the questions of whether the
amendment to the constitution of Oklahoma in question (Art.
Ill, Sec. 4a) was valid and whether the enforcement of
this amendment was a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution.27
It was a well-established doctrine that the Supreme
Court could test the constitutionality of a law by looking

26Guinn v. United States, 236 U. S. 347, 354 (1915).
The specific statute that the plaintiffs in error were
accused of violating was Sec. 19 of the Penal Code:

If two or more persons conspire to
injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate
any citizen in the free exercise or en
joyment of any right or privilege secured
to him by the Constitution or laws of the
United States, or because of his having
so exercised the same, or if two or more
persons go in disguise on the highway or
on the premises of another, with intent
to prevent to hinder his free exercise or
enjoyment of any right or privilege so
secured, they shall be fined not more than
five thousand dollars and imprisoned not
more than ten years, and shall, moreover,
be thereafter ineligible to any office,
or place of honor, profit, or trust
created by the Constitution or laws of
the United States.
^^Sec. 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment, ratified March 30,
1#70, states: "The right of citizens of the United States
to vote shall not be abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude."
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behind the statute to discover its intent.

Furthermore,

it had been established that a state may not do indirectly
29
what it is not permitted to do directly. 7 The government
could, therefore, correctly assume that its chances of win
ning the case were quite good.
The plaintiffs in error contended that since the
determination of the case did not require a ruling on the
constitutionality of the amendment in question, the Court
should not make such a ruling.

30

They also contended that

the provisions in question simply established literacy
requirements and did not contravene the Fifteenth Amend
ment's prohibition against limiting suffrage on the basis
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.

Finally,

in anticipation of what was the most serious attack that
would be made on the grandfather clause, the plaintiffs in
error asserted that "[t]he purpose and motive which moved
the legislature to submit and the people to adopt the
31
amendment are not subject to judicial inquiry."-'

^Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 115 U. S. 356 (lS#6).
^Bailey v* Alabama, 219 U. S. 219 (1911).
^Generally speaking, the Court will avoid ruling on
constitutional questions if it is possible for the case to
be disposed of on another basis.
^Guinn v. United States, supra, 350.
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In a point-by-point attack on his adversary's argu
ment, Davis built up a strong case for the government. He
contended that a ruling on the constitutionality of the
provision in question was "indispensable" to the deter
mination of the case.

He further stated that the grand

father clause violated the Fifteenth Amendment because it
incorporated by reference "the laws of those States which
in terms excluded negroes from the franchise on January 1,
1S66, because of race, color, or condition of servitude,
and so by itself impliedly excludes them for the same
32

reason.''^

Davis also noted that what is implied in a

statute is as much a part of it as what is expressed, and
that the "effect and operation of the Grandfather Clause
is to exclude practically all illiterate negroes and prac
tically no illiterate white men, and from this its
unconstitutional purpose may be legitimately inferred.
In addition to the argument presented by the plain
tiffs in error and the government, Mr. Moorfield Storey
appeared for the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People as amicus curiae, contending that all
discrimination respecting the franchise on account of color
was unconstitutional and that such restriction was both the
32Ibid.

•^Cited in Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous
Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (Indian
apolis, Inch: Bobbs-Merill, 1%2), p. 212.

purpose and effect of the Oklahoma grandfather clause.

The

NAACP justified its appearance in the case by saying that
"the vital importance of these questions to every citizen
of the United States, whether white or colored, seems
amply to warrant the submission of this brief."-^
The case, which was argued on October 17, 1913* was
not decided until June 21, 1915.
wrote the opinion of the Court.

Chief Justice White
There were no dissents,

although Justice McReynolds disqualified himself because
of his participation in the case while Attorney General.
The Court agreed that the State of Oklahoma had the
power to establish a literacy test for exercise of the
right of suffrage and that such power was not open to
supervision by the federal courts; however, if the statute
establishing the literacy test so connected itself with
another provision whose constitutionality was suspect, the
entire statute could be held unconstitutional.
This case, the first to hold a state law unconstitu
tional as a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment, did much
to establish early in his career Davis1 reputation as an
outstanding Solicitor General.

Not only was his reputation

•^Brief for National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People, in Guinn v. United States; supra, cited by
Samuel Krislov, "The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship
to Advocacy," Yale Law Journal, LXXII (March, 1963), 707.
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enhanced in the eyes of his fellow lawyers but also in the
eyes of the Supreme Court.

The esteem that Davis generated
i

among the Justices is indicated by the following account:
When [Davis] appeared in the Supreme
Court chamber every interested observer !
used to be reminded a lot of doting
grandfathers enjoying the performance
of a precocious and favorite grandson.
The Court fairly hovered over Mr. Davis
in its solicitude, particularly Chief
Justice White. The Court can be most
unapproachable and aloof in its demeanor
toward the bar, as every lawyer who has
appeared before it knows. But it never
heckled its fair-haired boy.35
His success in this case, in conjunction with his
victory in the Pipe Line case, meant that Davis had won
his first two cases before the Supreme Court, both of

oc
-^Edward G. Lowry, quoted in Clinton W. Gilbert, You
Takes Your Choice (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1924), p. b3.
Also cited in Stephen B. Wood, Constitutional Politics in
the Progressive Era: Child Labor and the Law IChicago:
University of Chicago Press, ±968), p. 143*

which received widespread comment in the popular press and
in legal circles.^
III.

I

United States v. Midwest Oil Co.

The Midwest Oil case is a key incident in the develop
ment of the constitutional powers of the president.

The

basic question in the case involved the power of the
president to withdraw lands from the public domain without
express authority from Congress to do so.

By act of Congress

The State of Oklahoma did not consider its defeat in
the Guinn case as the final word on the subject; for in
1916, the state legislature passed a law to replace the one
that was held unconstitutional. The new statute provided
all persons who had noted in the general
election of 1914 > when the grandfather
clause was still in effect, were perman
ently qualified to vote without taking a
literacy test. All other persons, except
those given a short extension because of
sickness or absence from the state, were
required to register during a twelve-day
period or be permanently disfranchised.
Rocco J. Tresolini, American Constitutional Law (2d ed.;
New York: Macmillan, 1965), p. 588.
In Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 26# (1939)» the Court
ruled the I9I6 act unconstitutional as a violation of the
Fifteenth Amendment. In the Court's opinion, written by
Justice Frankfurter, it was noted that
the Fifteenth Amendment "nullified sophis
ticated as well as simple-minded modes of
discrimination. It hits onerous procedural
requirements which effectively handicap
exercise of the franchise by the colored
race although the abstract right to vote
may remain unrestricted as to race."

Ibid
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all public lands were declared to be "free and open to
occupation, exploration and purchase by citizens of the
07
United States . . . under regulations prescribed by law."^'

Possession could be claimed after the payment of a nominal
fee.

Land covered by the provisions of the act encompassed

areas that included valuable oil deposits; and during the
first decade of the 20th century, thousands of acres of
land containing oil-bearing rock formations were claimed
by citizens, who thereupon extracted the valuable commodity.
The nature of oil extraction is such that oil is
removed not only from the immediate area of the well but
also from surrounding formations. Since the government was
a large user of petroleum, especially the Navy Department,
there was more than a casual interest by the government in
the disappearance of oil reserves at its expense.
On September 17, 1909, the Director of the Geological
Survey reported to the Secretary of the Interior that oil
reserves were being depleted, especially the rich Western
fields of California, and noted that the oil lands not yet
claimed by private citizens were rapidly disappearing.

The

Director recommended that "pending the enactment of adequate
legislation of this subject, the filing of claims to oil lands
in the State of California should be suspended.''^

•^Act of February 11, 1$97, 29 Stat. 526.
^United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U. S. 459» 467•

IIS

The Secretary of the Interior passed the recommendation
of the Director to President Taft who, on September 27,
1909, withdrew "from all forms of location, settlement,
selection, filing, entry, or disposal" about three million
acres of federal land in California and Wyoming.

About six

months after the President withdrew the land but prior to
an act of Congress on June 25, 1910, giving the President
express permission to withdraw such lands, the Midwest
Oil Company sunk a well on land in the State of Wyoming,
which had been included in the President's 1909 withdrawal
order.
The government brought suit in District Court to re
cover the land as well as payment for 50,000 barrels of
oil alleged to have been extracted.

The government lost

its case in the District Court and appealed to the Sth
Circuit Court of Appeals.

The Circuit Court of Appeals

made no decision in the case but certified certain questions
to the Supreme Court, which thereupon called up the entire
case for review.39
'
Davis estimated that this case, and several others
related to it, involved "the titles to some 4,000,000 acres
of supposed oil lands . . . worth probably one hundred

•^Report of the Attorney General (Washington:
ment Printing Office, 19^4), p» 37.

Govern
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million dollars," actually a conservative estimate of the
property's real worth.^
The case was first argued before the Supreme Court on
January 9 and 12, 1914, with Assistant Attorney General
Knaebel, who was the assistant attorney general specifically
concerned with public lands, on the brief with the Solicitor
General.

Davis* basic argument was that
the President, as Commander-in-Chief of
the Army and Navy, had power to make
the order for the purpose of retaining
and preserving a source of supply of
fuel for the Navy, instead of allowing
the oil land to be taken up for a
nominal sum, the Government then being
obliged to purchase at a great cost what
i t h a d previously owned . . . .
The President, charged with the care of
the public domain, could, by virtue of
the executive power vested in him by
the Constitution (Art. 2, Sec. 1), and
also in conformity with the tacit con
sent of Congress, withdraw, in the
public interest, any public land from
entry or location by private parties.^

Davis was not especially pleased with his oral presen
tation of the case.

He wrote to his mother:

I have argued two cases today [the second
case, United States v. Beatty, 232 U. S.
463, was lost by bavis], and have tonight
the profound depression and dissatisfaction

^Davis to Father, 7 December
Papers, Yale University.

1913, Box 8, Davis

^United States v. Midwest Oil Co., supra, 46#.

that I always feel after an effort of
that sort. In the first case—Midwest
Oil Co.—I had but ten minutes all told
in which I had to compress a number of
brilliant ideas, and when they rang
time on me I was still floundering
around in the year 1356.42
The defendant oil company contended that the with
drawal order of September 27, 1909» was illegal as the
President did not have the power to suspend a statute or
withdraw from entry land that Congress had declared to be
open for settlement or claim by United States citizens,
notwithstanding Congress' acquiescence in this withdrawal.
The Court made no decision after the argument of
January 9 and 12 but restored the case to the docket on
April 20, 1914.

The second argument was made on May 7,

1914» and the decision in the case rendered on February 23,
1915.43
In the majority opinion written by Justice Lamar, the
Court sustained the government's position and reversed the
District Court's holding.

42Davis

Justices Day, McKenna, and Van

to Mother, 12 January
Papers, Yale University.
43Davis

1914 > Box 3 , Davis

was somewhat upset at having to argue the case
again. He wrote his father that "[yjou know how hard it
is to take up and become interested in a case you have once
disposed of, especially when Spring and Spring fever are
hard upon one." Davis to Father, 20 April 1914» Box 6,
Davis Papers, Yale University.
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Devanter dissented from the majority opinion.
McReynolds did not participate in the case.

Justice

The main points

of the Court's opinion were:
1.

Government is a practical affair
intended for practical men, and the
rule that long acquiescence in a
government practice raises a pre
sumption of authority applies to
the practice of executive withdrawals
by the Executive of lands opened by
Congress for occupation.

2.

Law and rules for the disposal of
public lands are necessarily general
in their nature, and Congress may by
implication grant a power to the
Executive to administer the public
domain.

3. Silence of Congress after consideration
of a practice by the Executive may be
equivalent to acquiescence and consent
that the practice be continued until
the power exercised be revoked.^
The essential point of law involved in the Court's decision
was the recognition that the President "acquired authority
from the silences of Congress as well as from its positive
enactments . . .
This case is recognized today as an important one in
the development of the powers of the chief executive, and

^United States v. Midwest Oil Co., supra, headnote.
^Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers
(New York: New York University Press, 1940), p. 113.

is perhaps one of the most important, at least in its last
ing effect, of those argued by Davis while Solicitor
General.^
IV.

The Harvester Trust Case

The Justice Department during the Wilson Administration,
especially during the pre-World War I era, was actively
engaged in a number of antitrust suits.

Both McReynolds

and Gregory had reputations as antitrust lawyers before
they became Attorney General; McReynolds as Assistant
Attorney General from 1903-1907 and Gregory as the govern
ment attorney who was able to gain a favorable consent
decree in the New Haven Railroad trust case in 1914McReynolds was moderately successful in antitrust
ligigation during the relatively short time he was Attorney
General.

Gregory continued in this vein but was thwarted

in his efforts, once the United States had entered World
War I.

Wilson made the decision to suspend most antitrust

action as a concession to the war effort, a position with

^ The oil reserves in question in this case, specifically
those in Wyoming, would later gain notoriety for the part
they played in the Teapot Dome affair during the Harding
Administration. That tract of land originally retained by
the government in Wyoming (and later sold under questionable
circumstances to private interests) was known at the Teapot
Dome tract.
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which Gregory disagreed.^

There was one important anti

trust case, however, that the government continued to
pursue, in part because the defendant had received a dis
solution order in a District Court and appealed the action.
This case was that against the International Harvester
Company and its subsidiary units.
The Harvester Trust case had its origins in the Dis
trict Court of Minnesota before a three-judge Circuit
Zl$
Court.
During the course of the trial, it was shown that
the International Harvester Company, actually a consolidation
of five companies, produced 35 per cent of all harvesting

^For further discussion of the Wilson Administration's
switch on antitrust litigation, see Luther A. Huston, The
Department of Justice (New York: Praeger, 1967)* p. 4^T"
and Homer Cummings and Carl McFarland, Federal Justice:
Chapters in the History of Justice and the Federal Executive
(New York: Macmillan, 1937), p. 347.
~~
id
^ "Potential Restraint of Trade under the Sherman
Antitrust Act," Virginia Law Review, II (November, 1914)>
142. The explanation for the case being brought before
such a court is this:
The Attorney-General having, under Act
Feb. 11, 1903, c. 544, 32 Stat. 323
(U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 1333),
filed with the clerk of the District
Court a certificate that the case was of
general public importance, it came on
for hearing before the Circuit Judges,
Sanborn, Hook, and Smith, notwithstanding
the abolishment of the Circuit Court by
Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1167.
Ibid., p. 142, note 20.

machinery sold in the United States.

It was also shown,

in contrast to other trusts that had come under judicial
AO
scrutiny,
that the International Harvester Company "was
at once a large corporation and a corporation which dealt
fairly with its business rivals."^ This was used by the
defense to raise the question as to whether "a 'good trust'
should be considered in the same category as a 'bad trust.*
On August 12, 1912, the Circuit Judges, by a 2-1 vote,
held that the defendants
had combined and conspired in violation
of the Sherman Antitrust Act to create
an unlawful restraint and monopoly of
interstate trade and commerce in agri
cultural implements; and ordered that
if the entire combination and monopoly
were not dissolved within 90 days a
receiver would be appointed for all of
the properties of the corporate defend
ants.^

^See, for example, Standard Oil v. United States,
221 U. S. 1 (1911), and United States v. American Tobacco
Co., 226 U. S. 324 (1911T
-^Thomas D. Thacher, "The Sherman Act and the Harvester
Case," California Law Review, III (January, 1915)» 123.
This was pointed out in theopinion of the court as follows
While the evidence shows some instances
of attempted oppression of the American
trade by the International [Harvester]
and the American Companies, such cases
are sporadic, and in general their treat
ment of their smaller competitors has
been fair and just.
214 Fed. 9#7» at 993 > cited in Ibid.
CI

y

Huntley, o£. cit., p. 103.

52Ibid.,

pp. 102-103.

The defendants appealed the decision to the Supreme Court.
Davis assigned himself the task of writing the govern
ment's preliminary brief.

The record of the case in the

lower court consisted of "1500 closely printed pages:
that Davis had to read, as well as all the leading antitrust decisions to tighten my grip on the law." ^

The

task must have become tedious; for a few days later, he
wrote to his father:

"[H]ang the Sherman Law—its framers,

evaders, interpreters, all in short save its toiling de
fenders, of whom I am [one].^
The case, first argued on April &, 1915» attracted
national attention.

The basic reason for the special at

tention given this case was that if the Supreme Court held
that size and potential alone were sufficient grounds to
dissolve a corporation, the rule of reason, heretofore the
guiding principle in trust cases, would be abandoned by
55
the Court.
Attorney General Gregory and Davis both participated

^Davis to Father, 17 February 1915 > Box 8, Davis
Papers, Yale University.
^Davis to Father, 26 February
Papers, Yale University-

1915> Box 8, Davis

rc
•^"The Dissolution of the International Harvester Com
pany," Harvard Law Review, XVIII (November, 1914)» &9«

c6

in the oral argument.

The Attorney General's partici

pation was itself an indication of the government's strong
interest in the controversy.

Gregory opened the argument

by defining the government's basic position, and Davis then
"supported its position by an argument on the law and its
57
application to the facts."
The attorney for the International Harvester Company
stated what was the key to the appellants' argument, namely
[T]he charge of pre-eminence has been sustained, but the

eg
charge of monopoly and oppression has wholly failed."^
Carrying this argument to its logical conclusion, retorted
Davis,
would strike from the Sherman Law its social
and political significance, and restrict its
economic effect to a prohibition against rais
ing prices. Its [the International Harvester
Company's] attorney forgets that the Sherman
Law was passed because kings were bfting set
up to rule the country's commerce.5"

^Davis did not take credit for the brief prepared for
the case. He wrote:
Gregory had nothing to do with its preparation
and I very little. [Assistant to the Attorney
General] Todd and [Thurlow M.] Gordon are
entitled to the credit—and I think it quite
creditable.

Davis to Father, 1 April 1915 > Box 3, Davis Papers, Yale
University.
^New York Times, April 9, 1915, p« 15» col. 2.
5^Ibid.

59Ibid.

Davis further contended that the Sherman Act was a
"deliberate effort of conservative, clear-thinking men to
place some reasonable check on that liberty of combination
which, if permitted to the 'logical extreme,' would in the
end imperil liberty itself.
On October 21, 191$> after a second argument before
the Supreme Court, but before the Court ruled on the case,
a motion was submitted by the appellants to dismiss their
petition.

Tho Court accepted the motion to dismiss.^

Prior to the acceptance of tho motion by the Court, tho
International IIarvest|i|^fl^'y>'•^"vreed to an order that
provided that the^jHp^

*,rarious harvesting

machine lines k\jH^p"''

names, that the

company disposeBf

jhe equipment manu

factured under W*

/> was made, that the

Harvester companV
sales representative

/iving more than one
Sco\in in the United

States, and that if thoTtrrrrclcms of the agreement wore
not carried out and proved adequate within 18 months of
the end of the World War the government would have tho
right to roinstitute the suit.
The effect of this consent decree was to sustain the
government's basic position that

^Huntley, loc. cit.

(J

International Harvester Company v. United States,

24tf U . 3 . 5 8 7 ( 1 0 1 0 ) .

—

^Report of the Attorney General (Washington:
ment Printing OITice, .L9 I 9^ > pp. 01-62.
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combinations of competitive units on a
scale large enough to make the resulting
restriction of competition direct and sub
stantial are unlawful without more, on the
theory that it was not the policy of the
Sherman Act to wait until the evils of undue
concentration of commercial power have al
ready come to pass but rather to strike
at once at undue concentration of commercial
power itself.^3
Although the final disposition of the Harvester Trust
case came just as Davis was leaving the Office of Solicitor
General, and in fact never was ruled on by the Court, it
is instructive for the insight that it gives one into
Davis' position on the trust question.

It makes for inter

esting speculation to wonder what the effect would have
been if Gregory and Davis had been given a free rein in the
prosecution of antitrust cases, free of White House re
straint that came from the entry of the United States into
World War I.
V.

Brushaber v. Union

Pacific Railroad Co.

On February 25, 1913> the Sixteenth Amendment to tho
Constitution of the United States was certified as being
ratified by the requisite number of states.

This amend

ment was a direct result of an earlier Court decision,
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U. S.

9 0395),

rehearing, 15$ U. 3. 60! (1395). In this case, tlu: Act of

r'^Ibi-(l.,

p. (ui.
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Davis further contended that the Sherman Act was a
"deliberate effort of conservative, clear-thinking men to
place some reasonable check on that liberty of combination
which, if permitted to the 'logical extreme,' would in the
end imperil liberty itself."^
On October 21, 1918, after a second argument before
the Supreme Court, but before the Court ruled on the case,
a motion was submitted by the appellants to dismiss their
petition.

The Court accepted the motion to dismiss.^

Prior to the acceptance of the motion by the Court, the
International Harvester Company agreed to an order that
provided that the company dispose of various harvesting
machine lines known under various trade names, that the
company dispose of the factories where the equipment manu
factured under these various trade names was made, that the
Harvester company be prohibited from having more than one
sales representative in any city or town in the United
States, and that if the conditions of the agreement wore
not carried out and proved adequate within 18 months of
the end of the V/orld V/ar the government would have the
right to reinstitute the suit.^
The effect of this consent decree was to sustain the
government's basic position that

^Huntley, loc. cit.
^'International Harvester Company v. United states,
248 U. S. 587 U9I9).
^Report of the Attorney General (Washington:
ment Printing Office, 19-1-9), r>P.

Govern

combinations of competitive units on a
scale large enough to make the resulting
restriction of competition direct and substantial are unlawful without more, on the
theory that it was not the policy of the
Sherman Act to wait until the evils of undue
concentration of commercial power have al
ready come to pass but rather to strike
at once at undue concentration of commercial
power itself.^3
Although the final disposition of the Harvester Trust
case came just as Davis was leaving the Office of Solicitor
General, and in fact never was ruled on by the Court, it
is instructive for the insight that it gives one into
Davis' position on the trust question.

It makes for inter

esting speculation to wonder what the effect would have
been if Gregory and Davis had been given a free rein in the
prosecution of antitrust cases, free of White House re
straint that came from the entry of the United States into
World War I.
V.

Brushaber v. Union

Pacific Railroad Co.

On February 25, 19-13, the Sixteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States was certified as being
ratified by the requisite number of states.

This amend

ment was a direct result of an earlier Court decision,
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429 0-^95),
rehearing, 15^ U. S. 601 (1&95). In this case, the Act of

r,

' l l ) U l . , p . (u:i.
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Congress of 1394 providing for a federal income tax of two
per cent on salaries in excess of $4000, including profits
derived from real estate and municipal bonds, was held
unconstitutional because it was a direct tax.^

As a

direct tax that was not apportioned among the various states
in accordance with Art. I, Sec. 2, CI. 3 of the Constitution

f)L

^"There are three provisons in the Constitution speaking
to the question of taxation. Art. I, Sec. 2, CI. 3 states
that "... direct taxes shall be appropriated among the
several states which may be included within this Union,
which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of
free persons, including those bound to service for a term
of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of
all other persons."
Art. I, Sec. 8, CI. 1 says: "The Congress shall have
power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises
. . . but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States. Art. I, Sec. 9> CI. 4 reads:
"No capitation, or other direct tax, shall be laid, unless
in proportion to the census or enumeration herein before
directed to be taken."
In the case of Hylton v. United States, 3 Dallas 171
(1796), the Court ruled that a tax on carriages for the
conveyance of persons, kept for private use, was not a di
rect tax and therefore not in violation of Art. I, Sec. 8,
CI. 1 of the Constitution because of its lack of uniform
assessment. In the dictum of the opinion the justices
identified direct taxes as capitation taxes and taxes on
land. Justice Paterson, who had been a member of the Con
stitutional Convention of 17^7, "testified to his recol
lection that the principal purpose of the provision has
been to allay the fear of the Southern states lest their
Negroes and land should be subjected to a specific tax."
(Norman J. Small, ed., The Constitution of the United States:
Analysis and Interpretation [Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1964], p. 367).
The ruling in the Hylton case was not challenged until
the post-Civil War era. Several of the war taxes enacted
during the Civil War were challenged as being direct taxes.
The Supreme Court sustained all of these taxes, among them
an income tax that was upheld in the case of Springer v.
United States, 102 U. S. 5#6 (1S$1).

of the United States, the Court held that the entire act
was unconstitutional.
Although the Court did not expand the Pollock ruling
to other types of taxation, it was felt by many that a
constitutional amendment was necessary to overturn the
decision and permit the imposition of a graduated income
tax.

The passage of such an amendment became a prime ob

jective for the progressive

elements in both of the major

political parties as well as the Populist (People's) Party.
In 1913» this objective was attained with the adoption of
the Sixteenth Amendment, which "authorized] taxes on in
comes from whatever source derived and without apportion6
ment among the states . . . ."
One of the provisions of the Tariff Act of October 3,
66
1913» imposed an income tax.
The act provided "for a
graduated tax on all incomes over four thousand dollars,
with certain exemptions, and imposing on all corporations
a duty to retain and pay over the tax due on the interest
from corporate bonds and mortgages."

6*5
^Carl Brent Swisher, American Constitutional Development (2d. ed.; Cambridge, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1954),
pp"T"5o#-#9.
6633

Stat. 166.

^William C. Jones, "Sixteenth Amendment," California
Law Review, IV (May, 1916), 335.
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One Brushaber, a stockholder in the Union Pacific
Railroad Company, filed a petition to enjoin the company
from complying with the income tax provisions of the Tariff
Act of 1913•

The case originated in the District Court of

the Southern District of New York, where a decree was
issued sustaining a motion to dismiss.

The case was

appealed directly to the Supreme Court, where it was argued
on October 14-15, 1915.68
The United States was not one of the parties in the
suit. It was obvious, however, that the federal government
had an important stake in the controversy.

For this reason,

the Court permitted the United States to appear as amicus
curiae, in support of the lower court's decree dismissing
69
the suit.
Davis and Assistant Attorney General William
Wallace argued the case for the government.^

^Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 240 U. S. 1.
This case was actually the leading case in a series chal
lenging the income tax of 1913* These cases are often
collectively known as the Income Tax Cases.
69
^Amicus curiae, Latin for "a friend of the court,"
literally means one "who has no right to appear in a suit
but is allowed to introduce argument, authority, or evi
dence to protect his interests." (Black's Law Dictionary
[4th ed.; St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 19t>8], p.
107). See Samuel Krislov, "The Amicus Cruiae Brief: From
Friendship to Advocacy," Yale Law Journal, LXXII (March,
1963)» 694-721, for a history of this concept in American
jurisprudence.
70

' T h e importance o f the amicus curiae petition in the
instant case is illustrated by the appellee's failure to
make an oral argument or submit a brief.
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The argument of the appellant, which one reviewer
called more ingenious than convincing,^1 made three basic
attacks on the statute.

First of all, the appellant con

tended that the words of the Sixteenth Amendment, "income
from whatever source derived," forbade exemptions; and
since the act made exemptions, it was unconstitutional.
Secondly, it was asserted "that the tax, if held to
be indirect, would, because of its progressive features,
its exemptions, and the obligation placed on corporations,
72
violated the uniformity provisions of the constitution."'
Finally, the contention was made that the provisions of the
act violated the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Davis' brief spoke directly to each of the appellant's
basic propositions.

In a statement that was the key to

his entire argument, Davis flatly asserted that the Six
teenth Amendment removed all restrictions on apportion
ment to which income taxes had previously been subjected.
Furthermore, the rule of general uniformity, as established
in Art. I, Sec. 8, CI. 1, was not violated either by
exemption, classification, or discrimination, "unless so
arbitrary or outrageous as to indicate favoritism or
73
prejudice."
71
Jones, loc. cit.
"^Ibid. That is, it would violate Art. 1, Sec. 8,
CI. 1 of the Constitution.
^Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., supra, 6.
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Speaking further on the question of uniformity, Davis
noted that the Court had long held that the express uni
formity clause required only geographic and not intrinsic
ni

uniformity.

Finally, Davis contended that the due process

clause of neither the Fifth nor Fourteenth Amendment for
bade reasonable exemption, classification, or discrimination.
In a unanimous opinion, delivered by Chief Justice
White, the Court agreed with each of Davis' contentions.
Essentially, the Court held the following:
I.

The purpose of the Sixteenth Amendment
is to relieve all income taxes when
imposed from apportionment and from
consideration of the source.

II.

The uniformity of taxation required by
the Constitution is geographic.

III.

The Fifth Amendment is not a limita
tion upon the taxing power conferred
upon Congress by the Constitution.

IV.

The expediency of levying a tax, which
is within the power of Congress to
levy, is not a question which the Court
can decide.

^This doctrine was established in Knowlton v. Moore,
17# U. S. 41 (1900), a case upholding a graduated inheritance tax that was part of the war revenue act of 1&9B.

In short, the case
vindicate[d] the general belief that had
previously existed that the Sixteenth
Amendment had made possible an effective,
non-apportioned income tax, with appro
priate exemptions, which the relatively
unequal distribution of population and
wealth under the former necessity of
apportionment had made impossible.?5
That is not to say, however, that the decision and its
implications left everyone pleased.

One article noted:

"The court's disposal of the contention . . . that the
progressive feature of the tax violated the fundamental
elements of a tax and is, therefore, unconstitutional,
seems entirely too summary."

Another article, which was

written before the Brushaber decision but published before
it was announced by the Court, made an even stronger
criticism of the income tax law:
Levying upon a man a tax whose amount
shall be larger only because he is seen
to be able to pay that larger amount, is
an example of empirical legislation not
to be countenanced under our form of
government. It strikes down equality
before the law. . . . Confiscation . . .
may be reached, though disguised under
another name.77

75nThe Constitutionality of the Federal Income Tax of
1913i" University of Pennsylvania Law Review, LXIV (March,
1916), w:
Jones, o£. cit., p. 336.
^Frank W. Hackett, "The Constitutionality of the
Graduated Income Tax," Yale Law Journal, XXV (April, 1916),
439.
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Davis himself had privately expressed some opposition
to the income tax law, and a letter to his father shows
some of the negative feelings harbored against the Court's
reasoning in the case (even though it agreed point by
point with his own brief):

"Appreciating your desire for

light and diverting reading, I send you the opinion in the
Income Tax

Case.

If you find some difficulty in following

it, do not despair—there are others."

Nevertheless,

this decision is always listed as one of Davis' great
victories as Solicitor General; and today the income tax
79
is the federal government's largest source of revenue.,y
VI.

Wilson v. New

One of the most controversial cases in which Davis
go
participated as Solicitor General was Wilson v. New,
the
so-called Adamson Law case.

The circumstances leading up

to this case were part of the labor disorder that was wide
spread during the first two decades of the 20th century.
Specifically, the case grew out of an act of Congress, the
Adamson Act,

which attempted to forestall a threatened

"^Davis to Father, 26 January
Yale University.

1916, Box 8, Davis Papers,

^This case is an example of Davis giving his client,
the United States, the best possible argument in court, not
withstanding his personal feelings on the merits of the
question.
8o243
gl39

U. S. 332 (1917).

Stat. 721.

i;

general strike by railroad workers.
In 1916, the various railroad brotherhoods made a

concerted effort to establish an industry-wide eight-hour
$2
day with time and a half for overtime.
President Wilson
realized that a nation wide work stoppage in the rail in
dustry would be catastrophic.

Wilson was able to get the

railroad owners to agree to arbitration, but the workers
refused to participate in such an action.

Wilson then

suggested that an eight-hour day be adopted by the railroad
industry.

This time the employees agreed, and the railroad
go
owners refused to accede to the President's request. ?
After this apparent impasse was reached, the unions

announced that they would strike on Labor Day, 1916.
Following this announcement, the railroads appealed to the
federal government for protection of their property.

The

Wilson Administration replied that federal marshals "were
not police officers, and it was no part of their duty to

go
For a general discussion of the background to the
enactment of the Adamson Law, see Swisher, o£. cit., pp.

579-31.
^For a useful general discussion of the problem of
adopting an eight-hour work day in American industry and
the federal government's participation in the controversy,
see John R. Commons, "Eight-Hour Shifts by Federal Legis
lation," American Labor Legislation Review, VII (March,

1917), 139^5^

guard private property, railroads or otherwise, within a
state.
In order to prevent a national emergency, which
certainly would have occurred if the strike had taken
place, the President sent a message to Congress asking
that it pass legislation establishing an eight-hour day
in the railroad industry.

By acting with uncharacteristic

speed, Congress passed such legislation on September 1,

fSwisher,

ojo. cit., p. 5#0. The Wilson Administration
had changed the government's traditional policy of using
federal forces (often troops) to end strikes under the
guise of protecting property rights. Furthermore, the
Justice Department refused to prosecute contempt cases
brought against labor by private litigants. Davis, who had
long been a foe of the use of injunctions in labor disputes,
asked the rhetorical question:
Is it not better that reliance should be
placed in the future as in the past upon
the readiness of parties in interest to
bring to the attention of the court any
acts of disobedience and the willingness
of the judges to do their duty by enforcing
the order which they enter?
Davis to A. Leo Weil, 25 November 1913» File 169497> Record
Group 60, National Archives, cited in Ibid, p. 579.

only three days before the strike was to occur.^

The act

was to go into effect on January 1, 1917.
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pThe key provisions of the act read as follows:
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled
That beginning January first, ninteen hundred and seventeen
eight hours shall, in contracts for labor and service, be
deemed a day's work and the measure or standard of a day's
work for the purpose of reckoning the compensation for
services of all employees who are now or may hereafter
be employed by any common carrier by railroad, except
railroads independently owned and operated not exceeding
one hundred miles in length, electric street railroads,
and electric interurban railroad^ which is subject to the
provisions of the Act of February fourth, eighteen hundred
and eighty-seven, entitled 'An Act to regulate commerce,'
as amended, and who are now or may hereafter be actually
engaged in any capacity in the operation of trains used
for the transportation of persons or property on rail
roads, except railroads independently owned and operated
not exceeding one hundred miles in length, electric
street railroads, and electric interurban railroads, . . .
Sec. 2. That the President shall appoint a commission
of three, which shall observe the operation and effects
of the institution of the eight-hour standard work day
as above defined and the facts and conditions affecting
the relations between such common carriers and employees
during a period of not less than six months nor more than
nine months, in the discretion of the commission, and
within thirty days thereafter such commission shall re
port its findings of the President and Congress; . . .
Sec. 3. That pending the report of the commission
herein provided for and for a period of thirty days
thereafter the compensation of railway employees subject
to this act for a standard eight-hour workday shall not be
reduced below the present standard day's wage, and for
all necessary time in excess of eight hours such employees
shall be paid at a rate not less than the pro rata rate
for such standard eight-hour workday.
Sec. 4. That any person violating any provision of
this Act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon con
viction shall be fined not less than $100 and not more
than $1,000, or imprisoned not to exceed one year, or both.
39 Stat. 721, cited in Charles W. Bunn, "The Supreme Court on
the Adamson Law," Minnesota Law Review, I (May, 1917)» 395-96.

The act resulted in an outcry from the rail industry,
as was to be expected, and from some legal writers.

One

critic of the law felt that the act was an unfair intrusion
by government into the bargaining arena:
The railroad employees whom this law affects
are organized into the strongest labor unions
in the United States. Their labor unions are
the employee's answer to the factory system.
Comprising, as they do, almost a monopoly of
the workmen in this trade, they are able to
employ experts to bargain for all their mem
bers with the railroad companies which have
a monopoly of the jobs. By means of this
organization and this collective bargaining,
as it is called, the two parties to the labor
contract are equally strong. They are able
by higgling and bargaining to settle upon an
economically fair labor contract. Congress
by the Adamson Law interfered in this bar
gaining in favor not of the weaker party
but in favor of one of two equally competent
parties. The law is absolutely without
precedent
The author of this article apparently overlooked the
fact that the very equality of the two parties involved
in the dispute made the strike appear inevitable unless
the President took some action.

As leader of the nation,

he could not afford to stand by and allow the most important
transportation facility then existent come to a standstill
simply because two equal parties could not reach an agree
ment.

#6
Malcolm H. Lauchheimer, "The Constitutionality of
the Eight-Hour Railroad Law," Columbia Law Review, XVI
(November, 1916), 564•
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One of the outstanding constitutional scholars of
the day, Thomas Reed Powell, felt that the law was not so
one-sided as the rail industry asserted, for "[t]he Act
must be regarded as coercive upon employees as well as

do
upon employers ...."'

Also supporting the act, a note

in the Harvard Law Review observed that in spite of the
experimental nature of the law, "weighing . . . all the
interests on either side we cannot say that the congres
sional decision that such measures were necessary was
clearly unreasonable.

Its constitutionality even as an

experiment therefore must be sustained."
As is almost always the case in the American political
system, the dispute was settled by the Supreme Court, in

&7

Thomas Reed Powell, "Due Process and the Adamson Law,"
Columbia Law Review, XVII (February, 1917)> 11$. In answer
to the contention that the act deprived the railroads and
its employees of liberty of contract without due process
of law, Powell noted:
. . . Congress in regulating interstate com
merce must not deprive any one of liberty or
property without due process of law. Clearly
the Adamson Law deprives interstate carriers
and their employees of their freedom to con
tract on terms of their own choosing. This
is both a liberty and a property right. The
Constitution forbids, however, not all depri
vation of liberty or property, but only those
which are wanting in due process.
Ibid., p. 114.

dd
"The Experimental Aspect of the Adamson Law,"
Harvard Law Review, XXX (May, 1917), 742.

go
this instance almost immediately. 7

The Court heard argu

ments for and against the act on January S, 1917.^ In
the appellant's brief, Davis (who was joined in argument
by Frank Hagerman, a Special Assistant to the Attorney
General, with the Attorney General and Assistant Attorney
General Underwood on the brief) defended both the con
stitutionality of the provisions establishing hours-ofservice and the provisions establishing minimum wages.
Since the appellee's strongest attack was made on the
wage establishment section of the act, Davis concentrated
on this question in his argument.

He contended that the

right of Congress to establish wages in interstate commerce
was due to three factors:

first, an adequate wage is

essential to safe, regular, and efficient service in inter
state commerce, and the public, with Congress as its agent,
has a right to demand payment of such a wage; second, the
public has a vested interest, since it will eventually be
the one that pays through increased rates, in the

gQ
7Davis played both a "consulting and supervisory" role
in the government's defense of the act from the very begin
ning of the litigation. Davis to Mother, 16 November 1916,
Box #, Davis Papers, Yale University.
^The case was an appeal from an holding in the Dis
trict Court of the Western District of Missouri declaring
the Adamson Act unconstitutional. Wilson, the appellant,
was United States Attorney for that district, and Now, et
al., were receivers for the bankrupt Missouri, Oklahoma,
and Gulf Railroad Co.
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maintenance of wages that are not too high; and finally,
since wage disputes are often the cause of a disruption of
the flow of interstate commerce, it naturally follows
that Congress has the power to set wages for persons en
gaged in interstate commerce.
In less detail, Davis also contended that the hoursof-service aspects of the act were constitutional, that the
classifications made by the law were not arbitrary, and
that the act did not deprive the railroads of liberty of
contract or property without due process.
In reply to Davis, the appellee's asserted that Sec. 1
of the act (which established the eight-hour day) was un
constitutional per se because it was an arbitrary inter
ference with the liberty of contract, had no substantial
relation to interstate commerce, and lacked a standard of
conduct. In any event, according to the appellee, the
"extreme interference with the liberty of contract" in
Sec. 3 of the act (requiring that wages for the new eighthour day be no less than was paid for the ten-hour day)
was sufficient to cause the entire act to be declared un
constitutional. In closing, the appellee contended that
the reason for the act, the emergency precipitated by a
threatened strike, did not give Congress the power to pass

the Adamson Law.

Citing the Milligan case,^" the attorney

for the railroad reminded the Court that "emergency may
not create power."
Although the case was argued on three successive days,
January 8, 9, and 10; Davis completed his oral argument on
the first day.

It took him one and one-half hours to

complete his argument, unusually long for the normally
terse Davis.
presentation:

He was confident of victory after he made his
"'They' say I made a forcible argument.

For

myself I only know that I have rarely argued a case of
which I felt myself more throughly the master . . . ."^
Before the Court made its decision in the case public,
the railroads announced that they accepted the eight-hour
day; and, in the words of Davis, "the strike vanished into
93
thin air." ^He was aware that cynics would question the
industry's timing:
There will be those who will believe that
the Railroads had some inkling of the
coming event, and seized upon the foreign

^ Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wallace 2 (1666). This case
involved the power of the President to establish a mili
tary commission to try a non-combatant citizen where the
civil courts were open and functioning. In an unanimous
opinion, the Court held that he could not do so.

^2Davis to Mother, 8 January
Papers, Yale University.
^Davis to Mother, 20 March
Yale University.

1917» Box 8, Davis

1917, Box S, Davis Papers,

situation to take their medicine under cover
of patriotic motives. I am not inclined,
however, to believe this—as I think the
Supreme Court is the one leak-proof branch

of the Government.94
On March 19, 1917> a badly divided Court rendered its

decision.

Chief Justice White wrote the opinion of the

Court. Justice McKenna wrote a concurring opinion. Jus
tices Day, McReynolds, and Pitney each wrote dissenting
opinions, with Justice Van Devanter concurring in Pitney's
dissent.

Only Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Clarke filed

no opinions (they, of course, concurred with the Chief
Justice's majority opinion).

Thus, by a vote of 5-4> the

Court upheld the Adamson Act.
The essential point made in the Chief Justice's
opinion was that the act was a legitimate exercise of the
power of Congress to regulate commerce.

He admitted that

the establishment of wages and hours of labor were essen
tially a matter of private contract, however he justified
Congressional involvement in the instant case on the
grounds that "the public interests of society in the
continued operation and promotion of interstate trans
portation subjects those engaged therein to a public power

94Ibid.

95

of regulation."7^

Appellee's contention that "emergency

may not create power," citing the dictum of the Milligan
case, was rebuffed by the Chief Justice who asserted that
an emergency, may, however, "afford a reason for exerting
96
a power already enjoyed."7
The majority opinion, which upheld the Adamson Act
as both a regulation of hours of work and a regulation of
wages, broke new ground, not because it upheld the
establishment of an eight-hour day, but because it upheld
a wage law whose justification was to prevent the orderly

95nrphe Adamson Act," Yale Law Journal, XXVI (April,
1917), 496. This principle had been established in Munn
v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1&77), where the Court
declared:
«

When, therefore, one devoted his property
to a use in which the public has an interest,
he, in effect, grants to the public an
interest in that use and must submit to be
controlled by the public for the common good,
to the extent of the interest he has thus
created.
Cited in Ibid., p. 496, note 2.
^Small, 0£, cit., p. 186, note 65.

flow of interstate commerce.^
The authority of Congress to establish an eight-hour
work day was not questioned by the majority of the Court:
"We put the question as to the eight hour standard entirely
out of view on the ground that the authority to permanently
establish it is so clearly sustained as to render the subject not disputable."

97
7

'Previously the Court had upheld various state
statutes regulating hours of employment as a valid exercise
of the police power. In Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366
(1#9&), the Court upheld a statute regulating hours based
on the inherent danger of long hours in certain occupa
tions such as mining. The case of Muller v. Oregon, 208
U. S. 412 (190$), upheld a statute regulating hours of work
for certain classes of employees, specifically women and
children. In Bunting; v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 426 (1917), a
state law was held constitutional that regulated hours of
work on the theory that excessive work in general is harm
ful to the individual and by extension to the community.
A federal law that regulated hours of work in order
to make interstate transportation safer had been held a
legitimate exercise of the commerce power in Baltimore &
Ohio Railroad Co. v. ICC, 221 U. S. 612 (19HT
Q£>
Charles Kellogg Burdick, "The Adamson Law Decision,"
Cornell Law Quarterly, II (May, 1917), 321. The cases cited
by Chief Justice White in support of this position were
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. ICC, supra, note 95,
and Missouri, Kansas, and Texas Railroad Co. v United
States, 231 U. 5. 112 U913).
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There was considerable attention given to the strong
QQ

dissenting opinions,

7

but Davis noted that "notwithstanding

the dissent it is a great victory, and I have received my
share of the congratulations.""'"^

Davis richly deserved

the plaudits given him for the government's victory in
the case.

The decision, coming as it did just before the

American entry into World War I, gave notice to both labor
and business that the Court would permit extraordinary
measures of control by the President and Congress during
the impending crisis, notwithstanding the Chief Justice's
disclaimer to the Milligan rule.

go
77See, for example, Frank W. Hackett, "The Adamson
Act Decision," American Law Review, LII (1913), 23-40;
and Thomas Reed Powell, "The Supreme Court and the Adamson
Law," University of Pennsylvania Law Review, LXV (May,
1917)t 607-31. In the latter article, the author antici
pates the behavioral approach to the study of the judicial
process when he notes that the case
. . . invites earnest consideration of the
problem of discovering the factors that
influence or determine the conclusions of
each individual on the bench. Why do
judges disagree? Why is one so firmly con
vinced of the correctness of a conclusion
which another so vigorously condemns as
unsound?
Ibid., p. 631.
"^^Davis to Mother, 20 March 1917, Box 8 , Davis Papers,
Yale University. Davis observed in the same letter that
some of the newspaper praise he received in regard to his
success in court "exaggerated my pulchritude and belittles
my argument."

flow of interstate commerce.^
The authority of Congress to establish an eight-hour
work day was not questioned by the majority of the Court:
"We put the question as to the eight hour standard entirely
out of viev; on the ground that the authority to permanently
establish it is so clearly sustained as to render the subog
ject not disputable."

97
7'Previously the Court had upheld various state
statutes regulating hours of employment as a valid exercise
of the police power. In Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366
(1398), the Court upheld a statute regulating hours based
on the inherent danger of long hours in certain occupa
tions such as mining. The case of Muller v. Oregon, 20#
U. S. 412 (1908), upheld a statute regulating hours of work
for certain classes of employees, specifically women and
children. In Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 42o (1917), a
state law was held constitutional that regulated hours of
work on the theory that excessive work in general is harm
ful to the individual and by extension to the community.
A federal law that regulated hours of work in order
to make interstate transportation safer had been held a
legitimate exercise of the commerce power in Baltimore &
Ohio Railroad Co. v. ICC, 221 U. S. 612 (1911T
Qg
Charles Kellogg Burdick, "The Adamson Law Decision,"
Cornell Lav/ Quarterly, II (May, 1917), 321. The cases cited
by Chief Justice White in support of this position were
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. ICC, supra, note 95,
and Missouri, Kansas, and Texas Railroad Co. v United
States, 231 0. 5. 112 (1913).

147
There was considerable attention given to the strong
gg
dissenting opinions, 7 but Davis noted that "notwithstanding
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share of the congratulations."'1'^

Davis richly deserved

the plaudits given him for the government's victory in
the case.

The decision, coming as it did just before the

American entry into World War I, gave notice to both labor
and business that the Court would permit extraordinary
measures of control by the President and Congress during
the impending crisis, notwithstanding the Chief Justice's
disclaimer to the Milligan rule.
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Ibid., p. 631.
"'"^Davis to Mother, 20 March 1917> Box 3, Davis Papers,
Yale University. Davis observed in the same letter that
some of the newspaper praise he received in regard to his
success in court "exaggerated my pulchritude and belittles
my argument."

The Adamson Act itself indicated that Congress would
accede to the President's request for emergency power with
acquiescence and speed.

One can speculate that had Davis

lost the case by the same margin that it was won, 5-4> he
could have asked for a rehearing after America's entry
into the war, alleging constitutionality on the basis of
the President's war powers.
VII.

The Selective Draft Law Cases

On May 1$, 1917, less than a month after the nation's
entry into the war, Congress passed a law entitled "An
Act to Authorize the President to Increase Temporarily the
101
Military Establishment of the United States."
Among
other things, the act authorized the President to con
script 500,000 men by a selective draft; and after that
number was attained, he was authorized to conscript as
many men as he felt necessary.
This was not the first conscription law enacted by
Congress.

During the Civil War, several acts had been

passed by Congress authorizing the drafting of men into
the military service.

The Supreme Court was not called

upon to rule on the constitutionality of these laws,
although there was a case in a lower federal court,

10140

Stat. 76.
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Kneedler v. Lape, 45 St. 23& (1363), upholding the draft
laws.

There had also been a number of cases in the Southern
102
states in which Confederate draft laws had been upheld.
£•:)
Unlike the Civil War acts, the selective service

provisions of the 1917 act were ruled upon by the Supreme
Court.

Six of these cases are known collectively as the

Selective Draft Law CasesThe defendants in these six
cases alleged that the act was unconstitutional for the
following reasons:

102
The use of holdings of the courts of the Confederate
States to explain the Constitution of the United States
may appear absurd at first thought, but it should be
remembered that
[t]he provisions of the Confederate
Constitution on war, the army, navy and
militia were taken bodily from the Con
stitution of the United States. The
opinions in the cases in the.seceding states
are as much interpretative of one consti
tution as of the other. And they are in
fact, as they even claim to be, commentaries
upon the powers of the Congress of the
United States.
William C. Jones, "The Selective Draft Act," California
Law Review, VI (March, 1913), 221.
103 245 U. S. 366 (1918).
The docket titles of the
various cases are Arver v. United States, Otto Wagerin v.
United States, Walter WangerTn v. United States, Kramer
v. United States, and GraubarcT v. United States. Argued
at the same time by Davis were four other cases challen
ging the constitutionality of the Selective Draft Act.
They are not included in the Selective Draft Law Cases
because the Court wrote a separate opinion in each of
these cases. These cases are Jones v. Perkins, 245 U. S.
390; Goldman v. United States, 24$ U. S. 474; Kramer v.
United States, 245 U. S. 47«; and Ruthenberg v. United
States, 245 U. S. 4#0.

1.

Congress lacked the power to compel
military service;

2.

the act infringed the provision of the
Constitution respecting the militia;

3.

the act delegated federal power to
state officers;

4. the act vested legislative and judicial
power in administrative officers;
5.

the act interfered with the religion of
individuals;

6. and, the act imposed involuntary servi
tude in violation of the Thirteenth
Amendment.-*-04
In a 139-page brief, Davis defended the law against the
attacks made by the defendants.

He made eight essential

points in his brief:
1.

Congress has power to raise armies for
both domestic and foreign service by
selective draft;

2.

the Selective Draft Law infringes no
provision of the Constitution concern
ing the militia;

3.

the Selective Draft Law imposes neither
slavery non involuntary servitude;

4.

the act is not unconstitutional on the
ground that state officials aid in its
enforcement;

5.

the act does not delegate legislative
authority to administrative officials;

6. the act does not infringe the provision
of the Constitution concerning the
judicial power;

^^Huntley, 0£. cit., p. 105-
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7. the due process clause of the Consti
tution is not violated;

8.

the Selective Draft Law neither
establishes a religion nor prohibits
its free exercise.105

In an unanimous opinion, the Court, speaking through
the Chief Justice, upheld the constitutionality of the
Selective Draft Law.

Point by point, the Court agreed

with the contentions made by Davis in his brief.

The

chief constitutional justification for the draft law that
the Court considered was "the power of Congress to provide
for compulsory military service . . . given by Art. I, sec.
8, [cl. 12], of the Constitution 'to raise and support

armies.'"1^

To the popular contention that the con

scription of men to serve in the armed forces constituted
involuntary servitude, the Chief Justice concluded:
. . . as we are unable to conceive upon
what theory the exaction by government
from the citizen of the performance of his
supreme and noble duty of protection to
the defense of the rights and honor of the
nation as the result of a war declared
by the great representative body of the
people, can be said to be the imposition

^Brief for the United States, Selective Service
Draft Cases (Washington: Government Printing Office, 191#),
pp. I-III.
"^"Constitutionality of the Selective Draft Act,"
Yale Law Journal. XXVII (February, 191#), 575.

of involuntary servitude in violation of
the prohibitions of the 13th Amendment,
we are constrained to the conclusion that
the contention to that effect is refuted
by its mere statement.107
It is doubtful that Davis ever won a case in such an
overwhelming manner as he did in the instant series of
cases.

The Court did not disagree with a single major
in&
point present in his brief.
VIII. Hammer v. Dagenhart
All the cases discussed thus far in this chapter have
two things in common:

Davis argued them and won them.

The final case, Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251 (1916),
and indeed, virtually the last one Davis argued while
10 Q

Solicitor General,

was Davis' greatest defeat.

It was

also by all odds the most famous case he argued while
serving as the government's attorney.

^Selective Draft Law Cases, supra, note 103, 390;
cited in "Draft Law Constitutional," American Law Review,
LII (January, 191*}), 137-36* Although one may appreciate
the sentiments expressed by the Chief Justice, the sentence
is typical of his awkward style.
"^The last case argued by Davis while Solicitor
General, Cox v. United States, 247 U. S. 3 (1916), was
also a challenge to the Selective Draft Law. He also
won this case. For a discussion see William C. Jones,
"Selective Draft Act," California Law Review, VI (July,
1916), 137-36.
~
"^^Davis argued the Hammer case on April 15-16, 1916.
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Much has been written about this case. Two books
110
deal with the subject at length.
There has been a dis
sertation written that examines Davis' briefs in the case
111
with painstaking detail,
and there have been countless
112
law review articles on the subject.
Rare indeed is
the case book in constitutional law that does not contain
the Court's opinion in this case, often accompanied by an
explanatory headnote.
What was there about this case that made it so contro
versial, so famous, and the object of so much critical
comment? In order to answer these questions, it is neces
sary to examine the background of the child labor
controversary.
As early as 1906, the child labor question had been
an issue in American domestic politics.

During the Con

gressional elections of that year, Senator Albert J.

Raymond G. Fuller, Child Labor and the Constitution
(New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1923)> and Stephen B. Wood,
Constitutional Politics in the Progressive Era: Child
Labor and the Law (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1968). The latter work is especially good, its value
being enhanced by the skillful utilization of the Justice
Department files (Record Group 60) in the National Archives.
111
Klonoski, o£. cit.
112
A number of these are annotated in the bibliography
of this paper. This listing is not, however, exhaustive.

Beveridge brought the issue to national attention, asserting
that it was an evil practice that should be regulated by
113
federal legislation. J He introduced legislation to this
effect in 1907 and spoke in support of his bill in an
emotional address of the floor of the Senate.

His bill met

with strong opposition:
He faced economic opposition to interference
with child employment, doctrinaire opposition
to what was regarded as a socialistic measure,
and constitutional arguments that the commerce
clause did not justify legislation inter
fering in this manner with conditions of
employment in manufacture.114
The bill was soundly defeated.
In several states, largely Northern, child labor laws
were enacted. In every instance, these statutes withstood
court challenges to the legitimacy of the use of the states'
H<5
police power. ^ It soon became evident, however, that
•^William C. Jones, "The Child Labor Decision," Calif
ornia Law Review VI (September, 191$), 395. There had been
agitation to regulate child labor before Beveridge made it
a national issue. The National Child Labor Committee,
which concentrated its efforts on the passage of child labor
laws at the state level, was organized in 1904*
"^^Swisher, o£. cit., p. 5S4. The House Committee on
the Judiciary ma"3e a strong statement against the constitu
tionality of the bill. This statement came under attack
when, some ten years later, it was discovered that the
chairman of the committee had been associated closely with
an office of the National Association of Manufacturers (who
strongly opposed any regulation of child labor) in a
campaign fund scheme (Ibid., pp. 5$4-$5).
^^See Jones, "The Child Labor Decision," p. 396, note
2, for several citations of cases upholding the constitu
tionality of state child labor laws.

federal legislation was needed if the problem of child
labor was to be met effectively.

Moral and humane consid

erations aside, the economics of the situation was such
that states either not having a child labor law, or only
a weak one, could compete at an advantage in many areas
of manufacturing over regions which had strong child labor
laws.

Furthermore, there was a change in attitude con

cerning the place of the federal government in remedial
social legislations

"The feeling seems to predominate

that cooperation and uniformity and efficiency are better
attained by federal than state legislation."
On September 1, 1916, an act was passed by Congress
regulating child labor by prohibiting goods produced by
certain types of child labor from entering interstate or
117
foreign commerce.
There was a very deliberate effort

^•"^Harry S. Gleick, "The Constitutionality of the Child
Labor Law," Case and Comment, XXIV (March, 1916), 803.
•*•"*"^39 Stat. 675. Section 1 of the act provided that
. . . no producer, manufacturer, or dealer shall
ship or deliver for shipment in interstate or
foreign commerce any article or commodity the
product of any mine or quarry situated in the
United States, in which within thirty days
prior to the time of the removal of such pro
duct therefrom, children under the age of
fourteen years have been employed or permitted
to work, or children between the ages of four
teen and sixteen years have been employed or
permitted to work more than eight hours in any
day, or more than six days in any week, or after
the hour of seven o'clock post-meridian, or
before the hour of six o'clock ante-meridian.
Cited in Andrew A. Bruce, "Interstate Commerce and Child
Labor," Cornell Law Quarterly, III (January, 1919)» #9.

156

made to draft a law that the courts would not overrule.
The framers of the act had reason to be optimistic, for
the Supreme Court had on several occasions upheld Congres
sional actions that utilized the commerce clause as the

11$

source of federal police power.

In such cases, the

Court had held that "the power of Congress over interstate
commerce may be exercised in the interest of public health,
morals, safety, and welfare, as well as in the interest of
119
commerce and its instrumentalities."
The passage of the law was praised by its supporters
as "another Emancipation Proclamation," a law that was
"demanded in the name of humanity and promotive of the
120
best interests of society."
Even the strongest support
ers of the measure knew that the law would immediately come

11$

See, for example, the Lottery Case (Champion v.
Ames), 1$$ U. S. 321 (1903)> regulating interstate trans
portation of lottery tickets; Hoke v. United States, 227
U. S. 30$ (1913)» upholding the Mann "White Slave" Act
which regulated the interstate transportation of females
for immoral purposes; and Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky,
23$ U. S. 190 (1915)» upholding a law prohibiting the Interstate transportation of liquor in violation of a state law.
It should be pointed out, however, that in these cases the
statute forbade all persons to ship the contraband, not
just producers and dealers, as was the case in the OwensKeating Child Labor Law of 1916. For further discussion on
this point, see Frederick Green, "The Child Labor Law and
the Constitution," Illinois Law Bulletin, II (April, 1917)» 5-

^^Fuller, op cit., p.

239.

Edgar Watkins, "Is the Federal Child Labor Statute
Constitutional?" Case and Comment, XXIII (March, 1917)»

906.

under legal attack in the court, in which case they could
only hope that the Supreme Court would remember that "Ci]t
is an accepted principle of judicial construction that
'every intendment is in favor of' the validity of an act
121

of Congress."

Both the supporters of the law and its detractors
favored an early resolution of the question of the act's
constitutionality.

The opportunity presented itself when

one Dagenhart, the father of two children under sixteen
years of age and employed in a mill in North Carolina, sued
to enjoin Hammer, the local United States Attorney, from
enforcing the Child Labor Law.
The suit was brought in the District Court of the
Western District of North Carolina.

Great care was taken

in the selection of the government's attorneys for the
case.

At the suggestion of the National Child Labor Com

mittee, Attorney General Gregory retained Thomas I. Parkin
son, a professor at Columbia University Law School, to
present the government's case.

Parkinson, who had been

associated with the drafting of the law in question, was
122
designated as a Special Assistant to the Attorney General.

121Ibid.,

p. 910, citing the dictum from Butterfield
v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470 (1904).
"*"22Wood, o£. cit., p. 100.
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Shortly after Parkinson had been retained by the
Justice Department, Secretary of Labor William B. Wilson
wrote Gregory
It appears the suit . . . [Dagenhart v.
Hammer] has been filed with a view to
determining the constitutionality of the
United States Child Labor Law. In view of
the wide public interest in this act it
seems desirable to have associated with the
United States District Attorney in the
defense of the Act, an attorney who has to
a marked degree the confidence of the public
interested in the maintenance of the consti
tutionality of the measure.
I should like, therefore, to suggest that
Dean Roscoe Pound of the Harvard Law School
be invited by the Department of Justice to
assist in this case.123
The Attorney General replied ". . .1 would have been glad
to have

considered the employment of Dean Pound if your

suggestion had not reached me too late.

Before the receipt

of your letter, however, I had employed Mr. Thomas I.
Parkinson."12^

He went on to say in the same letter that

if Pound wished to volunteer his services, the Justice
Department would appoint him to the position of Special

Assistant to the Attorney General.

On August 23, Pound

accepted this offer and was hired by the Justice Department
for the siim of one dollar plus expenses (which eventually

12^William

B. Wilson to Thomas Watt Gregory, IS August

1917, Record Group 60, File 92195-1, National Archives.
Watt Gregory to William B. Wilson, 20 August
1917, Record Group 60, File 92195-1-5> National Archives.
12^Thomas

amounted to $^0.00).^^
Although Hammer, Parkinson, and Pound were the govern
ment's attorneys in the case, the major argument was made
by Parkinson.

The government lost the case and Judge Boyd

held that the law was unconstitutional on the grounds:
(1) That it interferes with the internal
affairs of the state which Congress has no
power to regulate directly, and therefore
cannot reach indirectly under the commerce
clause, and
(2) That it is a violation of the due process
clause in the Fifth Amendment because it de
prives the father of his right to control and
direct the work of his children and to have
their wages.126
Judge Boyd's decision was announced from the bench.

There

was no formal written opinion in the case.
Dean Pound was extremely upset at the manner in which
the case was handled by Parkinson.

He explained this in a

handwritten letter to the Attorney General:

^Thomas Watt Gregory to Dean Roscoe Pound, 23 Aug
ust 1917, Record Group 60, Files 92195-1-6 and 92195-1-12,
National Archives. Pound was one of the leading advocates
of the sociological school of jurisprudence. The basic
thesis of this school was that "the law was continuously
evolving and that the judicial process was creative in
nature." (Wood, op. cit., p. 101). For a further discus
sion of Pound and~this school of jurisprudence, see George
Whitecross Paten, Jurisprudence (2d ed.; London: Oxford
University Press, 1951/, pp. 17-20.
1
Memorandum for John W. Davis from Thomas I. Parkin
son, 13 September 1917, Record Group 60, File 92195-1-13,
National Archives.

It

. . . the government did not present a con
sistent case. At the conference with Mr.
Underwood [Assistant Attorney General], the
District Attorney and I understood that we
were to argue that in principle there was
nothing new about the law which the Supreme
Court had not already sanctioned; . . . but
Mr. Parkinson did not understand it as we
did and in his argument conceded the position
for which the plaintiffs had been contending,
namely that the primary purpose of the law
was a police purpose, and asserted that the
case was to be a landmark in constitutional
law and an epoch-making step forward. As
Judge Boyd said, "it is for a bigger court
than a district judge to take such an
epoch-making step."~27
This apparent mishandling of the case in the district
court increased the pressure on the Justice Department
from various groups and interested government departments
that Davis would argue the case before the Supreme Court.
Davis, who apparently never intended to assign the case to
a subordinate, announced that he would indeed personally
argue the case.
The brief for the case was prepared initially by
Assistant Attorney General Frierson and then revised by
Davis.

The galley-proofs of the joint Frierson-Davis effort

were then circulated among several parties who had an

interest in the case, including Pound and Parkinson, with
12^
a request for comments.

Pound replied:

Pound to Gregory, 13 September 1917, Record Group
60, File 92195-1-16, National Archives.
12$

Davis to Pound and Davis to Parkinson, 21 March 191#,
Record Group 60, File 92195-1-40/41, National Archives.
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. . . the argument appears to me full, com
plete and convincing. ... I shall write
to the friends of the Act who have been
interested in this litigation saying to them
that in my judgment they could not hope to
have the case better presented.129
There is no record that Parkinson ever replied to Davis*
letter.
Probably no brief has ever been presented to the Supreme
Court that has received as much scholarly investigation as
130
J

the one submitted by Davis in Hammer v. Da^enhart.

There is little that can be added at this time to these
studies, except to say that despite the overwhelming sup
port for the position that Davis presented the best possible
case, there are those critics who contend that Davis some
how sabotaged the government's case.

One review, for

example, criticized Wood's treatment of the case on the
basis that there was "near silence" on the role played by
Davis in the case—actually, Wood devotes several pages to
the part played by Davis—and that Davis' appointment as
Solicitor General somehow represents "a disjunction if not
indeed an opposition between the Progressive Era and that
policy of support for the needs of the depressed and

^Pound to Davis, 23 March 191#, Record Group 60,
File 92195-1, National Archives, cited in Wood, 0£. cit.,
p. 141•
130two recent exhaustive treatments are Wood, 0£. cit.,
pp. 145-4$; and Klonoski, op. cit., pp. 141-63. An outline
of the printed brief is included in Appendix F.
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disadvantaged designated as progressivism."1-^
The critic does not explain how such an "antiProgressive" as Davis was able to win so many other cases
challenging progressive legislation.

Whatever criticisms

may be made of Davis' political philosophy (especially if
one remembers him as the anti-New Deal leader of the
Liberty League in the 1930's and not the young Solicitor
General of 1916), few will deny that he can be safely
classified as a Burke conservative.

There is, however,

absolutely no evidence that he did not present the best
possible case for the government; and to say this where
Davis is concerned implies that his client could not have
received a better case anywhere else.
Perhaps the most valid criticism of Davis* brief is
that he "failed to draw up a theoretical defence of the
act which would have eased a potential Court majority's
132

task of writing an opinion upholding the statute." ^

The essence of Davis' "concise and well organized"1-^

^ Leo Weinstein, Review of Constitutional Politics in
the Progressive Era: Child Labor and the Law by Stephen
6. Wood. American Political Science Review, LXIII (June,

1969), 572^71:
"^^Klonoski, o£. cit., p. 147.
•*"^John R. Schmidhauser, The Supreme Court as Final
Arbiter in Federal-State Relations (Chapel Hill, N. C.s
University of North Carolina Press, 1953), p. 195.

brief was an argument for a broad interpretation of the
commerce clause, a position which had been developed by
the Marshall Court and reinforced during the 20th century
by various federal police power rulings. His opponent
asked that the Court apply the narrower interpretation of
the commerce clause, which was largely the development of
the post-Civil War era's "suiin-f.^tive due process" rulings;
and that the Court/ surpPRn

'

"

v

•

x^hat the Tenth Amend-

ment restricted fee-;
On June 3» lrf
the Child Labor L

\e of 5-4 held ,
eeding the com-

merce power and ir?

sS^rved to the

states.

'£ the Court.135

Justice Da}

The basic reasoning of

opinion was this:

1. The power to regulate interstate commerce
is the power to prescribe the rule by which
the commerce is to be governed;

13Sfood,

0£. cit., p. 153.

"^Justices Holmes, McKenna, Brandeis, and Clarke dis
sented. Four years later in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.,
259 U. S. 20 (1922), the Supreme Court held that a prohibitory tax upon manufacturers employing child labor was un
constitutional, with only Justice Clarke dissenting. Thus,
Justice Clarke had the distinction of being the only justice
to dissent in both child labor law cases. For a discussion
of the differences between these two cases, see William A
Sutherland, "The Child Labor Cases and the Constitution,"
Cornell Law Quarterly, VIII (June, 1923), 339-5#•
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brief was an argument for a broad interpretation of the
commerce clause, a position which had been developed by
the Marshall Court and reinforced during the 20th century
by various federal police power rulings.

His opponent

asked that the Court apply the narrower interpretation of
the commerce clause, which was largely the development of
the post-Civil War era's "substantive due process" rulings;
and that the Court support the theory that the Tenth Amend
ment restricted federal powers.
On June 3> 1913, the Court by the vote of 5-4 held
the Child Labor Law unconstitutional as exceeding the com
merce power and invading those powers reserved to the
loc
states. Justice Day wrote the opinion of the Court.
The basic reasoning of the majority opinion was this;
1. The power to regulate interstate commerce
is the power to prescribe the rule by which
the commerce is to be governed;

^""^Wood, o£. cit., p. 153*
"^Justices Holmes, McKenna, Brandeis, and Clarke dis
sented. Four years later in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.,
259 U. S. 20 (1922), the Supreme Court held that a prohibitory tax upon manufacturers employing child labor was un
constitutional, with only Justice Clarke dissenting. Thus,
Justice Clarke had the distinction of being the only justice
to dissent in both child labor law cases. For a discussion
of the differences between these two cases, see William A
Sutherland, "The Child Labor Cases and the Constitution,"
Cornell Law Quarterly, VIII (June, 1923), 339-5#.
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2. The manufacture of goods is not commerce,
nor do the facts that they are intended for,
and are afterwards shipped in, interstate
commerce make their production a part of that
commerce subject to the control of Congress.
3. It was not intended as an authority of
Congress to control the States in the exercise
of their police power over local trade and
manufacture, always existing and expressly
reserved to them by the Tenth Amendment.136
The Court's opinion, especially its application of the
theory of reserved powers, leaves itself open to legal
criticism.

As Thomas Reed Powell pointed out, the Tenth

Amendment "sets no standard for determining whether a power
has been delegated to the United States. It merely embodies
the elementary principle that Congress has only those
powers delegated to it either by explicit enumeration or
by the vague addendum of the 'necessary and proper'
clause."1-^

Powell further noted:

W e may agree that a power which North Carolina
did not have before the Constitution was not
taken away from her by the Constitution.
Experts in the higher mathematics of negative
quantities may find that things minus can be
reserved as easily as things plus. But how
a minus, by being reserved, changes its sign

"^Headnotes, Hammer v. Dagenhart, supra.
•^Thomas Reed Powell, "Child Labor, Congress, and the
Constitution," North Carolina Lav/ Review, I [November, 1922),

61.

and becomes a plus, is more difficult to
fathom.138
In any event, the "interstate friction" which had
developed economically as the result of different states
having different child labor laws was precisely why the
Founding Fathers at Philadelphia in 17#7 had written the
1*39
commerce clause into the Constitution.
It was clear
that in this case the Court had abandoned a primary rule
of constitutional construction, namely, "that every reason
able doubt must be resolved in favor of the validity of a
Legislative act."^®
Davis' role in the Child Labor Law case did not end
with the Supreme Court's decision in the affair.

At the

time the decision was announced, Davis requested that the
issuance of the mandate of the Court be delayed thirty days
to enable the Justice Department to prepare a petition for
a rehearing.
issuance

The Court granted the motion to delay the

of the mandate.1^"

On June 10, Davis asked the

-^Thomas Reed Powell, "The Child Labor Law, the Tenth
Amendment, and the Commerce Clause," Southern Law Quarterly,
III (August, 1916), 176-77.
"^•^Thurlow M. Gordon, "The Child Labor Law Case,"
Harvard Law Review, XXXII (November, 191$), 64*
"^•^Jones, 0£. cit., p. 413*
1^"LHenry

W. Bikle, "The Commerce Power and Hammer v.
Dagenhart," University of Pennsylvania Law Review, LXVII
(January, 1919), 21, note 1.
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Court for permission to apply for a rehearing, ^ but
suddenly, the Justice Department abandoned its strategy
and announced that it would not apply for a rehearing.
Davis wrote Parkinson:

"It has been finally concluded that

such a motion [for a rehearing] would be productive of no
result and that the matter will be permitted to rest."^1'^
Since all the parties involved knew that the chance
of reversing the decision was small, why was the action
contemplated in the first instance?

Possibly, it was to

placate the various reform organizations who were bitter
at the unexpected loss of the case; or perhaps, as Wood
suggests, it was "a tactical move, public notice to the
Court that the government considered the decision highly
political and did not acquiesce in the new limitations
imposed upon national power.
Further research has not provided an answer to this
question.

A document has been discovered, however, which

indicates the seriousness of the Justice Department's
original moves for a rehearing in the case.

There exists

in the Solicitor General's file of Thomas Watt Gregory's
papers at the National Archives a typewritten note that
states:

"^-^Davis to Parkinson, 30 June 1916, Record Group
60, File 92195-1» National Archives.
^Sfood, o£. cit., p. 166.

1(

After further deliberation and conference
with the party I spoke to you about I have
concluded it was not worthwhile to file a
motion for a rehearing in the child labor
case.
T.W.G.145
Of course, the key question becomes the identity of
"the party" to whom Gregory refers.

Was it someone else

in the Justice Department, a prominent individual in the
legal profession, the President, or one of the Justices?
The latter suggestion is extremely intriguing, and not
impossible, but highly improbable.
The close personal relationship that both Gregory and
Davis enjoyed with McReynolds makes him a likely candi
date, either as one who was feeding them "inside" infor
mation, or as one who would be willing to switch his vote
on a rehearing.

Perhaps a better candidate for a switch

in voting was Chief Justice White, to whom Davis is alleged
to have directed his argument in this case, and who had on
occasion voted to sustain federal police power actualized
through the commerce clause.1^6

Furthermore, White is on

^Gregory to Davis, 1# June, 191S, Record Group 60,
File 190470, Box 2734, Solicitor General Folder, National
Archives. Since this document is not in the regular
Justice Department file for the Hammer case (File 92195)>
it is understandable that even such a meticulous researcher
as Wood may have overlooked it.

"^^See, for example, the oleo margarine case, McCray
v. United States, 145 U. S. 27 (1904).

record countless times praising the abilities of Davis and
exhibited a virtual paternal attitude toward him.
All this is, of course, conjecture; however, the note
from Gregory demonstrated that the Justice Department had
some reason to believe that they could get a reversal on
rehearing, and that Davis was not the one who made the
decision not to ask for a rehearing.

Some critics who

would like to place the onus of defeat solely upon his
shoulders also imply that by failing to ask for the re
hearing Davis deliberately sabotaged the case.

Unless

Gregory and Davis had doctored the archives of the Justice
Department, evidence would indicate that the decision in
the case was simply not Davis' to make.

169

CHAPTER V
THE WAR YEARS
John W. Davis was restless in his job as Solicitor
General by the end of Wilson's first administration.

There

had been serious talk of his becoming Attorney General in
the new Wilson cabinet after the election of 1916, but that
promotion had failed to materialize, largely because Gregory
wished to stay in the position; and the President was agree
able to his wishes. The various rumors of Davis' elevation
to the Supreme Court had proved to be only speculation.
Within weeks of Wilson's second inauguration, Davis
journeyed to New York for interviews with two Wall Street
law firms. The first concern he interviewed was Cravath
and Henderson, a very large firm having seven full partners
and twenty-seven associates.

In the words of Davis:

"They

are distinctly the counsel for the predatory rich—railroads,
Trust Co.'s, combines and such."

The second firm was Rush-

more, Bisbee and Stern, a small legal concern in comparison
with Cravath and Henderson, with clients largely drawn
from "banking and commercial people."

This firm offered

Davis $25,000 a year for two years, with an increase pro
mised at the end of that period.2
1Davis

to Mother, 31 March
Yale University.
2 Ibid.

1917 > Box 9» Davis Papers,

1'

Davis realistically appraised his situation and came
to the conclusion that "[s]o far as further political
advancement is concerned, I seem to have run into a blind
alley . . .

Davis felt that perhaps the time was also

right from a professional point of view to move to greener
pastures, "for I feel that I shall never have bigger cases
or more success than I have had this winter, and that I
had better go while the wind is in the right quarter."^
Notwithstanding the financial, political, and pro
fessional reasons for leaving government service, Davis
was reluctant to go into a New York law firm, largely due
to the nature of, in Davis' words, "the international
situation."

Once the United States had entered the war,

Davis knew that his place was with the Wilson Administration
as long as the President required his services.
I.

The Entry into the War

From the beginning of the European war in 1914, and
especially after the invasion of Belgium by Germany, Davis
had been one of the leaders of the pro-British faction with
in the Administration.
Warren noted:

3Ibid.

4Ibid.

Assistant Attorney General Charles

"The Solicitor General has been so pro-British

173

that I [called] him 'The Germaniac.'"^

Warren later summed

up Davis' position as follows:
On the subject of the war and of the out
rages committed by Germany both in this
country and elsewhere he has long been
known in Washington as possessing the most
extreme views."
Warren intended this to be a compliment.
At times the nation's press considered Davis an
administration spokesman on the question of the war.

At

a New York City dinner speech in December, 1916, Davis was
introduced as an administration spokesman and thereupon
attacked various peace plans then being suggested in some

7

circles.

One day later, Davis was quoted as saying that

in expressing his opinion, he was in no way commissioned
to speak for the Administration.

The article went on to

say, however, that it was generally felt that Davis re
flected the Administration's views, even if he did not speak
for it officially.

^Charles Warren, "War Notes," Box 5» Charles Warren
Papers, Library of Congress.

^"Our New Ambassador to England is an Intellectual
Prodigy," Current Opinion, LXV (November, 191S), 294*
^New York Times, December 10, 1916, p. 1, col. 3New York Times, December 11, 1916, p. 1, col. 1.

A clear indication of how Davis stood on the question
may be seen in the following comment made to his mother as
he prepared his speech on the subject of peace to be de
livered on December 9, 1916:
It is not going to be easy for me to make a
speech on this topic, because it honestly seems
to me that most of those who are now agitating
for peace take out their efforts in "yearning,"
and contribute little that is of practical
value. Indeed my own sentiments are so
hartily with the allies, that I feel as they
do that it would be better to fight until
the last man was gone, until European civili
zation itself was wrecked, rather than com
promise with Germany or conclude a mere
drawn war. This I can hardly say so long
as I am on Uncle Sam's payroll. . . .9
One should not be misled into thinking that Davis
supported war per se. He summed up his feeling on the
question with the following:
. . . out of the bloody mist certain things
begin to take shape . . . there is approaching
a general—a universal agreement that peace is
desirable. The school of Moltke, Berhardi,
Nietzsche, and the rest who taught that war
is a thing desirable for its own sake, and the
mother of all manly virtues, no longer has
either a spokesman or an audience. The world
has had a chance to see war as it really is,
the sum of human miseries.-'-^

^Davis to Mother, 26 November
Papers, Yale University.
10Ibid.

1916, Box B, Davis

Davis chafed xmder the restrictions that his official
capacity placed upon his statements concerning the war.
The United States was, however, a neutral nation and the
Administration could hardly have someone in such a high
position as he occupied presenting the extreme anti-German
stance that Davis represented.

When President Wilson

finally severed diplomatic relations with Germany in
February, 1917, Davis told Warren "that now for the first
time in three years his head and his heart were together,
and he was tremendously relieved by the President's
action.""'"*"
So well known was Davis* reputation as a supporter
of the British cause that when the United States did enter
the war, he was utilized by the Administration to whip up
enthusiasm (as were many government officials) for war
bond purchases.

On October 27, 1917, Davis spoke, along

with Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo, to a crowd of about
100,000 gathered at the Ellipse in Washington on the occasion
of the last day for the subscription to the Second Liberty
Loan.
The speech made by Davis on that occasion received
wide distribution.

Not only did Blackburn Esterline, a

Special Assistant to the^Attorney General, have a private

"'""'"Warren, ojo. cit.

12 but it was also reprinted

printing made of the address,

13
in the American Bar Association Journal.

This speech,

the first made by Davis to attract wide spread public
attention, contained the phrase which Secretary of the Navy
Josephus Daniels called a "classic:"
Germany:

"Belgium replied to

We are a country, not a road."1^

Although Davis would later become identified with the
concept of limited federal governmental powers (especially
when he became something of a spokesman for the anti-New
Deal faction during the 1930's), he was willing to expand
the Constitution to its limit on Congressional war powers:
I think Congress in levying and conducting
war may do everything that any nation can do
under the circumstances, save only those
things which the Constitution in express and
literal terms forbids.^

12
A copy of the private printing is in the general col
lection of the Library of Congress.
13t»The Liberty Loans," American Bar Association Journal,
IV (April, 191#), S3-S6. The speech was also reprinted in
Theodore A. Huntley, The Life of John W. Davis (New York:
D u f f i e l d & C o . , 1 9 2 4 ) , p p . 1 4 3 " " " " "
"^Josephus Daniels, Cabinet Diaries, 1913-1921, ed. E.
David Cronon (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press,
1963), p. 227.
"^Davis to Gregory, 10 April 1917» Record Group 60,
File 186400, National Archives. Davis did not, however,
feel that the war gave either the Congress or the Executive
unlimited power. For an opinion to this effect, see his
statement on the passport question discussed in Chapter III.
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There were those who did not consider the Constitution
as a bar to legislative or executive actions.

In the state

of West Virginia, for example, the governor "ousted the
ordinary courts of their jurisdiction and [made] himself
a military dictator, above the operation of the Constitution and the laws . . .

16

Although this action was the

result of a labor dispute and not directly related to the
war, it was characteristic of the general temper of the
times that caused considerable apprehension among those
interested in the preservation of the civil liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution.

Later events of the war

years would prove these fears not without foundation.
When it appeared that the American entry into the war
was inevitable, the Justice Department took positive steps
to intern German merchant shipping that was in United
States ports and to prevent any attempts by the Germans
or their agents to do harm to the American war effort.

As

soon as the German note concerning the use of unrestricted
submarine warfare was delivered on January 31» 1917, the

Henry Winthrop Ballantine, "Effect of War on Consti
tutional Liberty," Case and Comment, XXIV (June, 1917)» 5.
The case involved a declaration ofmartial law in certain
areas of West Virginia in which there was labor unrest.
For a discussion of this event, see Virginia Elizabeth Lee,
"Political and Civil Liberties during Certain Periods of
Emergency in West Virginia" (unpublished IVLA. thesis, Mar
shall College, 1942).

Justice Department put several contingency plans into
operation.

On February 2, 1917» all United States Attor

neys were instructed
to take prompt measures to locate and prose
cute, so far as Federal law can reach them,
all persons who may attempt to engage in
activities detrimental to the United States
in connection with the foreign situation.1'
Further instructions told the United States Attorneys to
prosecute with vigor any members of the crews of German
merchant ships who might violate the United States
Criminal Code.

By doing so, the Justice Department was

able to prevent either the escape or destruction of a large
1$
number of German merchant craft.
Also in anticipation of the declaration of war, the
Justice Department sent a circular to all United States
Attorneys and marshals, and through them to state and local
law enforcement officials, to be on the alert for hostile
19

acts of all types.

"^Report of the Attorney General, 1917 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1918), p. 54.
l6Ibid.

Justice Department Circular No. 656, March 27» 1917.
A copy of this circular is in the Charles Warren Papers,
Library of Congress. Sections of it are reprinted in the
Report of the Attorney General, 1917» pp. 55-56.

The only statute available to the government that could
be used to thwart alien agents was the one enacted in 1796
as part of the infamous Alien and Sedition Acts.

The pro

visions of the act gave the president the power to intern
without trial in times of national emergency alien enemies
20

who were, in the president's opinion, dangerous.

The

Attorney General was convinced that a group of dangerous
individuals did in fact exist.

He wrote Davis:

You can accept it as absolutely true that
there are a very large number of German
citizens in this country who are dangerous
and who are plotting trouble, men from whom
we must necessarily expect trouble promptly
and of a sinister sort. We have many, I
might say several thousand, of these men
under observation, and they are scattered
throughout the country, there being quite
a large number in New York.21
Using the almost forgotten act (dating from 179#) as
statutory authority, Assistant Attorney General Warren,
with the assistance of Davis and Special Assistant to the
Attorney General Todd, drafted a presidential proclamation.
The proclamation was issued by the President Wilson on
the day war was declared; and within twenty-four hours, all
of the known German and Austrian agents were seized and

1 Stat. 577» as amended. Cited in John Lord 0'Brian,
"New Encroachments on Individual Freedom," Harvard Law
Review, LXVI (November, 1952), 9.
Gregory to Davis, 31 March 1917» Record Group 60,
File 190470, Box 2734, National Archives.
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interned for the duration of the war.

When America entered the war, the work of the Justice
Department relating to the enforcement of various statutes
related to America's participation in the conflict was
dispersed throughout the organization.

Eventually, it was

brought under the control of Charles M. Storey, who was a
2*3
subordinate of Charles Warren.
Considerable confusion
arose, both within the Justice Department and among other
Government agencies, concerning various war activities.
This confusion, along with the increased work load that
the war created, led to the establishment in July, 1917,
of a central clearing house in the Justice Department for
the various domestic intelligence agencies.

September of

the same year saw the creation of the War Emergency
Division of the Justice Department.^
22
Warren was the assistant attorney general in charge
of criminal prosecutions; thus, it was natural that the
prosecution of the alien enemy agents would fall into his
bailiwick. Although Warren developed a reputation as a
reactionary on questions of civil rights, John Lord 0'Brian
(whose civil rights credentials were as sound as anyone's in
the Wilson Administration) observed that the proclamation
"and the boldness and resourcefulness of Warren in executing
it have never been adequately emphasized." 0'Brian, loc.
cit.
23
-^Horner Cummings and Carl McFarland, Federal Justice:
Chapters in the History of Justice and the Federal Executive
I Mew York: Macmiilan,'1937 P- ^3-

)7

2^Report

of the Attorney General, 191#> (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1919), pp. 14-51*
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The new division was headed by a Special Assistant to
the Attorney General for War Work with the power to en
force all civil law (as distinct from military laws—he
naturally handled criminal cases) relating to the war
effort. John Lord 0'Brian of Buffalo, New York, a Repub
lican, was selected to head this new division. He was the
only person to hold this position, retaining the job until
the division was abolished shortly after the end of the
J
war.25
0'Brian had been appointed United States Attorney
during the Taft Administration and retained the position
during the early years of the Wilson Administration.

He

had gained some prominence during the prosecution of Fritz
26
von Rintelen, a German agent.
0fBrian and the unusually

^O'Brian, o£. cit., p. 10. O'Brian died in April,
1973»at age 98. He had had a long and distinguished career
after his service in the Wilson Administration, often
identified with the defense of civil liberties, notwith
standing his life-long membership in the conservative wing
of the Republican Party. Actually, a conservative in the
sense the word is applied to the adherents to the philosophy
of Edmund Burke is a civil libertarian. Davis himself was
a person of this persuasion, and what often appears to be
a paradox—conservative on economic matters and liberal on
individual rights—is not a paradox at all.
26
Von Rintelen and two American associates were con
victed for a conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Anti
trust Law for their part in a plan to promote strikes in
munitions plants. In May, 1916, all three were sentenced
to one year in prison. Report of the Attorney General,
1917, p. 50.

competent staff that he assembled were responsible for
"the registration of all enemy aliens in the country, and
the prosecution of sabotage, sedition, and other offenses.
0'Brian was at first faced with the problem of
"friction and jealousy between the confidential services
2fJ
of the various departments . . . ."
With the establish
ment of the War Emergency Division, however, most of this
organizational bickering disappeared.

Considering the

magnitude and sensitivity of the problems involved, it is
amazing that there was not more organizational dissonance.
Davis played an important role in the Justice Depart
ment's war work. In his nominal role as the government's
chief lawyer before the Supreme Court, Davis had little
to do with the prosecution of the Administration's war
aims—the Selective Draft Cases and the Adamson Law Case
are notable exceptions to this rule. Davis did, however,
play an important role as an administrator within the
Department, as a drafter of key war legislation, and as
an Administration spokesman.
The Attorney General's health problems, specifically
his weak eyes, caused him to delegate many of the duties

27
'Cummings and McFarland, loc. cit.
ptj
O'Brian, o£. cit., p. 12.
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of his office to Davis. For example, items as important
as the Espionage Act of 1917 were largely the result of
the joint efforts of Warren (who actually wrote the first
draft) and Davis.2^
Davis also conducted the general business of the
Justice Department, including war work, during Gregory's
frequent absences.^

For example, when the Secretary of

the Navy wished to confer with someone in the Justice
Department about alleged alien enemies working in the
Sperry plant, Davis was the individual with whom he
conferred.^3"
Davis' court work also increased during the war
years.

Cases in which the government was a party—as a

minimum Davis would have to review the briefs prepared in
these cases, even if he did not argue the case—increased

^Gregory to Davis, 31 March 1917, Record Group 60,
File 190470, Box-2734> Solicitor General's Folder, National
Archives.
•^Another second-in-command who often ran his depart
ment in the absence of his superior was Assistant Secretary
of the Navy, Franklin D. Roosevelt. See Kenneth S. Davis,
FDR: The Beckoning of Destiny, I8g2-192# (New York: G.P.
Putnam and Sons, 1972). Roosevelt, Davis, and Solicitor
for the State Department Frank Polk (who became Davis' law
partner in later years) were called by one observer, "the
three young Adonises of the Wilson Democracy." Clinton W.
Gilbert, "You Takes Your Choice" (New York: G. P. Putnam's
Sons, 1924J» p« £>!>•
^Daniels, o£. cit., p. 210.

1

from 103 in the 1915 term of the Supreme Court (October,
1916 to June, 1917) to 159 in the 1917 term of Court
(October, 1917 to June, 191S).

Davis was also ultimately-

responsible for the government's participation especially
on appeal petitions, in literally hundreds of cases in
the lower courts involving violations of the various war
statutes.
There is no indication that Davis did not enjoy this
additional work load. In fact, one gets the impression
that Davis welcomed the increased activity.

Certainly, he

no longer suffered the restraint that American neutrality
had placed on his voicing of personal opinions concerning
the war»
II.

War Legislation

When the war began in Europe in August, 1914» there
were few knowledgeable people who thought that the United
States could remain aloof from the struggle indefinitely.
For any number of reasons, not the least being cultural
heritage, the mass of American opinion supported the British
cause.

This feeling was reflected by the Wilson Administra

tion.
American industrial and commercial interests took
advantage of the international situation to supply the
Allies, at great profit to themselves, v/ith goods of all
sorts.

The Central Powers were handicapped the predomin

ance of public opinion against their position to increase

183

their trade with a neutral (at least nominally) United
States.
The central Powers attempted to thwart the rapidly
increasing commercial intercourse between the United States
and the Allies.

Their remedies were propaganda efforts and

sabotage or other interference with American industrial
activities that were supplying the British and French with
war goods.
With the exception of the Alien Law of 1793, there
were no federal statutes that the Justice Department could
use to control the German activities.

In order to correct

the situation, the Justice Department had submitted a
number of bills in the United States Senate.

They were

originally known within the Justice Department as the
"Neutrality Bills."

The Judicial Committee of the Senate

combined sixteen of these bills into a package known as
the Omnibus BilL

These bills were largely the work of

Assistant Attorney General Warren, with assistance from
Davis, the Attorney General, and Assistant Attorney General
Wallace.^

Although there had been a considerable amount

of clamor in Congress for law regulating the activities of
aliens, the Omnibus Bill did not fare well in the Congress.

^Gregory to Davis, 31 March 1917> Record Group 60,
File 190470, Box 2734» National Archives.
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It was passed by the Seriate but ran into difficulty in the
House of Representatives.
The Omnibus Bill, also called the "Spy Bill," was
opposed by various church, pacifist, and humanitarian
groups who objected to "the enactment of restrictive and
inquisitorial provisions" that the bill contained. ^ These
groups were especially fearful of provisions restricting
the freedom of speech and press. In any event, the bill
was not reported out of the House Judiciary Committee
before the end of the session in March, 1917.
At the direction of the Attorney General, Warren re
drafted the Omnibus Bill into what was known as the
Espionage Bill.

Gregory instructed Davis:

. . . you go over this new draft of [the]
Omnibus Bill quite carefully with Mr.
Warren and see if its provisions meet with
your approval. In case you and Mr.
Warren agree as to its provisions, I am
willing to let it go in as the Adminis
tration measure.34
The redrafted bill was introduced in Congress on
April 2, 1917.

Most of the debate on the bill centered

around a provision which would have provided "a $10,000
fine and ten years' imprisonment for any person convicted

•^Carl Brent Swisher, American Constitutional Develop
ment (2d ed.; Cambridge, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1954;,
pp. 603-606.
•^Gregory to Davis, 31 March 1917, 0£. cit.

1

of publishing such information as would be declared by a
Presidential proclamation to be useful or possibly useful
35
to the enemy."*" Understandably, there was considerable
opposition in the national press to such a provision.
Wilson, however, insisted on the censorship section and had
Postmaster General Burleson personally lobby for its pas
sage.

Notwithstanding the President's strong stand on the

issue, it was defeated in the House of Representatives and
never voted upon in the Senate.^
The President's position on the censorship question
was ironic, for he
had no illusions about the fate of civil
liberties in the United States, once the
nation had plunged into war. The people
would forget there was ever such a thing
as tolerance, he predicted. The spirit
of ruthless brutality would enter into the
very fiber of national life, infecting
Congress, the courts, administrative officers,
and the people at large. Freedom of speech
and of the press would go in spite of pro
tective constitutional provisions.37
It appeared that he was attempting to fulfill his own prophecy

35
•"Harry N. Scheiber, The Wilson Administration and
Civil Liberties, 1917-1921 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Uni
versity Press, I960), p. 1$.
36Ibid.

*V7
•"Swisher, o£. cit., p. 603, citing Ray Stannard Baker,
Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters, VI (New York: Scribner,

1927-39), 506-507.

186

After the President had lost his battle for the
censorship clause, opposition to the lav/ virtually disap
peared.

Actually, it was a false victory for the opponents

of censorship because at least tv/o sections of the enacted
bill restricted free speech and press and were used to do
so by the Justice Department in more than 2,000 cases.
Warren's part in the drafting of the Espionage Act
was recognized by a letter from Joseph P. Tumulty, the
Secretary to the President:
In response to your request through the
Attorney General, I have pleasure in sending
to you the pen with which the President
today approved H. R. 291 [the Espionage Act
of 1917J ... .39
The key provisions of the Espionage Act of 1917^ made
it a crime and provided punishment for
(1) making or conveying false reports
for the benefit of the enemy,
(2) seeking to cause disobedience in the
armed forces of the United States, and
(3) wilfully obstructing the recruiting or
enlistment service.5-1

•^Scheiber, op. cit., pp. 1&-19.
•^Tumulty to Warren, 15 June
Papers, Library of Congress.
^40 Stat. 217.
^"Swisher, op. cit., p. 604.

1917, Charles Warren
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The Act also contained a section that "closed the mails
to any item which violated any privision of the act."^
This provision gave Postmaster General Burleson "virtually
dictatorial control"^ over the circulation of newspapers
and magazines.^
The Trading with.the Enemy Act of 1917which had
as its main purpose the prohibition of United States citi
zens from engaging in commercial activities with the Cen
tral Powers, also contained a provision that provided for
the censorship of all mail (or other communications) with
foreign countries.
On May 16, 1913, the Espionage Act of 1917 was amended
by an act often called the Espionage Act of 191#, or the
Sedition Act.^

The Sedition Act went far beyond the Espi

onage Act of 1917 in its limitations on personal freedom.

^Ibid., pp. 604-605.
^Scheiber, o£. cit., p. 19.
^For a discussion of the statute and its relationship

to international law, see Charles Cheney Hyde, "The Espi
onage Act," American Journal of International Law, XII
(January, 1918), 142-46. •
4540

Stat. 411.

4640

Stat. 553.

Its language was so vague as to invite gross misinter
pretation by law officers.^
Apparently, the Sedition Act was not a Justice Depart
ment measure.

It probably was the product of the Senate

Judiciary Committee.

The logical person to have drafted

the bill in the Justice Department, Warren, did not take

ig
credit for the measure.
In addition to the Espionage Acts of 1917 and 1913,
and the Trading with the Enemy Act, there were scores of
acts passed during the war years that regulated the
activities of the American citizen in a manner previously
49
thought impossible.
In an address to the Kentucky Bar

^Actually, the Sedition Act of 191$ was simply an
amendment to Sec. 3 of Title I of the Espionage Act of 1917.
L&

Upon his departure from the Department of Justice,
Warren wrote a friend:

I leave on the books at least four permanent
records of my work—The President's Procla
mation of April 6, 1917 for the regulation
of alien enemies, The Espionage Act of June
15, 1917. The Trading with the Enemy Act of
October o, 1917, and the recently passed so
called Sabotage Act—all drafted by me.
Charles Warren to Gard [?], 22 April 191S, Charles Warren
Papers, Library of Congress.
JjQ
^Although the lower courts upheld the constitutionality
of both the Espionage Act and the Sedition Act, the Supreme
Court did not rule on either of the laws until after the
cessation of hostilities, at which time Davis was no longer
Solicitor General. The constitutionality of the Espionage
Act of 1917 was upheld in Schonck v. United States, 249
U. S. 47 (1919); the Sedition Act was sustained in Abrams v.
United States, 250 U. S. 616 (1919).
^or a general discussion of the Sedition Laws (179& and
1?3£), see M. G. Wallace, "The Constitutionality of Sedition
Laws," Virginia Law Review, VI (March, 1920), 385-99.

Association on July 2, 1918, Davis commented on the plethora
of war legislation:
Some of them are designed to occupy a per
manent place upon the statute books; others,
either by their essential character or express
terms, are limited to the duration of the war;
and still others embody policies experimental
in character but whose success or failure will
inevitably leave a lasting impress upon the
future destiny of the country. Certain character
istics which they present are obvious to even
the most casual observer. They exhibit the
Federal Government invading new fields of
activity; they make large additions to the
functions and powers of the Executive, and
they impose material limitations upon the
traditional freedom of action of the indi
vidual citizen.'*®
These last words anticipate what would become the leitmotiv
of Davis' political philosophy—the increasing power of
the federal government and the erosion of individual
rights.
III.

The Enforcement of the Espionage Act

One of the darker chapters in the history of the Wilson
Administration is the manner in which the constitutional
guarantees of the First Amendment were circumvented by
the application of the provisions of the Espionage Acts
of 1917 and 1918.

There has been no evidence uncovered to

-^John W. Davis, "The Lawyer and the War," Marquette
Law Review, III (December, 1913), 16-17.
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indicate that Davis stood in opposition to these activities.
Although he was certainly more moderate in his approach to
the question than many in the Administration (Burleson and
Warren, for example), Davis in general agreed with the
Justice Department's approach to the application of the
provisions of the act.
Davis justified the often harsh application of the
provisions of the act (specifically Section 3) abridging
the freedom of speech and press.

He noted:

The First Amendment and its inhibition
of any law which abridges the freedom of
speech or of the press has been appealed
to as against Section 3 of the Espionage
Act. But those who so contend mistake the
meaning of the liberty which it was the
purpose of that amendment to preserve.
As remarked by Lord Mansfield in Rex
St. Asaph [3 T. R. 428], "The liberty
of the press consists in printing without
previous license, subject to the conse
quences of the law." [Davis goes on to
• cite Supreme Court rulings in Patterson
v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454 (1907), and
Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States,
247 th S. 402 (1918), in support of this
v*

doctrine.]

Freedom of speech, also is a right to be
exercised like all others in the pursuit of
lawful and not unlawful ends. There is no
protection extended by the Constitution to
its licentious abuse.51

^ Davis, 0£. cit., pp. 23-24. One of Davis' contempora
ries took the rather smug attitude that "a sedition law,
supported by public sentiment, will be enforcable, while one
violating the public sense of justice and freedom will reg
ister its unfitness in verdicts of acquittal." W. R. Vance,
"Freedom of Speech and of the Press," Minnesota Law Review,
II (March, 191&), 260.

Davis was aware that there was a paradox in which
undemocratic measures were used to uphold a democratic
system. He explained his position thus:
The lawless who chafe under any exterior
restraint and the timorous who flinch at
any unusual exercise of the governmental
power find much in the existing circum
stances which seems to them to be a paradox
.... it is illogical that in the effort
to make the world safe for democracy,
authority autocratic even in seeming shall
for a moment be conferred upon the head of
a democratic State; it is inconsistent that
in a struggle, which is at bottom one for
the freedom of the individual, men shall be
forbidden to speak or write what belief or
fancy may dictate, or to go where choice or
interest leads them. It is the war, with
all its disturbances of human life and all
its loosening of the bonds of normal thought
and actions, which constitutes the paradox.
It is the emergency which is startling,
rather than the manner in which it is being
met
It is hard to exaggerate the widespread application
of the Espionage Act.

Under its provisions, the Justice

Department prosecuted more than 2,000 cases, of which at
least 1,055 resulted in convictions.^ (Under the auth
ority of the Presidential Proclamation of April 6, 1917»
6,300 aliens were arrested with 2,300 actually interned.)
With all these arrests, as well as others made under the

^ Davis, oj3. ext., p. 24.
^Scheiber, 0£. cit., p. 19.

authority of other war statutes, "not one bona fide spy
5/t
or saboteur was convicted during World War 1."^
Although the defendants prosecuted under the pro
visions of the Espionage Act may have received a fair trial
as 0'Brian suggested,^ the fault of the entire process
lay in the vagueness of the laws that permitted prosecution
of all manner of actions.

It is virtually a truism that

"it is impossible to define by legislation dangerous
doctrines; and if defined at all, they must be in such
general terms as to leave to the tribunal which applies the
law full opportunity to punish any expression with which
it disagrees."56
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., summarized the nature of the
cases prosecuted as follows:
It became criminal to advocate heavier taxa
tion instead of bond issues, to state that
conscription was unconstitutional though
the Supreme Court had not yet held it valid,

•^Ibid., citing John Lord O'Brian, National Security
and Individual Freedom (Cambridge, MassTi Harvard Univer
sity Press, 1955), pp. 49-50.
550. s. Hilton, "Public Opinion and Civil Liberties in
War Time, 1917-1919," Southwestern Social Science Quarterly,
XXVIII (December, 1947), 215. There is considerable evidence that can be culled from the transcripts of the trials
that "Ctlhe federal judiciary—termed 'hysterical' by
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes—proved to be highly immod
erate in passing on Espionage and Sedition Act cases."
Scheiber, o£. cit., p. 43«
^Wallace, o£. cit., p. 39#.
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to say that the sinking of merchant vessels
was legal, to urge that a referendum should
have preceded our declaration of war, to say
that war was contrary to the teachings of
Christ. Men were punished for criticizing
the Red Cross and the Y.M.C.A. . . .57
The entire situation eventually reached the point, especi
ally after the passage of the Sedition Act, that 0'Brian
was forced to complain "of the great number of complaints
which flooded the Department of Justice, and deplore the
tendency of so many people to dignify with demands for
prosecutions incidents which were hardly more than saloon

rg
squabbles or neighborhood quarrels."

Eventually,

Gregory attempted to stem the flood of indictments by
instructing that all United States Attorneys submit their
evidence to the Justice Department for a decision before
seeking an indictment.
Part of the problem arose from professional patriots
and amateur "secret service" agents.

Many of these indi

viduals belonged to a group known as the American Protec
tive League.

This organization consisted of some 250,000

^Zechariah Chafee, Jr., "Thirty-Five Years with Freedom
of Speech," Kansas Law Review, I (1952), 6.
^Hilton, o£. cit., p. 215.
^Ibid. Not until two months before the war's end did
the Justice Department make any effort to centralize prose
cutions under the war statutes. See Scheiber, o£. cit.,
pp. 46-49, for a discussion of "the fruits of decentrali
zation."

individuals scattered throughout the United States.

Wilson

personally expressed to Gregory some discomfort at the
existence of such a group, but the Attorney General defended
the group, which had been created with his approval, as
"disciplined citizen volunteers" in a "well-managed
organization" which had been "invaluable to the Government
as an auxiliary force."

0'Brian, however, was not as

impressed as Gregory with the American Protective League:
. . . the Chief of the War Emergency Division
. . . paid tribute to the work of the organized
spy-chasers in awakening the country to the
danger of "insidious propaganda," but says,
"no other cause contributed so much to the
oppression of innocent men as the systematic
and indiscriminate agitation against what
was claimed to be an all-pervasive system of
German espionage."61
In the final analysis, not withstanding the official
support of the American Protective League, the Justice
Department kept a rather level head during the spy scares
of the war years.

Gregory, Davis, and 0'Brian subscribed

in word and deed to the Attorney General's opinion that
the Justice Department was "not only responsible for law

Report of the Attorney General, 191#, p. 15. The
Bureau of Investigation had been increased by 191# to a
force five times its size in 1916. Ibid., p. 14^Hilton, 0£. cit., pp. 211-12.

enforcement, but in a larger sense responsible for the
Z! O

protection of civil liberty."
This concept of civil liberty did not, however, go
without challenge, both from Congress and from within the
Justice Department.

The split was particularly evident

on the problem of what constituted treason.
IV.

The Problem of Treason

The question of treason and its definition had been
of concern within the Justice Department from the time of
the beginning of hostilities in Europe.

The Attorney

General noted in his 191$ Report that
[b]efore the beginning of the war it
became evident that the constitutional
limitation both upon the definition of the
crime of treason and upon the mode of
proof thereof might seriously limit the
availability of the treason statute as an
instrument for suppressing or punishing ,
disloyal and hostile acts and utterances. ^
Fear that it would be difficult to obtain convictions on
the basis of the treason statute was one of the factors

that led to the passage of the Espionage Act of 1917.
Soon after the United States entered the war, the
Attorney General attempted to attain uniformity in the

Schieber, 0£. cit., p. 42, citing Report of the Attor
ney General, 191qT p. 16.
^Report of the Attorney General, 1913, p. 41.

department's definition of treason by the circulation of
a bulletin to the United States Attorneys.

There was con

siderable division within the Justice Department as to the
correct meaning of treason and so to those acts which came
within its definition.
Assistant Attorney General Warren, who had strong
feelings about what type of activities were treasonous,^
drafted a memorandum on the question that was circulated
within the Department for comment.
the Attorney General noted:

In a letter to Davis,

"There is considerable dif

ference of opinion among the attorneys in the Department
as to the definition [of treason] and I would very much
65
value your views."
Warren had defined treason in virtually its broadest
possible sense.

He spoke to this point in a law review

article in which he listed several specific acts that he
considered elements of the crime of "adhering to their
enemies, giving them aid and comfort.

^See Charles Warren, "What Is Giving Aid and Comfort
to the Enemy?" Yale Law Journal, XXVII (January, 191#)»
331-41, 347A-347T37
^Gregory to Davis, 23 July 1917, Record Group 60,
File 190470, Box 2730, National Archives.
^Warren, "What Is Giving Aid and Comfort to the
Enemy?" pp. 335-42.

There was considerable question as to whether "mere
words" constituted treason.

The most definitive statement

on the question at the time was in a charge made to a grand
jury by Justice Nelson of the United States Supreme Court:
Words oral, written, or printed, however
treasonable, do not constitute an overt act
of treason within the definition of the
crime. When spoken or written or printed in
relation to an act or acts which, if committed
with a treasonable design, might constitute
such overt act, they are admissible as evi
dence tending to characterize it, and to show
the intent with which the act was committed.
They also furnish some evidence of the act
itself against the accused. This is the ex
tent to which such publications may be used—
either in finding a bill of indictment or on
the trial of it.°7
Warren, however, contended that the constitutional require
ment that the crime of treason be an "overt act" did not
preclude "words as well as deeds if they can be proved by
68

direct evidence."

Perhaps a more reasoned appraisal of

the problem was one made by Hayes McKinney, who noted:
When mere words are said not to be treason,
what is meant is that words are not treason
if their effect is ended when uttered; if
they have not and cannot reasonably be expected
to have further operative force; but if the
uttered words are, on the contrary, of such a

^Charge to Grand Jury, 5 Blatchford 549, 550 (1&61),
cited in Thomas F. Carroll, "Freedom of Speech and the
Press in Wartime," Michigan Law Review, XVII (June, 1919),

661.
^Warren, "What Is Giving Aid and Comfort to the Knemy?"

p* 343•

character that they aid, or may reasonably
be expected to set in operation, a chain of
circumstances or events leading to acts which
hinder or delay a successful prosecution of
the war, then such words fully answer any
requirement as to overt acts.
The Justice Department actually had little need for a
treason statute after the passage of the Espionage Act,
especially after its amendment by passage of the Sedition
Act in 1913.

Although there were a few indictments re

turned based on the treason statute during the war, the
government was unable to get convictions in any of the
cases.

The Attorney General acknowledged that the cases

were brought "in order to test the possibilities of the
70
treason statute."
Some Congressmen did not appreciate the strict limita
tions placed on the definition of treason by the Constitu
tion and badgered the Justice Department for more action,
sometimes to the point of proposing laws that Gregory felt
unnecessary.

He felt an obligation to defend his actions

in this respect:
I have purposely moved slowly and with
caution in invoking the strong arm of the
law for seeming disloyality, believing that

^Hayes McKinney, "Treason Under the Constitution of
the United States," Illinios Law Review, XII (January,

1918), 402.
^Report of the Attorney General, 191&, loc. cit.
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more mature consideration would show the
occasional agitator that he was wrong and
the rest of us were right. However, I
shall not be half measured in undertaking
the control of those who persist in their
disloyalty and scheming against the
Government and its purposes.
. . . The Federal Government can find in
existing statutes and others now pending
before Congress power to handle any
situation likely to arise because of the
ill-advised activities of disloyal
agitators.'1
Davis and Warren often found themselves at odds on
the questions of policy and the treason question was no
exception.

At the beginning of the -war, former Assistant

Attorney William Wallace (who was Davis' favorite assis
tant before his resignation) wrote the Solicitor General:
The Germans have begun their internal and
infernal interferences .... We should
quit encouraging them in their deviltry
by proclaiming that we are sure they will
be law abiding (when we know damn well
they will not) and rather announce that
anyone caught at such pranks will be
promptly shot or hung, as may be most
convenient (to us—not him).'^

^ Thomas W. Gregory, "Disloyalty and Treason and Their
Punishment as Provided bv Federal Laws," Kentucky Law
Journal, VI (April, 1913), 274-75.
"^Wallace to Davis, 11 April 1917, cited in "War
Notes," p. 554» Charles Warren Papers, Library of Congress.

Davis forwarded this letter to Warren with the handwritten
notation:

"Referred to the great destroyer of the con-

stitution . . .
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According to Warren, the title "great destroyer of
the constitution,"
. . . referred to the statute which I
had drafted and which the Solicitor General
thought went to the very extreme verge of
legality under the Constitution. The
Solicitor General also knew well my general
views on the subject of dealing with war
and hostile acts in time of war. I was
of the opinion that any act of violence
directed at the Government in time of war
was treason and should be prosecuted as
such . . . .
The Attorney General, to my great regret,
did not concur with me in any of these
views. He took a very narrow view of the
law of treason ... .74
In retrospect, there seems to have been little, if
any, damage done to the Government's war effort by its
inability to get treason convictions for various actions
alleged to have given "aid and comfort to the enemy."
War statutes that were enacted proved, as Gregory had con
tended, more than adequate to quash disloyal activity.

"^Davis to Warren, [ll April 19173 > Box 1, Charles
Warren Papers, Library of Congress.
^"War Notes," p. 554> Charles Warren Papers, Library
of Congress.
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The entire question is of interest only because it illus
trates the growing chasm between Gregory and those who
would preserve some civil liberties in time of war, and
Warren and his supporters who would have had the President
virtually declare martial law.
V.

Military Trials for Civilians

One of the more interesting episodes which took place
within the Justice Department during the war was the forced
resignation of Charles Warren.

Warren, who would later

gain fame as a legal historian, had long been at odds
with most of his superiors within the Department, including
Gregory, Davis, and 0'Brian, on the question of civil
liberties in time of war.
The problem which precipitated his departure was the
demand for military trials for civilians accused of viola
ting the war statutes.

The specific advantages of mili

tary procedures over civil procedures were speed and the
lack of the requirement in military courts to allow the
defendant to have bail pending trial.

Many individuals,

including several Congressmen, looked with envy at the
"efficiency" of military justice; apparently, "that they
were not generally aware ... of the despotic nature
of the system of law and procedure by which the military
75
forces were governed." ^

"^Swisher, o£. cit., p. 6l6.

As has been noted before, Warren felt that Gregory
was too narrow in his definition of treasonable activity.
He went so far as to point this out in a memorandum to
Gregorys
I have noticed for some time that many
newspapers in different parts of this
country are commenting very severely on
this Department for failing to take any
action of the I.W.W. matters, especially
in connection with the activities of the
I.W.W. in destroying or attempting to
destroy grain, etc., and in tying up the
cutting of timber, etc.
As you know, my personal belief is that
these activities are treasonable and as
their necessary and direct result is to
impeach the operations of the war, those
who engage in them could not plead lack
of intent, inasmuch as they must be deemed
to intend the natural and direct consequences
of their acts. On this point, however, I
understand that Mr. Fitts and Mr. Herron
[justice Department attorneys] disagree
with me.76
There is little doubt that Warren could have found
many in the Justice Department in addition to Messrs. Fitt
and Herron who disagreed with him, including the Attorney
General. He did receive satisfaction, however, with the
passage of the Espionage Act because it permitted prose
cutions of the type he had envisioned under his broad

^Memorandum for the Attorney General from Warren, 6
August 1917» Record Group 60, File 190470, Box 2735»
National Archives.

definition of treason. He was not satisfied with the
continuance of civil trials in such cases.

He contended

"that the only effective way to deal with enemy activities
in this country was by trial by court martial (obtaining
further Congressional legislation, if necessary, for the
purpose)."^
Senator George E. Chamberlain of Oregon, chairman of
the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, introduced in
April, 1915 legislation which would have set up military
tribunals for the trial of civilians charged with offenses
7$
relating to the war.
While this bill was being debated
in the Senate, Warren took it upon himself to send Senator
Chamberlain, as well as several other Senators, a document
entitled "Who Are Spies?

A Memorandum of Law on the

Power of Congress to Subject Civilians to Trial by Courts79
Martial."
Warren accompanied his memorandum to the

^Warren to Gard, 22 April 191&, Box 1, Charles
Warren Papers, Library of Congress.
^O'Brian, 0£. cit., p. 10.
^The material contained in this memorandum was pub
lished in a law review article by Warren, "Spies, and the
Power of Congress to Subject Certain Classes of Civilians
to Trial by Military Tribunal," American Law Review, LIII
(1913), 195-223.

Senators with a letter explaining his position on the
question.do
Warren's letter to Senator Chamberlain states:
I have long believed that the moral
effect of one man arrested and tried by
court-martial was worth a hundred men
tried by the Department of Justice in
the criminal courts. The one feature
of bail alone makes the criminal courts
unsuited to these war crimes. Thus we
indict a man for seditious speeches,
etc.; he is released on bail; and then

His letter to Senator Lee S. Overman summed up his
position:
I note that in the debate on the amend
ment to the so-called Espionage Act, on
April 5> 191^, there were certain remarks
made by various Senators relative to the
power to deal with spies by court-martial.
As I, for some time in the past, had been
giving considerable attention to this phase
of the situation, and had prepared material
for an article on the subject for some law
journal, it occurs to me that it may be
helpful to you to have a full memorandum on
the subject of the power to deal with spies
and other civilians by court-martial. I
accordingly send to you herewith a copy of
my memorandum. I have sent a similar copy
to Senator Lodge, who took part in the de
bate, and will try to send a copy to one or
two other Senators.
Speaking personally, and not officially,
and not speaking in any way for the Department
of Justice, I desire to say for nearly a year
I have been convinced that the only effective
way of dealing with enemy activities in this
country was by the Military under the Military
Law. I do not believe that war can be effec
tively carried on by the criminal courts.
Warren to Senator Overman, S April 191^, Box 1, Charles
Warren Papers, Library of Congress.

goes ahead
speeches.
which must
preventing

and makes even more seditious
Enemy activities are activities
be promptly punished, thus
at once future activities.

Several senators had doubts about the constitutionality
of the proposed legislation.

Senator Overman wrote Presi

dent Wilson for his opinion on the bill.

The President's

reply was very critical of the proposal:
I am wholly and unalterably opposed to
such legislation, and very much value the
opportunity you give me to say so. I
think it is not only unconstitutional,
but that in character it would put us upon
the level of the very people we are fight
ing and affecting to despise. It would be
altogether inconsistent with the spirit
and practice of America . . .
Gregory also repudiated Warren's action, asserting that
had he known in advance of Warren's intention, he would
have forbidden it. "The general policies therein urged
and sought to be enacted into law are exactly contrary to
those proposed by [0'Brian] the assistant to the Attorney
General in charge of the problems involved and by the Attor$3
ney General himself."

Warren to Senator Chamberlain, 12 April 191$, Box 1,
Charles Warren Papers, Library of Congress.
^Wilson to Overman, 20 April 191$, New York Times,
23 April, 191$, cited in Swisher, o£. cit., p. 61b.
do
•'Swisher, loc. cit.

With such opposition from the Administration, it was
not surprising that Congressional support for the bill
died; and in the words of Warren, "the Attorney General
asked for my resignation, which I tendered instantly."
Davis, who had too much political skill to put himself
in such an awkward position as had Warren, took no active
part in the controversy.

He wrote Warren a simple letter

of condolences:
As I leave for Springfield in the
morning there is a chance that I may
not get to see you before I go, so I
am sending this note to tell you how
very sorry I am. I am sure i£ris un
necessary for me to say more.°5
In a more expansive letter written later, Davis once again
expressed his feelings toward Warren:
In conformity with our recent conver
sation I do myself the honor of sending
you under separate cover a copy of the
last photography to which I have submitted.
I send it not only in evidence of my
appreciation of the compliment paid by
your request, but in acknowledgment of
the unselfish aid which I have so freely
received at your hands in the last four
years. I shall always think of our associ
ation as among my pleasantest memories.""

^Warren to Gard, 22 April 1918, Box 1, Charles Warren
Papers, Library of Congress.
^Davis to Warren, [April 191SJ, Charles Warren Papers,
Library of Congress. There is also a calling card in the
Warren Papers from Mrs. Emma B. Davis on which is written
"Dear Mr. Warren—Just home. Are deeply distressed.
Affectionally, E.B.D."
Davis to Warren, 8 June
Papers, Library of Congress.

1918, Box 1, Charles Warren

Although this writer has been unable to discover any
documentary evidence to indicate that Davis opposed War
ren's position, Davis1 almost mystical love for the
institutions of American law would seem to indicate his
opposition to such a perversion of the Anglo-American
concept of due process as suggested by Warren.

CHAPTER VI
DAVIS AFTER 1916 AND CONCLUSION
As the title of this paper indicates, the primary
interest is Davis' career as Solicitor General from 1913
to 1916. It would be, however, unfair to the reader
simply to ignore Davis' life after 191S; therefore, this
concluding chapter will be in part a brief examination of
his career after he left the office of Solicitor General."1'
I. Davis1 Departure from the
Office of Solicitor General
In the summer of 191$, Davis was selected by the
Attorney General, at the request of the President, to be
the American delegate to a conference with the Germans on
the treatment and exchange of prisoners.

This conference

was held in Berne, Switzerland.
Associate Justice McReynolds had been Gregory's first
choice for the post; but when he refused, Davis was offered

At the time of this writing, there was no biography
of Davis that covered his life after 1924* William H.
Harbaugh's biography was, however, nearing completion. The
best primary source for information on Davis after 1924 is
his papers in the Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University.
This collection is described by Harbaugh in "The Papers
of John W. Davis (1873-1955)>" Yale University Library
Gazette, XXXVII (July, 1962), I3-J.8.

the position.

Gregory explained the appointment of Davis

in a letter to McReynolds:
I was very much disappointed at you not
being in a position to do the work in
Switzerland .... Under the circumstances
I have selected the Solicitor General and
know that he will handle it with his usual
discretion and ability.
I noted your suggestion of Mr. Dickinson,
but there were so many reasons why Davis
should be sent, as I will explain to you
the next time I see you, that I offered
him the place at once and he was quite
anxious to take it.2
Why Davis was so anxious to accept the new position
is not clear.

Perhaps he felt that he had attained all the

success he could expect in the Office of Solicitor General;
and as he had written his mother, he was "resolved to go
3
up, or out but not on."-' Another possibility is that Davis
may have become uncomfortable in his position because of
the intra-departmental conflicts of the type that led to
Warren's dismissal. In any event, in September, 191B,
Davis went to the Berne conference.
Although Davis* appointment to the Berne position did
not alter his status as Solicitor General, at least not
officially, the Attorney General felt that Davis' acceptance

^Gregory to McReynolds, 17 August 191#» Box 1, Thomas
Watt Gregory Papers, Library of Congress.
^Davis to Mother, 8 December
Papers, Yale University.

1916, Box 8, Davis
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of the post signaled his departure from the Justice
Department.

On September 19, 1916, Gregory offered the

position of Solicitor General to George C. Todd, his
Assistant for the Enforcement of Antitrust Laws.^"
Shortly after he arrived in Berne, President Wilson
offered Davis the position of Ambassador to Great Britain,
the most prestigious post in the American foreign service.
After some hesitation, largely because he was unsure of
his ability to meet the financial demands of the position,
Davis accepted the appointment.

He resigned his position

as Solicitor General, effective November 20, 1916.''
II.

Davis after 1916

With his appointment to the Court of St. James's,
Davis had replaced the capable and popular Walter Hines
Page.

His selection for the position brought mixed reac

tions from the national press.

An article in Current

Opinion observed:

^"Gregory to Todd, 19 September 1916, Box 1, Thomas
Watt Gregory Papers, Library of Congress.
^Wilson refused to accede to Gregory's request that
Todd be appointed to replace Davis. He gave as his reason
Todd's Virginia background, asserting that too many appoint
ments had already been made from the Southern states, and
that Todd's appointment "... would be seized upon to
deepen the impression that we are a Southern party." Wilson
to Gregory, 31 January 1919, Box 1, Gregory Papers, Library
of Congress.
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Despite this notable record and the
high regard with which the appointee to
the foremost post in the diplomatic ser
vice is held in Washington, the advis
ability of sending such a comparatively
unadvertised man to London is questioned
by a considerable section of the press
and public."
The New York Evening Post asserted that
President Wilson has appointed an able
man to the Court of St. JamesC's] but
that "he has made a mistake" because "it
is our conviction that the occasion de
manded the choice of a man of another
type, Mr. Davis being scarcely known out- y
side the official and professional realm."
The New York Times, however, took the view that "the country
is much better pleased with these non-political appoint
ments, these promotions for fitness, than it would be with
the appointment of men it knew better by name, but knew
c>
only through their activity in politics."
The Washington correspondent of the Boston Transcript
wrote a very favorable article supporting the appointment,
but this is not surprising since the writer was Charles
Q
Warren, the erstwhile Assistant Attorney General.

/r
"Our New Ambassador to England is an Intellectual
Prodigy," Current Opinion, LXV (November, 1913), 295*
^Citied in Ibid.
^Citied in Ibid.
^There is a copy of Warren's article in Box 1, Charles
Warren Papers, Library of Congress.

While serving as Ambassador to the Court of St.
James'si Davis participated in the Paris Peace Conference
of 1919. As a member of a committee drawn up for the
purpose, he was instrumental in establishing the guide10

lines for governing the occupied areas of the Rhineland.

Davis* tenure as Ambassador was an unqualified success
King George V characterized him as "one of the few perfect
gentlemen he had ever met."1"1"

His departure from the post

in 1921, which was inevitable when the Republicans won
the presidency in the 1920 election, was the occasion of
many congratulatory farewell dinners and laudatory news
paper articles.

A farewell dinner given by the Pilgrims,

an Anglo-American organization formed to foster good
relations between the two nations, was attended by the
12

Prince of Wales, the future Duke of Winsor.

An editorial in the London Times on the occasion of
Davis' departure from London observed:
He is a great lawyer, as was proved by his
work as Solicitor General of the United

10

"Our New President," American Bar Association Journal
VIII (September, 1922), 551""^"Great Lawyer," Newsweek, XLV (April 4> 1955), 30.
12

London Times, April 1, 1921, from a clipping xn
Box 4f Mrs. John Preston Collection, West Virginia Univer
sity.
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States. He loves the law. One who knows
him best says of him, "His profession is
the breath of his nostrils. Legal and con
stitutional complexities appeal to his mind."
Byron, you will remember, simplified his
politics into an "utter destestation of all
Governments." He would not have done so,
I think, if all Governments had been made
up of men like John William Davis.-*-3
When he returned to the United States, Davis became
a senior partner of the Wall Street firm of Stetson,
Jennings, and Russell.

The firm soon became Stetson,

Jennings, Russell, and Davis.

The addition of "and Davis"

to one of the most prestigious lav/ firms on Wall Street
was "tremendous to any one who knows the history of New
York law firms.Many prominent attorneys were members,
indeed senior partners, of Wall Street law firms for years,
if not throughout their entire career, and never had their
name added to the concern's title.
In 1922, the legal profession gave Davis one of its
greatest awards when it selected him President of the
American Bar Association.

This was not the only reward

his peers were willing to give him, for there was consid
erable pressure placed upon him to accept a seat on the

13
-'Undated clipping in Box 4, Mrs. John Preston Col
lection, West Virginia University.
^Clinton W. Gilbert, "You Takes Your Choice" (New
York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1924;, p. 55.

Supreme Court of the United States.
When Justice Clarke retired, Chief Justice Taft,
"knowing that Harding was not committed to any candidate,
1C
began to work feverishly to a suitable nominee."' Taft
was joined in his talent search by Justice Van Devanter:
Since only two members of the Court were
Democrats, Taft and Van Devanter agreed
that there was much to be said for the
appointment of a Democrat of "sound" views.
They had in mind . . . John W. Davis—"a
good lawyer and level-headed man who does
not run from work and . . . enjoys a good
reputation all over the country. If I
were making the appointment," said Taft,
"I would appoint John Davis."1"
Davis was not enthusiastic about the appointment.

To

those pressing the position upon him, he stated that he
would take the job if it were offered "but for financial
reasons would prefer to remain in practice with Stetson,
17

Jennings, and Russell."

Van Devanter wrote Davis that

he and the Chief Justice

were interested in Davis* appointment to the Court, saying
"While recognizing that you are not seeking the preferment
we conceive you would deem it a patrotic duty to accept

"^Walter F. Murphy, Elements of Judicial Strategy,
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 'Ik,
1 ft

Davis J. Danelski, A Supreme Court Justice Is
Appointed (New York: Random llouse, 1964), p. 43•
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the place were it tendered."

Davis faced a difficult

dilemma:
He knew what Van Devanter's communication
meant—a place on the Court if he wanted it.
Such an honor was difficult to turn down,
and the mention of patriotic duty touched
home. Yet had he not given himself fully
and unselfishly as Congressman, Solicitor
General, and ambassador to Great Britain?
He was not a wealthy man, and his govern
mental service, especially his two years
as ambassador, had depleted his savings.
Now had he not the right to think of his
family—and his law partners, who had been
generous to him and expected him to remain
with them? It was not that he wanted a
fortune ("in these income-tax days." he
said, "that was impossible anyway"), but
surely he was entitled to acquire a measure
of economic independence and to make pro
vision for those dependent upon him.1^
In so many words, Davis rejected an appointment to the
Supreme Court of the United States.
In an attempt to change his mind, Thomas W. Shelton
wrote Davis:
When the names of J. P. Morgan or Carnegie
have been forgotten, when Choate and Carter
will be meaningless, the words of Mr. Justice
Davis will be fresh in mind; will be educat
ing the coming generation in fundamental prin
ciples and will be measuring civil liberty
and property rights amongst millions.20
1A
Van Devanter to Davis, 29 October 1922, Van Devanter
Papers, Library of Congress, cited in Ibid., p. 53 •
^Ibid., citing from Davis to Van Devanter, 31 October
1922, Van Devanter Papers, Library of Congress.
^Shelton to Davis, 3° October 1922, Taft Papers,
Library of Congress, cited by Ibid., pp. 53-54.
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Chief Justice Taft was irritated at Davis1 refusal.
He predicted that Davis would eventually regret the refusals
He has made his choice now, and I don't
see quite how the opportunity can come
to him again, because while he is young
enough to wait some years, by that time
he will become so identified with the
Morgan interests that no President would
feel like taking him from the center of 2i
Wall Street and putting him on the Bench.
It is not unlikely that Davis had another motive in
refusing a seat on the Court in addition to his financial
condition, namely a chance at the presidential nomination.
Conventional history indicated that Davis' candidacy for
the presidency was something that developed out of noivhere
once the deadlock between Smith and McAdoo became apparent
at the 1924 convention.

A closer examination of the facts

shows that this was not true.
In May, 1920, the New York Times ran an editorial sup
porting Davis for the Democratic nomination to the

?l

Taft to Van Devanter, 2 November 1922, Van
Devanter Papers, Library of Congress, citod by Ibid., p. 54.
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presidency.

Prior to the 1920 convention, a "Hometown

Club" supporting Davis' candidacy was formed in Clarksburg.
Franklin Roosevelt, a Smith man until he withdrew his can
didacy, "seems to have been prepared to push for the
nomination of John W. Davis," if the convention dead23
locked. ^ The convention did not deadlock but chose Governor
Cox of Ohio as its candidate, with Roosevelt as his running
mate.
Since he was still ambassador to the Court of St.
James's, Davis participating in the ensuing presidential

2?

Editorial, "A Great Democrat," The New York Times,
May 23, 1920. According to a letter from Davis' daughter,
Julia, to an unidentified correspondent, the question was
also in her father's mind:
The question to run or not to run for
president is the chief problem on our horizon
just now .... Whatever happens Daddy can
certainly not be a voluntary candidate, and
make any effort to get the nomination. I
don't want him to have it at all.
Julia Davis to [?], 6 August 1919, Box 4» Mrs. John Preston
Collection, West Virginia University. This letter is typed,
possibly transcribed at a later date. It should be used
with caution.
^Kenneth S. Davis, FDR: The Crucial Years: Challenge
and Response (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1972), p. b±3.
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campaign was severely limited, unlike his active partici2Zl
pation in the 1916 campaign.

^"Davis had taken an active part in the 1916 presidential
campaign. Early in the campaign, newspapers carried stories
that Davis was Wilson's choice to be chairman of the Demo
cratic National Committee and his campaign manager. Davis
wrote his mother:
If you have followed the papers you may
have observed that I am now being touted for
chairman of the National Democratic Committee
in the coming campaign. I know nothing which
I less desire, and I attached to the newspaper
report no importance whatsoever, until I
learned today that I was under very serious
discussion last week in quarters the most
responsible. I would certainly regret a
draft of that sort. The danger seems to
have passed by.
Davis to Mother, 5 June
University.

1916, Box 8, Davis Papers, Yale

Notwithstanding his failure to become chairman of the
national committee, Davis campaigned heavily in Kentucky,
Ohio, and West Virginia for the Democratic ticket. He re
ported his activities directly to Gregory. After his cam
paigning in Ohio, Davis predicted that the state would go
for Wilson (Davis to Gregory, 26 October 1916, House Col
lection, Yale University). This was a brave prediction for
Ohio had not given the Democratic Party a majority since
the formation of the Republican Party in 1£>54• Wilson had
carried the state in 1912, but received fewer votes than
the Progressive and Republican tickets combined. In a letter
to Col. House, Gregory supported Davis' prediction:
I think you know that Davis is a man of
infinitely good judgment, who has no brain
storms and who can size up a political situ
ation remarkably well. Besides this, he has
campaigned in Ohio before, and living in the
adjoining state of West Virginia he knows
quite a deal about Ohio conditions.
Gregory to House, 30 October 1916, House Collection, Yale
University. Wilson did carry the state in 1916.

While Davis continued to add to his legal reputation,
and bank account, as counsel for clients such as the Morgan
interests, Standard Oil, and United States Rubber; a small,
loyal band of supporters, led by Clem Shaver of Fairmont,
West Virginia, continued to hope that Davis could get the
presidential nomination in 1924.
In 1924, the deadlock which Roosevelt feared would
occur in 1920, did in fact take place.

On the one hundred

and third ballot, a weary, badly divided convention gave
25
y

Davis the presidential nomination.

The 1924 Democratic convention was not only badly
divided over its choice for president but also over plat
form questions such as prohibition and the revived Ku Klux
Klan. It would have been difficult for a unified Democratic
Party to unseat the Republicans in the prosperous

years

of the early 1920's; the division demonstrated at the
convention killed any chances the Democrats had for vic
tory.

As if this were not enough, a Progressive ticket,

headed by Robert La Follette of Wisconsin, was on the ballot
in many states, draining off many normally Democratic votes.

^The convention selected as Davis' running mate
Charles Bryan, whose greatest claim to fame was that
William Jennings Bryan was his brother.
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In the ensuing election, Coolidge received 15,729,060
popular votes to Davis* S,391,431•
electoral votes, Davis 136.
an extended trip abroad.

Coolidge received 3^2

After the election Davis took

While in Paris, he wrote his

sister:
I'm slowly forgetting the campaign and
the election—although the bad taste it left
in my mouth recurs from time to time. I can
see my blunder . . . but I take comfort in
the thought that nothing could have changed
it. Never again for me—the law is good
enough to last me out my remaining time.26
After his return to the United States, Davis resumed
the practice of law, eventually forming the firm of Davis,
Pollc, Wardwell, Gardiner, & Reed. In the years that
followed, Davis further developed his already considerable
reputation as the "dean of the appellate bar."
An example of his work was an equity suit brought by
stockholders against the corporation officers of the
Plymouth Oil Company, Davis being retained by the defend
ants. Davis won a judgment for his clients in the District
Court.

His fee for this 1926 case was $400,000; and when

some of his clients complained about the size of the fee,
Davis reminded them that they had a bad case to begin with,
and that he had in fact won a settlement worth nine million

n/
Davis to Mrs. John Preston, 3 December 1924» Box 4>
Mrs. John Preston Collection, West Virginia University.
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dollars.^
As is the case with most Wall Street law firms, most
of the business of Davis, Polk, and Wardwell was settled
outside the courtroom.

When their services were required

in court, Davis1 forte remained appellate argument.

He

appeared in several cases before the Supreme Court in the
1930's and 1940's.

One of his more famous cases before

the Court was United States v. Macintosh, 2#3 U. S. 605
(1931)*

In this case, Davis contended that a consci

entious objector could not be denied citizenship solely on
2$
that account.
The Court did not agree with Davis'
argument, and he lost the case.
Davis remained active in Democratic Party politics.
He spoke for Smith in the 192# campaign, attempting to
blunt the religious objections to Smith's candidacy.

Al

though he was "loyal from first to last" to Newton D.

^For a detailed account of this case, see the following
collections, all located at West Virginia University:
Walter S. Hallanan Papers, I. C. White Papers, and Samuel
T. Mallison Papers.
2g
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United
States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1941)>
pp. 371-72. In 1946 the Court, in the case of Giouard v.
United States, 32§ U. S. 61 (1946), reversed the Macintosh
ruling. Davis also argued the Giouard case.
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Baker at the 1932 convention, 7 he supported FDR after he
received the party's nomination.
The 1932 election was the last time Davis supported
the national Democratic ticket.

He felt that the New

Deal practices of the Roosevelt Administration had moved
the Democratic party too far from the principles of Jeffersonian democracy. His opposition to the New Deal mani
fested itself in the formation, along with other conser
vative Democrats, of the American Liberty League.^®
The League was unsuccessful in its attempt to thwart
Roosevelt's re-election in 1936,

and had little if any

9C. H. Cramer, Newton D. Baker: A Biography (Cleve
land: World Publishing Co., lybij, p. 250. Baker, who was,
like Davis, a Clarksburg, West Virginia, native—he had
gained national fame as a progressive lawyer and politican
in Cleveland, Ohio—was Wilson's Secretary of War. lie and
Davis had great admiration and respect for each other.
Baker was quoted that "if he could be born again he would
ask to be given Davis's legal mind." Ibid., p. 222.
^For an account of the formation and activities of
this organization, see Frederick Rudolph, "The American
Liberty League, 1934-1940," American Historical Review, LVI
(October, 1950), 19-33•^The organization may have been, in fact, counter
productive; at least one individual thought so. S. M.
Croft of Charleston, West Virginia, wrote Davis after the
1936 election to thank him and other members of the American
Liberty League for FDR's victory. Davis sent the letter
to his nephew, a member of a Charleston law firm, for his
comment. Davis to John J. D. Preston, 6 November 1936,
John W. Davis Papers, West Virginia University.

effect on the 1940 election. The organization died a
quiet death in 1940.
In September, 1940, Davis appeared before a Senate
subcommittee to speak in favor of a constitutional amend
ment that would have limited the president to a single six32
year term.
This was, of course, a direct slap at
Roosevelt's running for a third term.

Davis also publicly

announced his support for the Republican candidate, Wendell
Willkie.
One is not surprised that a confirmed Anglophile such
as Davis backed Roosevelt's foreign policy when the Second
World War started.

Although he disagreed with Roosevelt's

domestic policies, he made public addresses urging support
for FDR's foreign policy.

Davis, a strong advocate of the

old League of Nation^ also spoke publicly for United States
participation in the new United Nations.
Wealth as well as fame came to Davis.

He had a

country estate on Long Island, a town house in New York
City, and a winter home near Charleston, South Carolina.
Not only was he counsel for some of the nation's largest
corporations, but he was also on their boards of directors.
He was "a director of the Guarantee Trust Company of New

•^2See The New York Times, September 20, 1940, for an
account of his appearance before the subcommittee.

York, the American Telephone and Telegraph Company,
trustee of the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York,
and general counsel as well as director of the United
States Rubber Company.
Davis remained active before the bar into the eighth
decade of his life; in fact, he was virtually an octo
genarian when he argued the 1952 Steel Seizure case
(Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579).

In

this case, Davis successfully defended, for a fee of
$100,000, the United States steel industry against

President Truman's attempt to nationalize it temporarily.
Some see a paradox in that Davis thirty-seven years
earlier had supported the executive department in the
Midwest Oil case.-^

Actually, neither the circumstances

nor the facts of the two cases lend themselves to com
parison.
Davis' last case before the Supreme Court (he argued
approximately 140 during his lifetime) involved his par
ticipation as counsel for the state of South Carolina in
35

the school segregation case decided in 1954.

Davis

^Current Biography 1953 (New York: H. W. Wilson Co.,
1954).
•^Glendon A. Schubert, Constitutional Politics (New
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, I960;, p.
4.
•^The leading case of the five segregation cases was
Brown v. Board of Education 347 U. S. 4#3 (1954). Davis'
argument was part of case bio. 2 in the series, Briggs v.
Elliott.

refused a fee for his participation in the case, his
only payment being "a huge and ornate tea service from
the legislature of the state of South C a r o l i n a . D a v i s
took the case "partly because an old friend, South
Carolina's Governor [and former Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States] James F. Byrnes, asked
him to, partly as a matter of constitutional (states'
rights) and social conviction (Race is a fact, like sex)."^
A reading of the brief and accounts of the oral
argument^

made by Davis indicates that he made a strong

case for a weak cause:
Davis did not think it mattered that
Thurgood Marshall [Chief counsel for the
NAACP.1 could quote the opinions of indi
vidual senators and congressmen on the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
point was, he said, that Congress had

•^Harbaugh, og». cit., p. 13.
37»»Mav It Please the Court . . .," Time, LXII (December
21, 1953), IS.
•^Oral arguments made before the Supreme Court were
not recorded in any official manner prior to the chief
justiceship of Earl Warren. Since that time they have
been recorded on tape, but only for use by the Court. This
is a serious handicap to those attempting to study the
operation of the Court. Even the printed briefs are avail
able at only a limited number (about 25) of depositories,
and many of these collections are not complete. Briefs of
earlier cases are available only at the Law Library of the
Library of Congress.

framed the amendment, and Congress main
tained a segregated school system in
Washington, D. C., itself.
This was a hard argument to answer, and
when the justices arose and filed out
behind the red felt curtain that backed the
bench, the effects of Davis' words were
still in the air.-'"
Despite the forceful argument (which the Court simply
ignored in their opinion), Davis was unable to sway a
single justice to his position.

By a 9-0 vote, the Court

overruled the Plessy doctrine of "separate but equal."
After the decision, Davis wrote an attorney in South
Carolina with whom he worked on the case that "looking
at the matter philosophically, perhaps a unanimous opinion
was better than a split court.
Davis remained active until his death on March 24,
1955.

At the end of his career, he was engaged in the

defense of nuclear physicist Robert Oppenheimer, who had
been denied a security clearance, thus thwarting to the
end those who would place him in an ideological pigeon
hole.

^Marjorie G. Fribourg, The Supreme Court in American
History: Ten Great Decisions (Philadelphia: Macrae Smith
Co., I§65), p. I3«.
^Cited by Harbaugh, o£. cit., p. IS.
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III.

Conclusion

There are two basic questions to which the concluding
section of this paper will address itself.

The first ques

tion concerns Davis' effectiveness as an attorney for the
United States; the second question concerns the influence
of his political ideology on his performance as Solicitor
General.
There are so many testimonials to Davis' effective
ness as Solicitor General that to list them becomes
monotonous.

All commentators assert that he was one of

the great Solicitor Generals of all time, and a substan
tial number contend that he was the greatest ever to hold
the office.
A simple listing of the cases in which he appeared
and won is impressive—he won almost seventy-five percent
of all the cases he argued.

Even more impressive is his

record in the "important" cases.

With the single exception

of the Child Labor case, which he lost by the narrowest
of margins, he won every case he argued where Wilson's
progressive problems were under attack, as well as cases
arising from attacks made on the government's war powers.

Not only was Davis an excellent legal technic ian^"1
but he was also an excellent administrator.

His uncanny

ability to get along with his fellow workers, both
superiors and subordinates, coupled with the energy that
enabled him to work normally a fourteen-hour day, dictated
success in almost any endeavor.^

^warren noted that Davis' courtroom performances were
the "despair" of other members of the Justice Department
for he has the singular faculty of pre
senting his whole case fully in an argu
ment seldom exceeding three-quarters of
an hour, in such apt, precise, unerring
and comprehensive language that a listener
in the court-room would believe that he
was reading instead of speaking extem
poraneously.
Warren, loc. cit.
^During the 1924 presidential campaign, one commen
tator observed:
The first time I heard of John W. Davis
was when he was Solicitor General of the
United States. Then I was told he was "the
best lawyer practicing before the Supreme
Court." The next time I heard of him was
from London correspondents of the American
newspapers—-that he was "the best man we had
in London." These memories were short, but
he was still the "best." Now what he most
commonly is called is "the best candidate in
any party for the Presidency." And certain
it is that he is Wall Street's best lawyer.
If I could run back over his record I would
probably find that he was once "the best
lawyer in his State" of West Virginia, and,
again, that he was "the best of the younger
members of the House of Representatives."
Gilbert, 0£. cit., pp. 57-5^

The question that bothered Davis' friends and foes
concerns his political ideology and its influence on his
legal career. Davis' biographer calls him "a Southern
moderate whose ultimate commitment was to the nation and
the rule of law."^ While I do not disagree with this
characterization, I prefer to classify him as a member
of the Burke school of conservatism.

Perhaps neither, or

both, classifications are correct—Davis was not an easy
man to classify.
Although Davis came to the national political scene
as a progressive Democratic Congressman, his credentials
were always open to question.

He was opposed to woman's

suffrage,^ at least until it became the law of the land
with the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920.

Even

the progressive legislation that he successfully defended
with great skill while Solicitor General often filled his
mind with doubts as to their constitutionality, desira
bility, or both.
Davis always contended that the guiding light of his
political ideology was the teachings of Thomas Jefferson:
"I think he is the greatest political philosopher this

^Harbaugh, o£. cit., p. IS.
^Davis to Father, 26 June
Papers, Yale University.

1914, Box £, Davis

country has produced.

Every time we have abandoned his

teachings we have taken a step in the wrong direction.
It is easy to document Davis' almost reactionary
attitudes on the expansion of governmental powers. In
1922, he questioned the constitutionality of laws estab
lishing general eight-hour days and minimum wages for men.

^Davis to Walter Stuart, 10 April 1942, Walter
Stuart Papers, West Virginia University. Davis explained
his choice in the following anecdote:
I was sitting one night with Lloyd George
around the fireplace in his country home.
He asked me "Who was the greater man, Hamil
ton or Jefferson?" I answered "I think they
were both great men and the efforts of the
biographers of either to belittle the other
are unwarranted. I will tell you what I
think they did and you will tell men which
you think the greater.
I went on. "Hamilton, with his brilliant
and orderly mind, played a large part in
organizing the governmental structure of the
country, particularly its finances. His
mark on the governmental machinery is
probably deeper than that of Jefferson.
Jefferson laid down the principles for social
and political conduct. His mark on the
social life and ideas of America—meaning
thereby the way Americans feel toward one
another and the ambitions they cherish for
themselves—left a far deeper mark than
Hamilton. I ask you, therefore, which was
the greater man?" Lloyd George answered at
once, "Jefferson by all odds."
Ibid.
^Davis to Clara M. Beyer, Executive Secretary, The
Consumers' League of New York, 29 December 1922, Box 1,
1966 Addition, Constitution Folder, Davis Papers, Yale
University.

23:

During the Roosevelt Administration, we find him questioning
the principles of the New Deal: "Who can doubt that there
are natural laws in the social and economic as well as the
physical worlds, and that these cannot be overridden with
out courting disaster?"^

By 1945» Davis was virtually in

despair;
I think the relief program administered
directly from the Federal Treasury one of the
greatest crimes ever committed in this
country against free government. It was
political bribery on a mass scale and I
am not sure that we will ever recover from
it. Indeed, I am inclined to think we will
not.4°
In an address at his Alma Mater in 1949> Davis summed
up his feelings on the decline of constitutional govern
ment by saying, "... the widest of all breaches in the
constitutional wall, which was supposed to render impos
sible a centralized government, is by way of the power of
Congress, uncontrolled and uncontrollable, to collect funds
from the citizen and spend them as it will."49

^Quoted in Francis Biddle, Mr. Justice Holmes (New
Yorkj Scribner's Sons, 1942), p. 123. T^he source of this
quote is not identified by Biddle. Whether Davis said it
or not, it certainly ranks as one of the best one sentence
summaries of the philosophy of the 19th century liberal
(or Social Darwinist) that one will ever encounter.
^Davis to Stuart, 6 August 1945» Walter Stuart
Papers, West Virginia University.
^John W. Davis, John Randolph Tucker: The Man and
His Work (Lexington, Va.: Washington and Lee university,
1949], p. 26.

If one can with such ease document Davis' political
ideology, can we infer that it adversely affected his
performance as Solicitor General?

The answer to this

question must be an emphatic "No!"

He was, in every sense

of the word, a "lawyers' lawyer."

Had the occasion arisen

in which he felt that he could no longer support the
policies of the Wilson Administration before the Court,
his resignation would have been forthcoming.

As one

writer observed:
There are men born to feel that they are
captains of their soul. And Mr. Davis is
one. He is one of life's fair-haired
boys. He has never had reason to be
afraid. When he sells his legal services
he does not throw in his soul for good
measure.50
The cases that he argued and won before the Court
marked a liberal peak, whose decline was marked by the
191& ruling in the Dagenhart case, and which would not
be attained again until the post-1937 Court moved into the
area of civil liberties.

Much of the credit for rulings

which sustained Wilson's New Freedom belongs to Davis, a
Solicitor General whose performance before the Court set
a new standard of quality that is yet to be surpassed.

-^Gilbert, o£. cit., p. 56.
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JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURTj

1913-191S
Appointing
President

Years
of Service

Edward D. White

Cleveland

1394-1921*

Joseph McKenna

McKinley

1^93-1925

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.

Roosevelt

1902-1932

William R. Day

Roosevelt

1903-1922

Horace H. Lurton

Taft

1909-1914

Charles E. Hughes

Taft

1910-1916**

V/illis Van Devanter

Taft

1910-1937

Joseph R. Lamar

Taft

1910-1916

Mahlon Pitney

Taft

1912-1922

James C. McReynolds

Wilson

1914-1941

Louis D. Brandeis

Wilson

1916-1939

John H. Clarke

Wilson

1916-1922

Justice

*

Chief Justice, 1910-1921, appointed by Taft.

** Chief Justice, 1930-1941» appointed by Hoover.
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APPENDIX B

AN ACT TO ESTABLISH
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Be it enacted in the Senate and House of Represen
tatives of the United States of America in Congress assem
bled, That there shall be, and is hereby established, an
executive department of the government of the United States,
to be called the Department of Justice, of which the Attorney-General shall be the head.

His duties, salary, and

tenure of office shall remain as now fixed by law, except
so far as they may be modified by this act.
Sec. 2.

And be it further enacted, That there shall

be in said Department an officer learned in the law, to
assist the Attorney-General in the performance of his
duties, to be called the solicitor-general, and who, in
case of a vacancy in the office of Attorney-General, or in
his absence or disability, shall have power to exercise
all the duties of that office.

There shall also be continued

in said Department the two other officers, learned in the
law, called the assistants of the Attorney-General, whose
duty it shall be to assist the Attorney-General and solici
tor-general in the performance of their duties, as now
required by law.
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Sec. 3.

And be it further enacted, That from and

after the time when this act takes effect, the solicitor
of the treasury and his assistants, the solicitor of
internal revenue, the solicitor and naval judge advocate
general, who shall hereafter be known as the naval solici
tor, and the clerks, messengers, and laborers employed in
the office of the Attorney-General, and in the offices of
the solicitor of the treasury, naval solicitor, and
solicitor of internal revenue, and the law officer in the
Department of State, now designated as the examiner of
claims in said Department, shall be transferred from the
Department with which they are now associated to the
Department of Justice; and said officers shall exercise
their functions under the supervision and control of the
head of the Department of Justice.
Sec. 4.

And be it further enacted, That questions of

law submitted to the Attorney-General for his opinion,
except questions involving a construction of the Consti
tution of the United States, may be by him referred to
such of his subordinates as he may deem appropriate, and
he may require the written opinion thereon of the officer
to whom the same may be referred; and if the opinion given
by such officer shall be approved by the Attorney-General,
such approval so endorsed thereon shall give the opinion
the same force and effect as belong to the opinions of
the Attorney-General.
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Sec. 5. And be it further enacted, That whenever the
Attorney-General deems it necessary, he may require the
solicitor-general to argue any case in which the government
is interested before the court of claims; as to cases
coming by appeal from the court of claims to The Supreme
Court of the United States, it shall be the duty of *.he
Attorney-General and solicitor-general to conduct ar. j. argue
them before that court as in other cases in which the United
States is interested.

And the Attorney-General may, when

ever he deems it for the interest of the United States, con
duct and argue any case in which the government is inter
ested, in any court of the United States, or may require
the solicitor-general or any officer of his Department to
do so.

And the solicitor-general, or any officer of the

Department of Justice, may be sent by the Attorney-General
to any State or district in the United States to attend to
the interests of the United States in any suit pending in
any of the courts of the United States, or in the courts
of any State, or to attend to any other interest of the
United States; for which service they shall receive, in
addition to their salaries, their actual and necessary
expenses, while so absent from the seat of government,
the account thereof to be verified by affidavit.
Sec. 9.

And be it further enacted, That the several

officers herein before transferred from the other
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Departments to the Department of Justice shall hold their
respective offices until their successors are duly quali
fied; and the solicitor-general, and whenever vacancies
occur, the assistants of the Attorney-General, and all
the solicitors and assistant solicitors mentioned in this
act, shall be appointed by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate ....
Sec. 10.

And be it further enacted, That the fol

lowing annual salaries shall be paid to the officers
herein before mentioned:

To the solicitor-general, seven

thousand five hundred dollars; ....
Sec. 14.

And be it further enacted, That the

Attorney-General may require any solicitor or officers
of the Department of Justice to perform any duty required
of said Department or any officer thereof; and the officers
of the law department, under the direction of the AttorneyGeneral, shall give all opinions and render all services
requiring the skill of persons learned in law, necessary
to enable the President and heads of the executive Depart
ments, and the heads of bureaus and other officers in such
Departments, and the heads of bureaus and other officers
in such Departments to discharge their respective duties;
and shall, for and on behalf of the United States, procure
the proper evidence for, and conduct, prosecute, or defend
all suits and proceedings in the Supreme Court of the
United States and in the court of claims, in which the

United States, or any officer thereof, is a party or may
be interested.

And no fees shall be allowed or paid to

any other attorney or counselor at law for any service
herein required of the officers of the Department of
Justice.
Sec. 19.

And be it further enacted, That this act

shall take effect and be .in force from and after the first
day of July, eighteen hundred and seventy.
APPROVED, June 22, 1370.

Source: Luther A. Huston, The Department of Justice (New
York: Praeger, 1967), pp. 244-60.
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APPENDIX C

SOLICITORS GENERAL, 1370-1913
Name

Appointing
President
Grant

Appointed

Resigned

State

Benjamin H.
Bristow

Oct. 11,

Nov. 15t
1372

Ky.

Samuel F.
Phillips

Nov. 15f
1372

May 3,
1335

N. C.

Grant

John
Goode

May 1,
1335

Aug. 5,
1336

Va.

Cleveland

George A.
Jenks

July 30,
1336

May 29,
1339

Pa.

Cleveland

Orlow W.
Chapman

May 29,
1339

Jan. 19,
1390

N. Y.

Harrison

William H.
Taft

Feb. 4,
1390

Mar. 20,
1392

Ohio

Harrison

Charles H.
Aldrich

Mar. 21,
1392

May 23,
1393

111.

Harrison

Lawrence
Maxwell, Jr.

Apr. 6,
1393

Jan. 30,
1395

Ohio

Cleveland

Holmes
Conrad

Feb. 6,
1395

July 6,
1397

Va.

Cleveland

John K.
Richards

July 1,
1397

Mar. 16,
1903

Ohio

McKinley

Henry M.
Hoyt*

Feb. 25,
1903

Mar. 31,
1909

Pa.

Roosevelt

Lloyd W.
Bowers

Apr. 1,
1909

Sept. 9,
1910

111.

Taft

Fredk. W.
Lehmann

Dec. 12,
1910

July 15,
1912

Mo.

Taft

1870

Name

Appointed

Resigned

State

^Pre^ldent

Wm. Marshall
Bullit

July 16,
1912

Mar. 11,
1913

Ky.

Taft

John V7.
Davis**

July 2 8 ,
1913

Nov. 20,
1918

W. Va.

Wilson

*

Mr. Iloyt took the oath of office and entered duty
March .1.6, 1903•

**

Mr. Davis took the oath of office and entered duty
August 30, 1913.

Source: Edward Grandison Smith, "John William Davi.iJ,
Solicitor-General of the United States," The Green 0a;%
XXV (November, 1913)> 459«

APPENDIX D

KEY OFFICIALS IN THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
DURING DAVIS'

TENURE AS SOLICITOR GENERAL

Office

Beginning

Ending

Attorney General
McReynolds, James C.
Gregory, Thomas W.

Mar. 5, 1913
Aug. 29, 1914

Aug. 29, 1914
*

Aug. 25, 1913

*

Jul. 2&, 1913

Nov. 20, 191$

Private Secretary [and
Assistant to trie
Attorney General]
Sutter, John T.
Solicitor General
Davis, John V/.
Attorney (attached to
Solicitor General's
office)
Hughes, William J.
Megaarden, Theodor
Szold, Robert

1914
1914
1915

*
1915
*

Assistant Attorney
(functioned as Davis'
private secretary)
Peddicord, C. E.

1913

Law Clerk (attached to
Solicitor General's
office)
Hinton, John R.

1911

Assistant to the
Attorney General
(Enforcement ofAnti
trust laws)
Todd, George Carroll

1913

*

272

Office

Beginning

Ending

Special Assistant to
the Attorney General
(War Work;
0*Brian, John Lord

1917

Special Assistant to
the Attorney General
(Rate Regulation;
Esterline, Blackburn

1914

Assistant Attorneys
General
Knaebel, Ernest
Adkins, Jesse C.
Thompson, S. Huston
Graham, Samuel J., Jr.
Wallace, V/illiam, Jr.
Underwood, E. Marvin
Warren, Charles
Kearful, Francis J.
Fitts, William C.
Frierson, V/illiam L.
Brown, H. LaRue
Porter, Claude R.

1911
1912
1913
1913
1913
1914
1914
1917
1917
1917
1913
191^

1917
191#
1913
*

1911
1914

1914
*

1916**
1914

*

*
*
*

Assistant Attorney General
"Customs) [Stationed in
ew York)

1

Wemple, V/illiam L
Henson, Bert
Chief, Division of
Investigation
Bielaski, A Bruce
*
**

1912

Still in office at end of Davis' tenure.
Resigned to become Reporter of Decisions for the
United States Supreme Court.

Source: United States Department of Justice, Register of
States
the Department of Justice and the Courts of the United 5t
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1913-1919.

APPENDIX E

CASES IN WHICH DAVIS EITHER ARGUED OR
APPEARED ON THE BRIEF BEFORE THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT WHILE SOLICITOR GENERAL
(Arranged by Date of Court Appearance)

Case

Status of
Davis

Results

Pipe Line Cases
234 U. S. 548
October 15-16, 1913

Argued

Won

Guinn and Deal v. U. S.
238 U. S. 347
October 17, 1913

Argued

Won

U. S. v. Mosley
23FTT. S. 3§3
October 17, 1913

Argued

Won

Little v. Williams
231 W. S. JJ3
October 30, 1913

Amicus
curiae

Graham v. U. S.
231 U. S. 7774
November 13-14, 1913

Argued

won

On brief

Won

Argued

Lost

On brief

Won

U. S« ex rel. Goldberg v.

Daniels
231 U. S.218
November 14, 1913
U. S. v. Carter
TFTU. S. 492
December I, 1913
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Rr. Co. v. U. S.
232 U. 3. 199
December 1-2, 1913
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Case
Weeks v. U. S.

Status of
Davis

Results

Argued

Lost

U. S. v. Antikamnia Co.
<Tjr~U. S.T54
December 9, 1913

Argued

Won

Chapman & Dewey Lumber Co. v.
St. Francis Levee District
232 U. S. 186
~
December 12, 1913

Amicus
curiae

U. S. v. Youn/y
252"U. S. 155
January
1914

Argued

Won

U. S. v. Dirdsall
TJfU. S.""323
January £-9, 1914
Reargued February 25, 1914

Argued

Won

U. S. v. Midwest Oil Co.
?W~U. S.T59
January 9, 12, 1914
Reargued May 7, 1914

Argued

Won

U.S. v. Beattv
23^~U. S.~4^3
January 12-13, 1914

Argued

Lost

The Los Angeles Switchinf; Case
234 U. S. 294
January 14-15, 1914

On brief

Won

Diamond Coal & Coke Co. v. U. S.
233 U. S. 236
January 2&-29, 1914

Argued

Won

Henry v. Ilenkel
23TU. S."2IT"
February 24-25, 1914

Argued

Won

U _3. v. Axman
2*34 U. S.15
March 9, 1914

Argued

Loot

232 u. s
December 2-3, 1913

275

Status of
Davis

Case

Ocamno v. U. S.

Results

Argued

Won

U. S. v. First National Bank
23HJ. S.~27T5
April 7, 1914

Argued

Lost

Itov/ and Fushimi v. U. S.
1>33 U . S . 5 « I
April 3, 1914

On brief

Won

Apapas v. U. S.

On brief

Won

On brief

Lost

On brief

Lost

Argued

V/on

Argued

Lost

On brief

Won

Argued

Won

Argued

V/on

aSTB. s. srMarch 12-13, 1914

srnrr s.~w
April g, 1914
The Tap Line Cases
234 U. S. 1
April 8-9, 1914
U. S. and ICC v. Butler County
kr. Co.
234 U . S . 29
April 13, 1914
Louisiana v. McAdoo
2 3 4 U . S . 627
April 14, 1914
Stone, Sand & Gravel Co. v. U. S,

234 u: s. 270

—

April 23, 1914
Evens & Howard Fire Brick Co. v.
B. S.
235HT7 S. 210
October 20, 1914
U. S. v. Mayor

23TTJ. s.~5r~
October 22-23, 1914
U. S. v. Reynolds
O.v. Broughton
235 U. S. 133
October 23, 1914'

2-;

Case

Status of
Davis

Results

Missouri. Kansas, & Texas Ry.
Co. v. U. S.
23T^U. S.jTT
October 23-29, 1914

Argued

Won

Shapiro v. U. S.

On brief

Won

Argued

Won

U. S. v. Erie Ry.
73T"U. S. 513
December 14, 1914

On brief

Lost

Pennsylvania Ry. Co. v. U. S.

Argued

Won

Argued

Lost

Argued

Lost

U. S. v. Emery
2TTU. S."lf5^
January 12-13, 1915

Argued

Lost

U. S. v. Hvoslef
2TTU. S."T
January 13, 1915

Argued

Lost

U. S. v. U. S. Fidelity Co.
23ETU. S."3T2
January 15, 1915

Argued

Won

McCoach v. Pratt
236 U. S. 552
January 25, 1915

On brief

Lost

235 0. S. 412

December 3-4, 1914
U.S. v. Delaware, Lackawana, &
Western Ry.
235 U. S. 516
December 9-10, 1914

236 U: SV351
December 14-15, 1914
Burdick v. U.S.
Curtinv. U. S.
236 U. S. 77"~"
December 16, 1914
U.S. v. Louisville & Nashville
I?y. Co.
236 U. S. 318
January 5-6, 1915

Case

Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co.
v. U. S.
232 UT37 1
March 1, 1915
Oregon & California Ry. v. U. S.
•430. S.W>
April 23, 26-27, 1915

Status of
Davis

Results

Argued

Won

On brief

Lost

Brushaber v. Union Pacific Ry.
(income Tax Case)
240 U. S. 1
October 14-15» 1915

Amicus
curiae

Gegiow v. Uhl
239 U. S. T~
October 14-15, 1915

Argued

Lost

U. S. v. Barnow
SITTj. S.~7H
October l£, 1915

Argued

Won

Argued

Won

U. S. v. Archer
2ETU. S. 119
December 7, -1-915

Argued

Won

Ex parte U. S.
242 U.S. 27
January 10-11, 1916

On brief

Won

Lamar v. U. S.
240 U. S.""W
January 17, 1916

Argued

Won

Five Per Cent: Discount Cases
243 tf. S. 97
February 25, 1&, 1916
Reargued February 2, 1917

Argued

Won

U. S. v. U. S. Steel Corp.

Argued

Won

U. S. v. New York & Rierbo Rico
Steamship Co.
'
239 U. S. 88
November 3 > 1915

"S^cTu. S.~T%2

March 14, 1916
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Case

Status of
Davis

Results

Lamar v. U. S.
sqnr. s.im
April 4> 1916

Argued

Won

Lane v. Mickadiet
Zi+L U. ST~Z0I
April 10, 1916

Argued

Won

Argued

Won

Submitted
motion

Won

U. S. v. Pennsylvania Ry. Co.
27^TU. S. 208 —
October 1&-19, 1916

Argued

Lost

Selling v. Radford
243 U.S. 4$
November 20, 1917

Argued

Won

New Mexico v. Lane

Argued

Won

Argued

Won

On brief

Won

On brief

Won

Cubbins v. Mississippi River
Commission

241 V. S. 'Jf? 1
April 24, 1916
U.S. v. American-Asiatic
Steamship Company

242 U. 3. 537
December 4> 1916

243 U. S. 52
January 3, 1917
Wilson v. New
243 IT. S. JJZ
January &-10, 1917
Oregon & California Ry. Cc. v.
11
yWl g • • 1
~
24rrrr's. 549
March 8 - 9 , 1917
Lehigh Valley Ry. Co. v. U. S.

243 0. S. 412
March 15, 1917
U. S. v. United Shoe Machinery Co. On brief
27TTU. S.~32

March 16, .1.9-21, 1917
Reargued January 11, 14-15>
1918

Loat

27(

Case

Status of
Davis

Results

Manufacturers Ry. Co. v. U. S.
246 U. S. 457
March 21-22, 1917

On brief

First National Bank v. Union
Trust Co"!
244 u. s. 416
March 22-23, 1917

Amicus
curiae

Mason v. U. S.
244 U. S.~~35Z
April 11, 1917

Argued

Won

U. S. v. Wildcat
27PTU. s.~m ~
April 11-12, 1917

On brief

IjOot

Ewing v. Fowler Car Co.

Argued

Won

Valdez v. U. S.
244 U. S.
April 23-24, 1917

Argued

Won

U. S. v. Chase

Argued

Won

Argued

Won

On brief

Won

Ex parte Park and Tilford
245 U. S. 82
October 15-16, 1917

On brief

Won

U. S. v. Ness
^5~u. s.~3T9
November 5, 1917

Argued

Won

Tempel v. U. S.
248 U. S. TZT~
November 5, 1917

Argued

Lost

Won

272TU. s."T
April 17, 1917

sznru. sr®r~

October 2, 1917
Lee Wilson & Co. v. U. S.
245 U. S. 24
October 4-5, 1917
Illinois Central Ry. v. Public
Utilities CommT
October 8-9, 1917

230

Case

Status of
Davis

Results

Arant v. Lane
24TTT. S.THT
November 13-14> 1917

On brief

V/on

Tovme v. ICisner
^TTTIT. S. US' "
December 12, 1917

Argued

Lost

Selective Draft Lav; Cases
245 tT. S. 3"66
December 13-14> 1917

Argued

V/on

Jones v. Perkins
245 U. S.""790
December 13-14» 1917

Argued

Won

Goldman v. U. S.
245 U. S. 47£
December 13-14» 1917

Argued

V/on

Kramer v. U. 3.
245 U. S. 475
December 13-14» 1917

Argued

Won

Ituthenberg v. U. 3.
245 U. 5 . 1 , 8 0
December 13-14» 1917

Argued

Won

Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co.

Argued

Lost

Argued

V/on

Ilays v. Gauley Mt. Coal Co.
STTU. S. 159
March 4-6, 1918

Argued

V/on

Lynch v. Hornby
27TTTT. 3. 339
March 4-6, J.918

Argued

Won

Lynch v. Turrioh
strir.
—
March 4-6, 191#

Argued

r,oi)t

2?ru. s. "±'97
March 4-6, 191#
Goldfield Consolidated Mines v.
Scott
247 U. S. 126
March 4-6, 191&1

Case

Status of
Davis

Results

Peabodv v. Eisner
247 U. S. 337
March 4-6, 191S

Argued

Won

Southern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Lowe
247 U. S. 330
March 4-6, 191S

Argued

Lost

U. S. v. Biwabik Mining Co.
27TTU. S.TC5
March 3-6, 1918

Argued

Won

Argued

Lost

Hammer v. Dagenhart
247 U. S. 25*r~
April 15-16, 191S

Argued

Lost

Cox v. Wood
2777 U. 373
April 17-18, 191S

Argued

Won

U.S. v. Cleveland, Cincinnati,
STSt. Louis Ry.
247 U. S.195
March 4-6, ±9'L$

APPENDIX F
OUTLINE OF THE BRIEF OF THE
UNITED STATES IN HAMMER V. DAGENHART
I.
II.

The act is both in terms and in fact a regulation of
interstate and foreign commerce
The situation confronting Congress and the evils to be
remedied
1.

Child labor, once regarded as harmless or beneficial,
had come to be regarded as immoral and injurious

2.

Regulations in the States were not uniform

3. The result was an unfair discrimination in inter
state commerce

III.

4.

Citizens in the States in which child-labor products
were introduced through interstate commerce were
made unwilling parties to practices deemed immoral

5.

The health of children in competing States was
injuriously affected by the interstate transpor
tation of child-made goods

The act does not contravene the Fifth Amendment
1.

The due process clause in the Fifth Amendment
limits Congress precisely as the same clause in
the Fourteenth Amendment limits the State

2.

The lav/ is a legitimate exercise of legislative
power for the protection of the public health
(a) The act is reasonably calculated to protect
the health of children in states competing
with the point of origin
(b) The act protects the health of children in
the producing State
(c) That the articles excluded are themselves
innocuous is immaterial

233

IV.

3.

A seller's liberty is not unduly restrained by
protecting a purchaser from becoming an unwilling
party to an immoral sale

4.

There is no right to use the channels of interstate
commerce for unfair competition

5.

The extension of the prohibition to all products
of the factory in which the child labors is a
reasonable provision for the due enforcement of the
act

Assuming that the act does not contravene the Fifth
Amendment, there is no other clause of the Constitution
to which it is obnoxious
1.

The Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the Constitution
are not violated

2.

The argument that only the "consumer" can be pro
tected is without merit

3.

Congress was attempting to regulate commerce in
good faith and non to do indirectly what it could
not do directly

4. Suggestions of political inexpediency are irrelevant

Source: Brief for the United States, Hammer v. Dagenhart
(Washington: Government Printing Office, iPXLtf), pp. T-ltl.
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ABSTRACT
John W. Davis (1&73-1955) was the fifteenth Solicitor
General of the United States and is considered by many
commentators to be one of the most out / anding individuals
to fill the position.

This paper examines Davis' contri

butions to the VJilson Administration as the federal
government's chief courtroom attorney, as an administrator
and as a politician.
Davis, a native of Clarksburg, West Virginia, re
ceived a Bachelor of Arts degree from Washington and Lee
University in ±892 and a lav/ degree from the same insti
tution in i$95•

After spending one year as an instructor

in the lav; school at Washington and Leo, Davis entered
into a law partnership with his father in Clarksburg.
This partnership continued until Davis was elected to
Congress from the First Congressional District of West
Virginia in 1910.
During his first term in the Mouse of Representatives,
Davis was selected for membership on the House Judiciary
Committee.

His work on this committee gained him favor

able attention from both Republicans and Democrats.

He

was re-elected to Congress in 1912 and in 1913 he attempted
to obtain an appointment to the United States Circuit Court
of Appeals. He was not successful in this attempt but

shortly thereafter the President appointed Davis, at the
suggestion of Attorney General James McReynolds, Solicitor
General of the United States.
The most important function of the Solicitor General
is the presentation of the government's cases before the
Supreme Court.

During Davis' tenure in the office, how

ever, both statutory provisions and informal delegation
of powers by the Attorney General resulted in a number
of other important duties.

For example, by the provisions

of the original act of 1SV70 establishing the Office of
Solicitor General, Davis was Acting Attorney General in
the absence of the Attorney General.
While Davis was Solicitor General, the United States
Supreme Court disposed of almost 700 cases in which the
United States was either a party or in which the govern
ment had a substantial interest.

Of these cases, Davis

argued approximately 70 and appeared on the brief in 21
others.

Of the cases Davis argued before the Court, eight

are discussed in detail in this paper:

Guinn v. United

States, 23$ U. S. 347 (1915); The Pipe Line Cases, 234
U. S. 54# (1914); United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236
U. S. 459 (1915); International Harvester Co. v. United
States, 248 U. S. 5$7 (1919); Brushaber v. Union Pacific
Railway Co., 240 U. S. 1 (1916); Wilson v. New, 243 U. 3.
332 (1917); The Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. 3. 366
(1917); and Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. 3. 251 (191^).

239

After the United States entered World War I, Davis
played an important role in various questions concerning
civil liberties and the prosecution of the war. He was
also active in the writing of various pieces of war-time
legislation.
Near the end of the war, Davis was appointed byPresident Wilson as the United States representative to
a conference in Berne, Switzerland concerning the care and
treatment of prisoners of war.

He retained his position

as Solicitor General while at the Berne Conference, but
resigned when he was appointed by President Wilson in
November, 191S, as the United States Ambassador to Great
Britain. He resigned from the Office of Solicitor General
on November 20, 191$, thus ending his career as a Solicitor
General whose performance before the Court set a standard
of quality that is yet to be surpassed.
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